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CHAPTER 1
Prologue
1.1 Preface
A genuine leader is not a searcher for
consensus but a molder of consensus.
Martin Luther King Jr.
From social to mathematical sciences, passing by computer, economical and biological
sciences, collective decision making is a problem setting that has been addressed systemat-
ically by the research community, covering a varied spectrum of scientific disciplines. When
a decision among several candidates concerns a large number of people, it is desirable to
choose the option that best benefits the group as a whole. This well-being of the entire
group is usually referred to as social welfare. As this social welfare is hardly measurable,
a voting procedure is commonly invoked to determine the best option to be taken. This
best option may either be a single candidate, a set of candidates or a ranking (with ties)
of the different candidates. In this dissertation, we mainly focus on the search for the best
option of the latter type.
The choice of this best ranking of the candidates is a difficult problem in itself, let aside
the fact that the voting procedure may easily be manipulated by strategic votes of some
dishonest voters. In general, there is no absolute truth and we can say that no method
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is truly best. In fact, as Arrow stated in his well-known impossibility theorem, among
all methods based on the search for the best ranking of the candidates, only dictatorship
satisfies the following two natural properties at the same time:
• If a candidate is preferred to another candidate by all the voters, then it should be
preferred to this other candidate in the best ranking.
• The relative position of two candidates in the best ranking should not depend on the
other candidates.
The consequences of Arrow’s impossibility theorem are despairing. Even worse, it is known
that all prominent methods may yield different winners given the same set of votes. One
then wonders if the best ranking is just the truly best in case all the power of decision is
given to an individual. Should we forget about democracy and surrender to an all powerful
leader? No, we just need to accept that a truly best candidate might not exist, that the
only truth is that we may need to compromise. The notion of consensus turns then out
to be a crucial concept that leads to the study of conditions under which the existence of
a truly best candidate can be assured. In this dissertation, we analyse different types of
consensus (states) and, turning a deaf ear to Martin Luther King Jr. and his introductory
quote to this chapter, we search for consensus in order to identify the best ranking of the
candidates. All these notions of consensus are centred on the property of monotonicity,
which is a common desired property in mathematical modelling exercises.
The property of monotonicity is an old acquaintance for scholars of social choice theory that
can easily be traced back to the early 1970s. This concept of monotonicity is different from
the one considered throughout this dissertation. Monotonicity, understood in this classical
sense, means that a candidate remains being the winning candidate in case he/she is raised
on some of the voters’ rankings. Although the consequences of the absence of this property
may seem paradoxical, several existing methods do not fulfill monotonicity. Indeed, social
choice theory is a field full of paradoxes. Among all the existing paradoxes of voting,
the one pointed out by Condorcet has managed to become known as ‘the’ voting paradox.
This relevant paradox states that the transitivity of the voters’ rankings does not imply the
transitivity of the majority rule (a candidate is said to defeat another candidate by simple
majority if the number of voters who prefer the first candidate to the second candidate is
greater than the number of voters who prefer the second candidate to the first candidate).
However, this majority rule disregards a considerable part of the information provided by
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the voters. The transitivity of the voters’ rankings is surprisingly ignored. Monotonicity,
now understood in the sense of this dissertation, will be again proved to be a key property
for social choice, this time by helping to avoid the inconvenient voting paradox.
1.2 Objectives
Motivated by the numerous potential applications in many fields of interest such as ecosys-
tem management, sustainability assessment and consumer preference analysis, this research
studies many aspects concerning the theory of social choice. Mainly, this dissertation fo-
cuses on the following objectives:
• In real-life problems, where voters rarely unanimously agree, the analysis of condi-
tions under which a consensus can be easily reached becomes of utmost importance.
In particular, we delve into the role of the monotonicity property in the definition of
natural consensus states, leading to an obvious consensus decision.
• Mainly due to the confrontation of several groups with opposing opinions or to the
usual presence of noise in real-life data, these newly-introduced monotonicity-based
consensus states may still not hold. The proposal of a methodology for facilitating the
decision making based on the search for these monotonicity-based consensus states
is the ultimate goal of this research.
1.3 Outline of this dissertation
The rest of this dissertation is divided in four clearly differentiated parts.
Part I consists of one chapter (Chapter 2) and is devoted to an exhaustive study of the most
prominent ranking rules in the theory of social choice. A knowledgeable reader, aware of
the current state of the art of the field, could skip this first part and go directly to Part II.
In Part II, which consists of seven chapters, we explain in detail all the theoretical devel-
opment addressed during this PhD research. The first chapter (Chapter 3) of this part
is devoted to the (mono)metric rationalisation of ranking rules, a branch of social choice
4 1.3 OUTLINE OF THIS DISSERTATION
theory that amounts to explaining ranking rules by the minimisation of the distance to
a consensus state for some appropriate (mono)metric. In Chapter 4, we analyse four dif-
ferent representations of votes used in the field of social choice theory. The property of
monotonicity of these representations of votes is studied in Chapter 5, leading to the intro-
duction of natural consensus states for the (mono)metric rationalisation of ranking rules.
The search for these consensus states is formulated as an optimization problem in Chap-
ter 6. In Chapter 7, we discuss some properties of the ranking rules based on the search
for a monotonicity-based consensus state and we prove that all proposed ranking rules are
independent with respect to each other. The more general setting where voters express
a ranking with ties instead of a ranking is analysed in Chapter 8. In the last chapter
(Chapter 9) of this part, we restrict our attention to the setting where the goal is to choose
the best candidate rather than the best ranking.
In Part III, we show some examples of application of this research to real-life problems.
We highlight three particular problems: an ecosystem management problem in the Lar
rangeland in Iran; an environmental decision making problem in the Argentinian province
of Corrientes; and a consumer preference analysis problem at the Laboratory of Food
Microbiology and Food Preservation at Ghent University, Belgium. All is here applied.
Finally, we end this dissertation with the closing Part IV, where a discussion on some
conclusions and open problems of this research is addressed.
PART I
THE STATE OF THE ART

CHAPTER 2
Introduction to social choice theory
In this chapter, we introduce the concepts of social choice theory that are necessary for a
correct understanding of this dissertation, together with a brief review of the most promi-
nent ranking rules. A reader aware of the current state of the art in the theory of social
choice may direct to Section 2.3 for an explanation of the ranking rule that was the starting
point of this dissertation.
2.1 Social choice theory
Social choice theory concerns the study of the conclusions that can be drawn from the
preferences expressed by several voters over a set of candidates. Throughout this disser-
tation, we consider the problem of ranking candidates, meaning we are dealing with the
social choice subdiscipline of ranking rules. The simplest and oldest ranking rule is the
plurality rule [153], which can be traced back to times of the Ancient Greece. This ranking
rule simply ranks candidates according to the number of voters who considered them as
their preferred choice. Although it is a really simple and naive proposal, it is still the most
frequently used ranking rule, for example, in national elections. Many ranking rules have
been proposed since the eighteenth century, when the works of Rousseau [139], Borda [18]
and Condorcet [35] laid the foundations of social choice theory. Already in the twentieth
century, the contributions of Arrow [3] and Fishburn [57, 58, 59] were fundamental in the
settling of social choice theory as a relevant research field. In the last fifty years, researchers
have focused on the analysis of strategies and strategy-proof ranking rules [68, 78, 79, 146].
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Several researchers, concerned about how, in some extreme cases, every ranking can be
elected winner when considering an appropriate ranking rule, called attention to the fact
that the choice of ranking rule is linked to a notion of consensus (or consensus state). In
this direction, Nitzan [106], Lerer and Nitzan [88] and Campbell and Nitzan [27] charac-
terized social choice rules (where, instead of a ranking, the winner is a subset of the set
of candidates) by means of a consensus state and a distance function. This characteri-
zation is known as metric rationalisation of social choice rules. In general, a profile of
rankings is said to be in a consensus state when determining a winning ranking is obvious.
A trivial consensus state is that of unanimity [80], where each voter expresses the exact
same ranking on the set of candidates. Another slightly more involved one is that of the
existence of a Condorcet ranking [35]. Meskanen and Nurmi [99] demonstrated that most
ranking rules can be characterized as minimizing the distance to a consensus state for
some appropriate distance function. A well-known method of this type is the method of
Kemeny [80], where the Kendall distance function [82] between rankings and the consen-
sus state of unanimity are considered. Other relevant proposals are due to Bogart [16, 17]
or Cook and Seiford [37, 38], where different distance functions are considered; or due
to Meskanen and Nurmi [99, 109], Rademaker and De Baets [133] or Pe´rez-Ferna´ndez et
al. [116, 121, 122, 124, 125], where different consensus states are considered.
There exist many ranking rules in social choice theory and, in some extreme cases, every
ranking can be elected winner considering an appropriate ranking rule. Unfortunately, the
choice of a best ranking rule is not an absolute truth as Arrow proved in his applauded work
“A difficulty in the concept of social welfare” [3]. Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that
there is no ranking rule satisfying, at the same time, three properties that can be considered
natural or desirable: non-dictatorship (there is no voter whose ranking always is elected
the winning ranking), unanimity (if a candidate is preferred to another candidate by all the
voters it should be ranked at a better position than this candidate in the winning ranking)
and independence of irrelevant alternatives (the order of two candidates in the winning
ranking does not depend on the rest of candidates). Arrow’s impossibility theorem leads
to the conclusion that the choice of an ‘appropriate’ ranking rule depends on the nature
of the problem and that, unfortunately, a truly best choice does not always exist.
In social choice theory, two different settings are normally considered when choosing a
winner. On the one hand, when the goal is to look for the winning candidate(s), one talks
about a social choice rule. On the other hand, when the goal is to look for the winning
ranking, one talks about a ranking rule. When the distinction between a social choice
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rule and a ranking rule does not matter, one talks about a voting rule. Note that a social
choice rule can be seen as a special case of ranking rule where all candidates following the
first-ranked one are not taken into account. Due to the nature of this dissertation, which
is centered on ranking rules and not on social choice rules, we present here an overview of
the most important ranking rules1 in social choice theory. A more exptensive review on
voting rules can be found in [6, 14].
2.2 Best-known ranking rules in social choice theory
Throughout this dissertation, we denote by C = {a1, . . . , ak} the considered set of k
candidates. Each of r voters expresses his/her preferences on the set of candidates in the
form of a strict linear order relation or ranking j on C , i.e., the asymmetric part of a
total order relation j on C . This list of r rankings is called a profile of rankings and is
denoted by R = (j)rj=1. The set of all rankings on C is denoted by L(C ). The position
of a candidate a ∈ C in a ranking  is called the position or rank of the candidate a and
is denoted by P(a) (for short, Pj(a) is directly denoted by Pj(a)).
2.2.1 Plurality (first-past-the-post)
The simplest and most ancient ranking rule in social choice theory is plurality [153], which
is proved to be used at the latest in one of the city states of the Ancient Greece: Sparta.
When taking into account this ranking rule, candidates are ranked according to the number
of voters that considered this candidate to be their preferred option. Although it is a really
simple and naive proposal, it is still the most frequently used ranking rule, for example, in
national elections.
Plurality leads to a ranking rule where only the main choice of each voter is taken into
account and voters are not asked to provide a ranking on the set of candidates. This is one
of the reasons why, although it does not accurately represent the preferences of the voters,
it is still the most used ranking rule in national elections.
1Some of these ranking rules provide a ranking with ties instead of a ranking on the set of candidates.
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Example 2.1 Let us consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile R =
(i)14i=1 of fourteen rankings given by the voters shown in Table 2.1.
# i Ranking on C
6 c  b  a  d
5 a  d  b  c
3 b  a  d  c
Table 2.1: Profile of rankings on C given by fourteen voters.
First-place votes are the only votes taken into account when considering the plurality rank-
ing rule. Candidate c is the first choice six times, candidate a is the first choice five times,
candidate b is the first choice three times and candidate d is not the first choice for any of
the voters. Therefore, considering the plurality ranking rule, the winning ranking is:
c  a  b  d .
Unfortunately, plurality is really sensitive to manipulation, as can be understood by reading
the following extract of a paper by Tideman where he discusses how he manipulated a
treasurer election [157]: “When I was 12 years old I was nominated to be treasurer of my
class at school. A girl named Michelle was also nominated. I relished the prospect of being
treasurer, so I made a quick calculation and nominated Michelle’s best friend, Charlotte.
In the ensuing election I received 13 votes, Michelle received 12, and Charlotte received
11, so I became treasurer”.
2.2.2 Borda count
In 1770, Jean-Charles de Borda [18] proposed to the French Academy of Sciences his ideas
for reforming the election procedures in the academy itself [170]. He called attention to the
fact that the plurality rule can easily elect a candidate that is supported by only a small
minority of the electorate and suggested that each voter should provide his/her preferences
in the form of a ranking on the set of candidates. In that way, each candidate is rewarded a
point every time that another candidate is ranked at a worse position than him/her in the
profile of rankings given by the voters. Candidates are then sorted based on the number
of points obtained.
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Although his method only lasted about two decades as the academy official election proce-
dure, the Borda count undoubtedly is one of the best-known ranking rules in social choice
theory [96]. For more details concerning the history of the Borda count and preceding
similar procedures, we refer to [50].
Example 2.2 Let us consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile R =
(i)14i=1 of fourteen rankings given by the voters shown in Table 2.1.
Considering the Borda count, the respective score for each candidate is:
B(a) = 5 · 3 + 3 · 2 + 6 · 1 + 0 · 0 = 27 ,
B(b) = 3 · 3 + 6 · 2 + 5 · 1 + 0 · 0 = 26 ,
B(c) = 6 · 3 + 0 · 2 + 0 · 1 + 8 · 0 = 18 ,
B(d) = 0 · 3 + 5 · 2 + 3 · 1 + 6 · 0 = 13 .
A winning ranking on the set of candidates is defined by sorting the candidates according
to their respective score. Therefore, considering the Borda count, the winning ranking is:
a  b  c  d .
The Borda count also is really sensitive to manipulation. In fact, it was already criticized
in the eighteenth century by one of Borda’s contemporaries: Marquis de Condorcet. When
confronted with this criticism, Borda was merely moved to comment: “My scheme is only
intended for honorable men” [140].
2.2.3 Scoring ranking rules
Scoring ranking rules2 [32, 57, 67, 102, 104, 169] constitute a large family of ranking
rules based on positional information, with as most prominent examples plurality [153],
the Borda count [18], veto [7, 141] (also known as anti-plurality) and best-worst voting
systems [66]. A scoring ranking rule assigns a score to each of the k candidates based on
the positions at which the candidate is ranked by each voter. Each scoring ranking rule
2In case we are considering social choice rules instead of ranking rules, scoring ranking rules are just
referred to as ‘scoring rules’.
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has an associated vector of scores3 (α`)
k
`=1, where α` ≥ α`+1 ≥ 0 for any ` ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1}
and α1 > αk. For instance, the vector of scores corresponding to plurality is α1 = 1 and,
for any ` ∈ {2, . . . , k}, α` = 0; the vector of scores corresponding to the Borda count is
α` = k− `, for any ` ∈ {1, . . . , k}; the vector of scores corresponding to veto is αk = 0 and,
for any ` ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, α` = 1; the vector of scores corresponding to best-worst voting
systems is α1 = 1, αk = 0 and, for any ` ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}, α` = α ∈ ]0, 1[.
Every candidate is assigned a score of α` every time that he/she is ranked at the `-th
position in one of the rankings in the profile. The total score s(ai) of each candidate
ai ∈ C , usually obtained as the sum of the received scores, can be used to define a weak
order relation4 on the set of candidates by sorting these total scores in decreasing order.
The asymmetric part of a weak order relation is referred to as a ranking with ties. As a
scoring ranking rule may define a ranking with ties, the notion of linear extension (also
known as refinement) of a ranking with ties must be introduced. A ranking  linearly
extends (is a linear extension of) a ranking with ties ′ if ′⊆.
A relevant subfamily of scoring ranking rules, known as t-approval5 scoring ranking ru-
les [93], contains all scoring ranking rules where the first t ∈ {1, . . . , k−1} scores α1, . . . , αt
are equal to one and the last k− t scores αt+1, . . . , αk are equal to zero. t-approval scoring
ranking rules allow voters to divide the set of candidates in two subsets: the t candidates
that they approve and the k − t candidates that they refuse. Note that plurality and veto
belong to the family of t-approval scoring ranking rules, but the Borda count does not
belong to this family.
Another relevant subfamily of scoring ranking rules, known as convex scoring ranking
rules [154], contains all scoring ranking rules such that α` − α`+1 ≥ α`+1 − α`+2 for any
` ∈ {1, . . . , k− 2}. Convex scoring ranking rules reward first place votes over second place
votes more than second place votes over third place votes; second place votes over third
place votes more than third place votes over fourth place votes; etc. Note that plurality
and the Borda count are convex scoring ranking rules, but veto (and any t-approval scoring
ranking rule different from plurality) is not a convex scoring ranking rule.
3This vector of scores is unique up to a positive multiplicative constant.
4A weak order relation is a complete and transitive relation.
5Not to be confused with approval voting [20] where voters are able to freely choose the number of
candidates that they approve.
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Example 2.3 Let us consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile R =
(i)14i=1 of fourteen rankings (with ties) given by the voters shown in Table 2.2.
# i Ranking on C
6 a ∼ b ∼ c  d
5 a ∼ b ∼ d  c
3 a ∼ c ∼ d  b
Table 2.2: Profile of rankings (with ties) on C given by fourteen voters.
Note that, in the given profile of rankings (with ties), six voters have vetoed (ranked last)
candidate d, five voters have vetoed candidate c and three voters have vetoed candidate b.
Considering the veto ranking rule ((k−1)-approval), the respective score for each candidate
is:
s(a) = 14− 0 = 14 ,
s(b) = 14− 3 = 11 ,
s(c) = 14− 5 = 9 ,
s(d) = 14− 6 = 8 .
A winning ranking on the set of candidates is defined by sorting the candidates according
to their respective score. Therefore, considering the veto ranking rule, the winning ranking
is:
a  b  c  d .
2.2.4 Majority
The simple majority rule [54, 76, 95, 149] is one of the most widespread and studied
concepts in social choice theory. A candidate is said to defeat another candidate by simple
majority if the number of voters who prefer the first candidate to the second candidate is
greater than the number of voters who prefer the second candidate to the first candidate.
The simple majority rule has been proved [95] to be the unique solid and meaningful voting
rule when we are restricted to a set of two candidates6.
6May [95] proved that majority is the only social choice rule that is decisive (it leads to a unique choice
for an odd number of votes), egalitarian (it is anonymous), neutral (it does not favour any alternative)
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A closely related concept is that of the absolute majority, where a candidate is said to
defeat another candidate by absolute majority if the number of voters who prefer the first
candidate to the second candidate is greater than half of the number of voters. As in the
setting of this dissertation each voter provides his/her preferences in the form of a ranking
on the set of candidates, both simple and absolute majority coincide.
The strongest type of majority is that of the unanimous majority. A candidate is said to
defeat another candidate by unanimous majority if every voter prefers the first candidate to
the second candidate. Nevertheless, unanimous majority obviously is too strong a condition
that almost never holds in an election.
Another type of majority that lies in between the notions of absolute majority and unan-
imous majority are qualified majorities [51]. Qualified majorities require the number of
voters who prefer the first candidate to the second candidate to be greater than or equal to
a certain quota α r (where r equals the number of voters and α ∈ [0.5, 1]), fixed before the
election. Note that α = 0.5 corresponds to weak absolute majority and α = 1 corresponds
to unanimous majority. In the eighteenth century, Rousseau [139] already encouraged
the use of qualified majorities for important decisions: “The more the deliberations are
important and serious, the more the opinion that carries should approach unanimity.”
In the same way that qualified majorities lie in between absolute majority and unanimous
majority, there exists another type of majorities (majorities based on differences of votes)
that lie in between simple majority and unanimous majority. Qualified majorities and
majorities based on differences of votes become equivalent in the setting of this disserta-
tion, where each voter provides his/her preferences in the form of a ranking on the set of
candidates. For more details on all these types of majorities, we refer to [112].
Unfortunately, all these majority rules (except unanimous majority) might lead to the
well-known voting paradox [35] (also known as Condorcet’s paradox), where a candidate
defeats a second candidate, this second candidate defeats a third different candidate, which,
at the same time, defeats the first candidate. Furthermore, the given relation on the set of
candidates might not be complete. Therefore, majority rules are not considered ranking
rules.
and positively responsive (if a candidate is the winner of the election, then it should still be the winner if
a single voter changes its preference in a way favourable to this candidate) for a set of two candidates.
CHAPTER 2 INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 15
Example 2.4 Let us consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile R =
(i)14i=1 of fourteen rankings given by the voters shown in Table 2.1. Candidate b is preferred
to candidates a, c and d by more than half of the number of voters. At the same time,
candidate a is preferred to candidates c and d by more than half of the number of voters
and candidate d is preferred to candidate c by more than half of the number of voters.
Therefore, considering the simple majority rule, the winning ranking is:
b  a  d  c .
Unfortunately, the simple majority rule does not always lead to a ranking on the set of
candidates. Consider that, instead of the profile of rankings in Table 2.1, the profile of
rankings listed in Table 2.3 is provided.
# i Ranking on C
6 c  b  a  d
5 a  d  c  b
3 b  a  d  c
Table 2.3: Profile of rankings on C given by fourteen voters.
Candidate a is preferred to candidate c by more than half of the number of voters, candidate
c is preferred to candidate b by more than half of the number of voters but, at the same
time, candidate b is preferred to candidate a by more than half of the number of voters.
This inconvenience is referred to as the voting paradox. Therefore, the simple majority rule
defines no ranking on the set of candidate for the profile of rankings given in Table 2.3.
For improving the performance of the simple majority rule, several authors have encouraged
the use of degrees of preferences in social choice theory [64, 123, 131]; quoting a well-known
phrase by Sen [150], “... the method of majority decision takes no account of intensities of
preference, and it is certainly arguable that what matters is not merely the number who
prefer x to y and the number who prefer y to x, but also by how much each prefers one
alternative to the other”.
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2.2.5 Condorcet
In 1785, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, mostly known as Marquis de Condorcet,
followed the direction started by Rousseau in his remarkable work ‘Du Contrat Social’ [139]
where he discusses about the ‘general will’: “When a law is proposed in the people’s
assembly, what is asked of them is not precisely whether they approve of the proposition
or reject it, but whether it is in conformity with the general will [...]”. In that way,
Condorcet [35] stated that it is not a compromise ranking what is searched, but an unknown
truth that remains hidden due to the fact that “voters sometimes make mistakes in their
judgements”. In order to identify this unknown truth, Condorcet proposed a probabilistic
model [170] for finding the ranking that is the “most likely to be best”.
In this same direction, Arrow [4] stated a couple of centuries later the following: “[...]
each individual has two orderings, one which governs him in his everyday actions, and one
which would be relevant under some ideal conditions and which is in some sense truer than
the first ordering. It is the latter which is considered relevant to social choice, and it is
assumed that there is complete unanimity with regard to the truer individual ordering”.
Nevertheless, Condorcet’s most important contribution to social choice theory is the notion
nowadays known as the Condorcet winner. He stated that if a candidate is preferred by
more than half of the voters to all the other candidates, then it is presumptively the best
and must be elected the winning candidate7. This candidate is commonly known as the
Condorcet winner. Analogously, a candidate such that every other candidate is preferred
to him/her by more than half of the voters is known as the Condorcet loser. Another term
related to Condorcet is that of the Condorcet ranking, which is a ranking such that every
candidate is preferred by more than half of the voters to all the candidates ranked at a
worse position than him/her.
One may note that a Condorcet winner/loser/ranking might not exist, but the uniqueness
(in case of existence) is always assured. When both a Condorcet winner (resp. loser)
and a Condorcet ranking exist, the first (resp. last) candidate of the Condorcet ranking
and the Condorcet winner (resp. loser) coincide. Any ranking (resp. social choice) rule
7Some authors consider that a Condorcet winner is one that satisfies that, the support of this candidate
over any other candidate is greater than the support of this other candidate over him/her. Note that both
definitions are equivalent in the setting considered in this dissertation where each voter expresses his/her
preferences in the form of a ranking on the set of candidates.
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always electing a Condorcet ranking (resp. winner), if it exists, as the winning ranking
(resp. candidate) is called a Condorcet ranking rule (resp. Condorcet method). A well-
known Condorcet method is the social choice rule introduced by Black [14], where, if there
is a Condorcet winner, then he/she should be chosen the winner and, otherwise, the Borda
winner should be considered.
A weaker definition of the Condorcet winner/loser/ranking can be found in the literature
when instead of ‘being preferred by more than half of the voters’ one requires ‘being
preferred by at least half of the voters’. In such a case, one talks about a weak Condorcet
winner/loser/ranking. The Condorcet winner/loser/ranking always is a weak Condorcet
winner/loser/ranking, but the converse is only true when the number of voters is odd.
Both the existence and the uniqueness of a weak Condorcet winner/loser/ranking are not
assured.
The fact that a Condorcet winner/ranking might not exist has led to the introduction of
many different ranking rules where the winning candidate/ranking is the one that is the
closest to being a Condorcet winner/ranking. Several ways of measuring such closeness have
been proposed. Here, we restrict our attention to the two most prominent ones: Dodgson’s
method [46] and Condorcet’s least-reversal method [99]. The former one addresses the
search for the closest Condorcet winner by means of the Kendall distance function between
rankings [82]. The latter one addresses the search for the closest Condorcet winner by
counting the minimum number of reversals in the voting matrix. For more details, we refer
to [99].
Example 2.5 Let us consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile R =
(i)14i=1 of fourteen rankings given by the voters shown in Table 2.1.
Every profile of rankings is represented by a voting matrix (from now on referred to as
the votrix)8 V . This votrix is formed by the pairwise comparisons between each couple of
candidates. In that way, Vij denotes the number of voters that prefer the i-th candidate to
the j-th candidate (by convention, all diagonal elements are equal to zero).
V =

0 5 8 14
9 0 8 9
6 6 0 6
0 5 8 0
 .
8Later on in this dissertation, we will provide a more formal definition of the votrix.
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Candidate b is preferred to all the other candidates by more than half of the voters: nine
voters prefer candidate b to candidate a, eight voters prefer candidate b to candidate c
and nine voters prefer candidate b to candidate d. Therefore, candidate b is the Condorcet
winner. In addition, candidate a is preferred to candidate c by eight voters and to candidate
d by fourteen voters and candidate d is preferred to candidate c by eight voters. We conclude
that candidate c is the Condorcet loser and that the Condorcet ranking is:
b  a  d  c .
However, the existence of the Condorcet ranking is not assured for every profile of rankings.
In the following, we will consider the profile of rankings given in Table 2.4 in order to
illustrate the method of Dodgson [46].
# i Ranking on C
6 a  b  c  d
5 b  c  a  d
3 c  d  a  b
Table 2.4: Profile of rankings on C given by fourteen voters.
The votrix V corresponding to this profile of rankings is:
V =

0 9 6 11
5 0 11 11
8 3 0 14
3 3 0 0
 .
There is no Condorcet winner (and therefore no Condorcet ranking) because candidate a
is preferred to candidate b by more than half of the voters (nine), candidate b is preferred
to candidate c by more than half of the voters (eleven) and candidate c is preferred to
candidate a by more than half of the voters (eight).
Note that we can reverse the preference of two voters w.r.t. candidates a and c and obtain
the profile of rankings in Table 2.5.
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# i Ranking on C
6 a  b  c  d
3 b  c  a  d
3 c  d  a  b
2 b  a  c  d
Table 2.5: Profile of rankings on C given by fourteen voters.
The votrix V ′ corresponding to this profile of rankings is:
V ′ =

0 9 8 11
5 0 11 11
6 3 0 14
3 3 0 0

Now, the Condorcet winner, a, and the Condorcet ranking, a  b  c  d, exist. In Ta-
ble 2.6, the number of reversals needed to turn each possible ranking on C into a Condorcet
ranking is shown.
Ranking Rev. Ranking Rev. Ranking Rev. Ranking Rev.
a  b  c  d 2 b  a  c  d 5 c  a  b  d 5 d  a  b  c 20
a  b  d  c 10 b  a  d  c 13 c  a  d  b 10 d  a  c  b 25
a  c  b  d 7 b  c  a  d 3 c  b  a  d 8 d  b  a  c 23
a  c  d  b 12 b  c  d  a 8 c  b  d  a 13 d  b  c  a 21
a  d  b  c 15 b  d  a  c 18 c  d  a  b 15 d  c  a  b 23
a  d  c  b 20 b  d  c  a 16 c  d  b  a 18 d  c  b  a 26
Table 2.6: Number of reversals needed to make each ranking the Condorcet
ranking.
Therefore, considering the method of Dodgson, the winning candidate is a. Extending the
method of Dodgson to the search for the Condorcet ranking we obtain the following winning
ranking:
a  b  c  d .
The work of Condorcet [35] undoubtedly is one of the most important contributions to
social choice theory. Condorcet’s proposal has suffered criticism among the research com-
munity, especially due to the fact that it is easy to find profiles of rankings for which
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the Condorcet winner is a more than questionable winner [120]. As an example of such
received criticism, we refer to a brief reflection by Saari [142]: “the combination of the
pairwise vote with the Condorcet terms loses the crucial fact that voters have transitive
preferences. [...] An equally surprising assertion is that rather than being the standard,
the Condorcet winner must be held suspect”.
2.2.6 Kemeny (Kemeny-Young)
The method of Kemeny [80] is a ranking rule where the winning ranking is the one that
minimizes the sum of the Kendall distances [82] to the given profile of rankings. The
Kendall distance function between two rankings 1 and 2 is defined as:
K(1,2) = #{(a, b) ∈ C 2 | a 6= b ∧ a 1 b ∧ b 2 a} .
Intuitively, the winning ranking according to the method of Kemeny is the one that can
become unanimous in the profile of rankings with the least number of reversals.
Under the assumption that: (i) each voter will choose the best candidate with some fixed
probability p, where 0.5 < p < 1 and p is the same for all voters; (ii) every voter’s judgement
on every pair of candidates is independent on every other pair; (iii) each voter’s judgement
is independent of the other voters’ judgements; Young [171] proved that the ranking that
has the maximum likelihood coincides with the winning ranking according to the method
of Kemeny. Due to this result, the method of Kemeny is also known as the maximum
likelihood method.
A common criticism against the method of Kemeny concerns the fact that it is NP-hard
to compute its winning ranking [9]. Some researchers have focused on the search for
approximate methods that can be executed in polynomial time. Nevertheless, quoting
Conitzer et al. [36], “an approximation algorithm for a voting rule is, in effect, a different
voting rule; and in real-world elections, voters may feel deceived if a different voting rule
is used than the one that was promised to them”.
Example 2.6 Let us consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile R =
(i)14i=1 of fourteen rankings given by the voters shown in Table 2.4.
The Kendall distance between two rankings is the minimum number of reversals we need
to do in one of them in order to obtain the other one. For instance, K(b  c  a  d, a 
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b  c  d) = 2, as we can reverse c  a to a  c in the ranking b  c  a  d and we will
obtain b  a  c  d. Then we can reverse b  a to a  b and we will obtain the ranking
a  b  c  d. The Kendall distances of all the rankings in the profile to the ranking
a  b  c  d are the following:
K(a  b  c  d, a  b  c  d) = 0 ,
K(b  c  a  d, a  b  c  d) = 2 ,
K(c  d  a  b, a  b  c  d) = 4 .
Therefore, the Kendall distance between the profile of rankings in Table 2.4 and the profile
of rankings where all voters have expressed the ranking a  b  c  d equals
14∑
j=1
K(j, a  b  c  d) = 6 · 0 + 5 · 2 + 3 · 4 = 22 .
In Table 2.7, the number of reversals needed to make each ranking the unanimous ranking
(measured my the Kendall distance function) is shown.
Ranking Rev. Ranking Rev. Ranking Rev. Ranking Rev.
a  b  c  d 22 b  a  c  d 26 c  a  b  d 28 d  a  b  c 52
a  b  d  c 36 b  a  d  c 40 c  a  d  b 36 d  a  c  b 60
a  c  b  d 30 b  c  a  d 24 c  b  a  d 32 d  b  a  c 56
a  c  d  b 38 b  c  d  a 32 c  b  d  a 40 d  b  c  a 54
a  d  b  c 44 b  d  a  c 48 c  d  a  b 44 d  c  a  b 58
a  d  c  b 52 b  d  c  a 46 c  d  b  a 48 d  c  b  a 62
Table 2.7: Number of reversals needed to make each ranking the unanimous
ranking.
Therefore, considering the method of Kemeny, the winning ranking, which minimizes the
costs in Table 2.7, is:
a  b  c  d .
As previously discussed, Condorcet [35] proposed a probabilistic approach [170] for finding
the ranking that is the “most likely to be best”. Actually, Condorcet formalized the prob-
abilistic approach for the case where the set of candidates only consists of three candidates
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and what he meant to do for a set of candidates of bigger cardinality is unclear. Quoting
Nanson [14, 105, 170]: “the general rules for the case of any number of candidates as given
by Condorcet are stated so briefly as to be hardly intelligible [...] and as no examples are
given it is quite hopeless to find out what Condorcet meant”.
Young declares in [170] that the method of Kemeny is what Condorcet [35] really had
in mind: “Condorcet’s overall intention is quite clear. It is to find the most probable
combination of opinions. In describing his method he seems to have used the term ‘succes-
sively deletes’ rather loosely as a heuristic for computing the solution. (He may also have
believed, mistakenly, that successive deletion always does give the most probable combi-
nation.) But there appears to be little doubt about his objective. [...] It seems reasonably
likely that this is what Condorcet meant to say. In any case, it is the only interpretation
that is consistent with his goal of finding the ranking that is most likely to be correct”.
2.2.7 Litvak
The method of Litvak [108] follows similar principles as the method of Kemeny [80]. Instead
of selecting the ranking that minimizes the sum of the Kendall distances [82] to the given
profile of rankings, the method of Litvak selects the ranking that minimizes the Litvak
sum. Given the profile R = (i)ri=1, the Litvak sum of a ranking  is defined as:
k∑
i=1
s(ai) =
k∑
i=1
r∑
j=1
|P(ai)− Pj(ai)| .
The winning ranking according to the method of Litvak is sometimes referred to as the
Litvak median.
Example 2.7 Let us consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile R =
(i)14i=1 of fourteen rankings given by the voters shown in Table 2.4.
For the ranking a  b  c  d, we see that candidate a is ranked at the first position, which
leads to a coincidence with the ranking a  b  c  d and to a difference of two positions
with respect to the rankings b  c  a  d and c  d  a  b. This leads to a score for
candidate a of
s(a) =
r∑
j=1
|P(a)− Pj(a)| = 6× 0 + 5× 2 + 3× 2 = 16 .
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Analogously, the scores for the other candidates are given by:
s(b) =
r∑
j=1
|P(b)− Pj(b)| = 6× 0 + 5× 1 + 3× 2 = 11 ,
s(c) =
r∑
j=1
|P(c)− Pj(c)| = 6× 0 + 5× 1 + 3× 2 = 11 ,
s(d) =
r∑
j=1
|P(d)− Pj(d)| = 6× 0 + 5× 0 + 3× 2 = 6 .
Therefore, the Litvak sum of the ranking a  b  c  d equals 44. In Table 2.8, the Litvak
sum of each the rankings is shown.
Ranking Rev. Ranking Rev. Ranking Rev. Ranking Rev.
a  b  c  d 44 b  a  c  d 46 c  a  b  d 56 d  a  b  c 94
a  b  d  c 66 b  a  d  c 68 c  a  d  b 72 d  a  c  b 88
a  c  b  d 50 b  c  a  d 42 c  b  a  d 46 d  b  a  c 84
a  c  d  b 66 b  c  d  a 64 c  b  d  a 68 d  b  c  a 84
a  d  b  c 82 b  d  a  c 74 c  d  a  b 78 d  c  a  b 84
a  d  c  b 76 b  d  c  a 74 c  d  b  a 84 d  c  b  a 90
Table 2.8: Litvak sum of each ranking.
Therefore, considering the method of Litvak, the winning ranking, which leads to a Litvak
sum of 42, is:
b  c  a  d .
2.2.8 Bucklin
The term Bucklin voting refers to the process of considering the comparisons in the profile
of rankings that are above some threshold and then adjusting that threshold down until a
majority is reached. In particular, Bucklin [23] introduced a ranking rule that consists of
looking for a majority of more than half of the voters supporting some candidate starting
from the first-place choices. If there is no candidate with a majority of first-place choices,
then second-place choices are included and the search for a majority is addressed consider-
ing both first-place and second-place choices. The procedure continues until the smallest
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n ∈ N is reached such that one or more candidates are supported by more than half of the
voters taking the n-first-place choices into account9. All candidates obtaining a majority
considering the n-first-place choices are then ordered according to the number of times that
they are considered in the n-first-place choices by a voter10. In case of tie, Bucklin specified
that first-place choices are used, but no further tie-breaking rule is explicitly mentioned
in [23].
Example 2.8 Let us consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile R =
(i)14i=1 of fourteen rankings given by the voters shown in Table 2.1.
First-place choices are firstly taken into account when considering the method of Bucklin.
Candidate c appears six times, candidate a appears five times, candidate b appears three
times and candidate d does not appear any time. As there is no candidate with at least
seven appearances as a first-place choice, the consideration of second-place choices needs
to be addressed.
Considering both first-place and second-place choices, candidate b appears nine times, can-
didate a appears eight times, candidate c appears six times and candidate d appears five
times. Now, both candidate a and candidate b reach more than half of the first and second-
place choices. Then, as candidate b appears more times as a first or second-place choice
than candidate a, candidate b is elected the Bucklin winner.
In order to obtain a winning ranking on the set of candidates, we continue with the procedure
considering also third-place votes. Note that candidate d appears eight times as a first-place,
second-place or third-place choice, so it reaches a majority. However, candidate c appears
only six times and it will not reach a majority without additionally considering the fourth-
place choices. Therefore, considering the method of Bucklin, the winning ranking is:
b  a  d  c .
9Although he mentions the variation of omitting “the scheme of dropping the lowest candidate”, Buck-
lin [23] actually states that the candidate with the lowest score should be dropped after each step.
10Bucklin actually proposed his method as a social choice rule and how to order the candidates that
do not reach a majority in the n-th step is not explicitly addressed. We propose to continue with his
procedure until every candidate reaches a majority.
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2.2.9 Copeland
Copeland [40] is a Condorcet ranking rule measuring the number of victories, ties and
defeats of each candidate with respect to the other candidates. There are many equivalent
definitions of this ranking rule considering different score assessments. In this dissertation,
we are going to consider the following score assessment:
(i) 1 point per victory.
(ii) 1
2
point per tie.
(iii) 0 points per defeat.
The candidate with the highest score is considered the winner and the winning ranking is
given by decreasingly sorting these scores.
Example 2.9 Let us consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile R =
(i)14i=1 of fourteen rankings given by the voters shown in Table 2.9.
# i Ranking on C
6 a  b  c  d
4 b  c  a  d
3 c  d  a  b
1 a  c  d  b
Table 2.9: Profile of rankings on C given by fourteen voters.
When considering the method of Copeland, we need to calculate the pairwise confrontation
between each two candidates. Candidate a beats candidate b (10 voters out of 14 prefer
candidate a to candidate b) and candidate d (11/14) and ties with candidate c (7/14),
candidate b beats candidate c (10/14) and candidate d (10/14) and, finally, candidate d
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beats candidate c (14/14). The scores corresponding to each candidate are then given by:
s(a) = 2 · 1 + 1 · 1
2
+ 0 · 0 = 5
2
,
s(b) = 2 · 1 + 0 · 1
2
+ 1 · 0 = 2 ,
s(c) = 0 · 1 + 1 · 1
2
+ 2 · 0 = 1
2
,
s(d) = 1 · 1 + 0 · 1
2
+ 2 · 0 = 1 .
Therefore, considering the method of Copeland, the winning ranking is:
a  b  d  c .
2.2.10 Simpson (Simpson-Kramer, Minimax, Maximin)
The method of Simpson [85, 151] is a Condorcet method11 that ranks candidates according
to their maximum defeat. In that way, the best ranked candidates are the ones that are
not clearly defeated by any other candidate. A relevant (and unintuitive) property of this
method is that, although it is a Condorcet method (if there is a Condorcet winner it is
elected winner), a Condorcet loser might be elected winner.
Example 2.10 Let us consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile R =
(i)14i=1 of fourteen rankings given by the voters shown in Table 2.10.
# i Ranking on C
4 a  d  b  c
4 c  a  b  d
4 b  c  d  a
1 d  a  b  c
1 d  c  a  b
Table 2.10: Profile of rankings on C given by fourteen voters.
11The method of Simpson is not a Condorcet ranking rule.
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When considering the method of Simpson, we need to obtain the biggest defeat of each
candidate. Firstly, we obtain the votrix V corresponding to the given profile:
V =

0 10 5 8
4 0 9 8
9 5 0 8
6 6 6 0
 .
The biggest defeat of candidate a is against candidate c (five against nine), the biggest defeat
of candidate b is against candidate a (four against ten), the biggest defeat of candidate c
is against candidate b (five against nine) and the biggest defeat of candidate d is against
either candidate a, candidate b or candidate c (six against eight). Note that candidate d
is a Condorcet loser, but it is the winner considering the method of Simpson due to the
fact that all his/her defeats are by a small margin. Therefore, considering the method of
Simpson, the winning ranking is:
d  a ∼ c  b .
2.2.11 Tideman (ranked pairs)
The method of Tideman [157] is a Condorcet ranking rule that consists of two steps. Firstly,
all couples of candidates are sorted from stronger to weaker. Secondly, these couples of
candidates are locked by order (ignoring those that contradict stronger victories) until an
order on the set of candidates is decided. Although in social choice theory normally there
are a huge number of voters and the probability of a tie is low, a tie breaking rule needs
to be defined when two or more couples of candidates have the same strength. The most
adopted tie breaking rule [172] consists of randomly12 selecting a voter and use his/her
personal ranking to break the ties13.
Example 2.11 Let us consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile R =
(i)14i=1 of fourteen rankings given by the voters shown in Table 2.10.
12This selection is usually made by means of a discrete uniform distribution on the set of voters.
13The order on the set of couples of candidates induced by a ranking on the set of candidates is given
by firstly ordering by the best ranked candidate of the couple, secondly ordering by the worst ranked
candidate of the couple and, finally, the two couples of candidates involving the same two candidates are
ranked according to the candidate that appears the first in the couple.
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When considering the method of Tideman, we need to rank all the couples of candidates.
A random ranking14 b  c  d  a given by a voter was selected in order to act as a
tie-breaking rule. We firstly recall that the votrix V corresponding to this profile is the
following:
V =

0 10 5 8
4 0 9 8
9 5 0 8
6 6 6 0
 .
The couples of candidates are then sorted in the following way:
1. a  b (10),
2. b  c (9), c  a (9),
4. a  d (8), b  d (8), c  d (8),
7. d  a (6), d  b (6), d  c (6),
10. c  b (5), a  c (5),
12. b  a (4).
We should apply the tie-breaking rule in each group. For instance, between b  c and c  a,
as the randomly selected ballot was b  c  d  a, the couple b  c should be ranked first
as it involves the first candidate of b  c  d  a. In that way, the resulting order on the
preferences is:
1. a  b (10),
2. b  c (9),
3. c  a (9),
4. b  d (8),
5. c  d (8),
6. a  d (8),
7. d  b (6),
8. d  c (6),
9. d  a (6),
10. c  b (5),
11. a  c (5),
12. b  a (4).
14This random ranking should be changed after each comparison but, in order to ease the illustration of
the method, we will work with this first ranking all the time.
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We will proceed to construct the winning ranking locking these preferences and ignoring the
contradictory ones until a ranking is established. Firstly, we lock a  b. Secondly, b  c
is locked providing a  b  c. Thirdly, c  a is ignored as it contradicts the current order
a  b  c. Fourthly, b  d is introduced so the winning ranking will either be a  b  c  d
or a  b  d  c. Finally, c  d is locked and the winning ranking, considering the method
of Tideman, is:
a  b  c  d .
The method of Tideman, sometimes referred to as the ranked pairs rule, has been proved
to be one of the few ranking rules that is independent of clones. Two candidates are said to
be clones if they are ranked at consecutive positions by every voter. Intuitively, a ranking
rule is said to be independent of clones if adding one (or more) candidate to the election
that is a clone of an existing candidate does not affect the outcome of the election.
The study of the notion of clone is not exclusive of the field of social choice theory. For
instance, De Baets et al. [42] analysed the clone relation of a (partial) order relation and
Bouremel et al. [19] extended this notion to any binary relation.
2.2.12 Schulze
The method of Schulze was developed in 1997 and it was first discussed in public mailing
lists. Due to the increasing success of the method, which has been used by several private
organizations, such as the Wikimedia Foundation, The Pirate Party of Sweden and the
Pirate Party of Germany, Schulze decided to publish his method in a well-known academic
journal in 2011 [147].
The method of Schulze is based on the notion of a beatpath. A path from a candidate
ai1 to a candidate ai2 , denoted by ai1 → ai2 , is a list of couples
(
(ai, ai+1)
)n
i=1
such that
a1 = ai1 , a
n+1 = ai2 and (a
1, . . . , an+1) are pairwisely different. The weakest link of a
path
(
(ai, ai+1)
)n
i=1
from ai1 to ai2 is the couple (a
i, ai+1) such that the number of voters
preferring ai to ai+1 (called the strength of the weakest link) is the minimum among all
the couples in
(
(ai, ai+1)
)n
i=1
. A path from ai1 to ai2 that maximizes the strength of the
weakest link is called a beatpath from ai1 to ai2 .
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Finally, the strength of all the beatpaths are gathered in a beatpath matrix B, where the
element Bij at the i-th row and j-th column equals the strength of the beatpath from the
i-th candidate to the j-th candidate. The relation defined by aiRaj if Bij ≥ Bji or i = j
turns out to be a weak order relation on the set of candidates.
Example 2.12 Let us consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile R =
(i)14i=1 of fourteen rankings given by the voters shown in Table 2.1.
In a set of four candidates, there are five different paths from a candidate ai1 to a candidate
ai2. For instance, for going from candidate a to candidate b, there are the following five
possible paths: (
(a, b)
)
leading to min(5) = 5 ,(
(a, c), (c, b)
)
leading to min(8, 6) = 6 ,(
(a, d), (d, b)
)
leading to min(14, 5) = 5 ,(
(a, c), (c, d), (d, b)
)
leading to min(8, 6, 5) = 5 ,(
(a, d), (d, c), (c, b)
)
leading to min(14, 8, 6) = 6 .
The paths maximizing the strength of the weakest link, leading to a value of six, are(
(a, c), (c, b)
)
and
(
(a, d), (d, c), (c, b)
)
. Therefore, the element of the beatpath matrix cor-
responding to (a, b) equals six. The beatpath matrix is the following:
B =

− 6 8 14
9 − 8 9
6 6 − 6
6 6 8 −
 .
Therefore, considering the method of Schulze, the winning ranking is:
b  a  d  c .
2.2.13 WVM and EWVM
The Weighted Voting Method (WVM) [74] is a natural voting procedure that considers
the proportion of victories/defeats of each candidate for each couple of candidates and it
assigns to each candidate a score based on the aggregation of all the proportions of victories
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and ranks the candidates according to this score. It must be remarked that this method
comes from the field of group decision making [33].
A natural extension of this Weighted Voting Method, known as the Extended Weighted
Voting Method (EWVM) [113, 114, 115], introduces a parameter α allowing to model the
importance of ‘beating other candidates’ or ‘not being defeated by other candidates’.
We consider the matrix P of proportions of victories/defeats where Pij is the proportion
of times that candidate ai is preferred to candidate aj, for any i 6= j, and Pii = 0.5. The
victories and the defeats are separated in two matrices P+ and P−:
P+ij = max{0, pij − 0.5} ,
P−ij = min{0, pij − 0.5} .
The weighted matrix Pα is constructed as
Pα = α · P+ + (1− α) · P− .
Therefore, for each candidate ai ∈ C , we calculate the score:
s(ai) = A(P
α
i1, . . . , P
α
ik) ,
where A is an aggregation function [11, 71], usually the arithmetic mean. Finally, candi-
dates are ranked according to this score.
Note that the EWVM coincides with the WVM in case α = 1
2
. Different combinations
of aggregation functions and different values of the parameter α may lead to well-known
ranking rules. For instance, when the aggregation function is the arithmetic mean and the
considered value of the parameter α is 1
2
, the EWVM coincides with the Borda count. On
the other hand, when the aggregation function is the minimum and the considered value
of the parameter α is 0, the EWVM coincides with the method of Simpson.
Example 2.13 Let us consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile R =
(i)14i=1 of fourteen rankings given by the voters shown in Table 2.11.
The votrix V corresponding to this profile of rankings is the following:
V =

0 7 8 8
7 0 5 11
6 9 0 9
6 3 5 0
 .
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# i Ranking on C
5 a  c  b  d
3 b  d  a  c
2 c  a  b  d
2 d  b  c  a
1 c  b  a  d
1 c  d  b  a
Table 2.11: Profile of rankings on C given by fourteen voters.
The matrix P of proportions of victories/defeats:
P =

1
2
1
2
4
7
4
7
1
2
1
2
5
14
11
14
3
7
9
14
1
2
9
14
3
7
3
14
5
14
1
2
 .
When considering the Weighted Voting Method, the score for each candidate (considering
the arithmetic mean) is:
s(a) =
1
4
(
1
2
+
1
2
+
4
7
+
4
7
)
=
30
48
,
s(b) =
1
4
(
1
2
+
1
2
+
5
14
+
11
14
)
=
30
48
,
s(c) =
1
4
(
3
7
+
9
14
+
1
2
+
9
14
)
=
31
48
,
s(d) =
1
4
(
3
7
+
3
14
+
5
14
+
1
2
)
=
21
48
.
Therefore, considering the Weighted Voting Method, the winning ranking is
c  a ∼ b  d .
If we consider the Extended Weighted Voting Method, then we need to define the matrices
P+ and P−:
P+ =

0 0 1
14
1
14
0 0 0 2
7
0 1
7
0 1
7
0 0 0 0
 , P− =

0 0 0 0
0 0 −1
7
0
−1
14
0 0 0
−1
14
−2
7
−1
7
0
 .
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Therefore, for any α ∈ [0, 1], Pα is given by:
Pα =

0 0 α
14
α
14
0 0 α−1
7
2α
7
α−1
14
α
7
0 α
7
α−1
14
2α−2
7
α−1
7
0
 .
When considering the Weighted Voting Method, the score for each candidate (considering
the arithmetic mean) is:
s(a) =
1
4
(
0 + 0 +
α
14
+
α
14
)
=
2α
48
,
s(b) =
1
4
(
0 + 0 +
α− 1
7
+
2α
7
)
=
6α− 2
48
,
s(c) =
1
4
(
α− 1
14
+
α
7
+ 0 +
α
7
)
=
5α− 1
48
,
s(d) =
1
4
(
α− 1
14
+
2α− 2
7
+
α− 1
7
+ 0
)
=
7α− 7
48
.
Therefore, considering the Extended Weighted Voting Method, the winning ranking is
a  c  b  d , if α ∈ [0, 1
3
[ ,
a ∼ c  b  d , if α = 1
3
,
c  a  b  d , if α ∈]1
3
, 1
2
[ ,
c  a ∼ b  d , if α = 1
2
,
c  b  a  d , if α ∈]1
2
, 1[ ,
c ∼ b  a  d , if α = 1 .
Note that, as expected, the winning ranking according to the WVM coincides with the
winning ranking according to the EWVM when α =
1
2
.
2.2.14 Elimination methods
Although an elimination method is not a ranking rule by itself, it can be combined with any
ranking rule to define a new ranking rule. Elimination methods [5, 59, 137, 152] consist of a
multi-stage voting procedure based on iteratively eliminating the worst candidates until the
winning candidate is obtained. An important family of elimination methods contains the
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ones with only two steps where the two best candidates (according to the chosen ranking
rule) are finally compared and the one that is preferred by the highest number of voters
is elected the winning candidate. Here, we are interested in elimination methods based on
a scoring ranking rule [60]. Relevant elimination methods based on a scoring ranking rule
are plurality with run-off [137], the method of Nanson [105] or the method of Coombs [39].
Example 2.14 Let us consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile R =
(i)14i=1 of fourteen rankings given by the voters shown in Table 2.12. In the following, we
will analyse how different elimination methods may change the winning ranking considering
the same ranking rule. For instance, we will consider plurality combined with different
elimination procedures.
# i Ranking on C
5 a  c  b  d
4 b  c  a  d
3 c  d  b  a
2 d  c  b  a
Table 2.12: Profile of rankings on C given by fourteen voters.
When considering the plurality ranking rule, first-place votes are the only votes taken into
account. Only considering these votes, candidate a is the main choice five times, candidate
b is the main choice four times, candidate c is the main choice three times and candidate d
is the main choice two times. Therefore, considering the plurality ranking rule, the winning
ranking is:
a  b  c  d .
Nevertheless, if we consider a three-step elimination method, then we will firstly eliminate
candidate d as it is the one which is the main choice for the least number of voters. Only
taking candidates a, b and c into account, candidate a is the main choice five times, can-
didate b is the main choice four times and candidate c now is the main choice five times
(the original three and the two cases where candidate d was the main choice). Therefore,
candidate b is eliminated and candidates a and c are the only two candidates taken into
account in the last step. Finally, candidate a is the main choice five times and candidate
c is the main choice nine times. Therefore, considering a three-step elimination procedure,
the winning ranking is:
c  a  b  d .
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Finally, if we consider plurality with run-off, then we will eliminate candidates c and d as
they are the ones that are the main choice for the least number of voters. Only taking into
account candidates a and b, candidate a is the main choice five times and candidate b is the
main choice nine times. Therefore, considering plurality with run-off, the winning ranking
is:
b  a  c  d .
Note that the same ranking rule combined with three different elimination methods leads to
three totally different winning rankings.
2.3 A ranking rule based on monotonicity
Monotonicity is a common desired property in mathematical modelling exercises, and its
importance has been acknowledged in several disciplines, e.g. in machine learning [12, 28,
90] and fuzzy modelling [128, 155, 161]. However, real-life data is often imperfect and
does not fully comply with the monotonicity hypothesis. One option then is to (mini-
mally) adjust the data set restoring the monotonicity [132, 134, 135]. This is particularly
important as, for instance, in machine learning, some algorithms cannot be trained with
non-monotone datasets [134].
Returning to the field of social choice theory, several ranking rules centered on this mono-
tonicity property have already been proposed. Rademaker and De Baets [133] advocated
that, for a ranking a  b  c, monotonicity implies that the number of voters preferring a
to c should not be less than both the number of voters preferring a to b and the number
of voters preferring b to c15.
More formally, each ranking  on the set of candidates defines a strict order relation A
between couples of candidates (ai1 , aj1), (ai2 , aj2) ∈ C 2:
(ai1  aj1) ∧ (aj2  ai2) ∧ (ai1  aj1 ∨ aj2  ai2) .
This relation is represented in Figure 2.1 for an example of a set of four candidates.
According to the proposal of Rademaker and De Baets, if the strength of support (number
of times that the first candidate of the couple is preferred to the second candidate of
15This intuitive notion is closely related to the property of strong stochastic transitivity [138].
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(a, d)
(a, c) (b, d)
(a, b) (b, c) (c, d)
(b, a) (c, b) (d, c)
(d, a)
(c, a) (d, b)
Figure 2.1: Hasse diagram of the order relation A for the ranking a  b 
c  d.
the couple) is monotone decreasing on the Hasse diagram of the order relation A for a
ranking , then  should be elected the winning ranking. If there is no such ranking,
then the costs of imposing monotonicity w.r.t. each possible ranking are obtained. These
costs are measured in the same way that they are measured in Condorcet’s least reversals
method [99], by counting the minimum number of reversals of pairwise comparisons.
Example 2.15 Let us consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile R =
(i)14i=1 of fourteen rankings given by the voters shown in Table 2.1. This profile of rankings
is not monotone w.r.t. any ranking on C . However, we can see in Figure 2.2 that, with a
small number of reversals (three), we can impose monotonicity w.r.t. the ranking a  b 
c  d.
Of course, the number of changes needed in order to impose monotonicity totally depends
on the chosen ranking. For instance, the cost of imposing monotonicity w.r.t. the ranking
d  c  b  a (fourteen) is much larger than the cost of imposing monotonicity w.r.t. to
the ranking a  b  c  d (three). The number of reversals needed in order to impose
monotonicity w.r.t. the ranking d  c  b  a can be seen in Figure 2.3.
In Table 2.13, the number of changes needed to impose monotonicity w.r.t. each possible
ranking is shown.
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(a, d) 14
(a, c) 8 (b, d) 9
(a, b) 5 7 (b, c) 8 (c, d) 6 7
(b, a) 9 7 (c, b) 6 (d, c) 8 7
(d, a) 0
(c, a) 6 (d, b) 5
Figure 2.2: Minimum number of reversals needed for imposing monotonicity
w.r.t. the ranking a  b  c  d.
(d, a) 0 7
(c, a) 6 7 (d, b) 5 7
(b, a) 9 7 (c, b) 6 7 (d, c) 8 7
(a, b) 5 7 (b, c) 8 7 (c, d) 6 7
(a, d)14 7
(a, c) 8 7 (b, d) 9 7
Figure 2.3: Minimum number of reversals needed for imposing monotonicity
w.r.t. the ranking d  c  b  a.
Therefore, considering the ranking rule proposed by Rademaker and De Baets, the winning
ranking is:
a  b  c  d .
This simple and intuitive ranking rule was the starting point of this research. The natural
property of monotonicity turns out to be a cornerstone of social choice theory, and it is only
in case this property is not fulfilled that the need of making a decision arises. Therefore,
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Ranking Rev. Ranking Rev. Ranking Rev. Ranking Rev.
a  b  c  d 3 b  a  c  d 7 c  a  b  d 12 d  a  b  c 11
a  b  d  c 9 b  a  d  c 7 c  a  d  b 14 d  a  c  b 14
a  c  b  d 7 b  c  a  d 9 c  b  a  d 12 d  b  a  c 11
a  c  d  b 13 b  c  d  a 9 c  b  d  a 14 d  b  c  a 12
a  d  b  c 11 b  d  a  c 8 c  d  a  b 14 d  c  a  b 14
a  d  c  b 13 b  d  c  a 10 c  d  b  a 14 d  c  b  a 14
Table 2.13: Cost imposing monotonicity w.r.t. each ranking on C .
we advocate for exploiting the search for this monotonicity property for the introduction
of new ranking rules.
PART II
THE METHODOLOGY

CHAPTER 3
Rationalisation of ranking rules
3.1 Metric rationalisation of ranking rules
One of the most well-known methods for the aggregation of rankings is that of Kemeny [80].
According to Kemeny, we select as the winning ranking the one that minimizes the sum of
the Kendall distances to the profile of rankings given by the voters. Note that this ranking
rule can be seen as the search for the ‘closest’ unanimous profile of rankings in the sense
of minimizing the sum of the Kendall distances, i.e., considering the following distance
function between profiles of rankings:
d(R1,R2) =
r∑
i=1
K
( 1i ,2i ) .
However, requiring a profile of rankings to be unanimous is a very restrictive property.
Therefore, in social choice theory, another less restrictive property is commonly accepted.
According to Condorcet [35], if it exists, the Condorcet ranking should be the winning
ranking.
In the same way that a profile of rankings does not need to be unanimous, a Condorcet
ranking might not exist either. The method of Dodgson [46] and Condorcet’s least reversals
method [109] look for the minimum number of reversals that need to be made in order to
find a Condorcet ranking.
42 3.1 METRIC RATIONALISATION OF RANKING RULES
Rademaker and De Baets [133] proposed a ranking rule based on the search for mono-
tonicity in the strength of support. According to their proposal, for a ranking a  b  c,
monotonicity implies that the strength with which a  c is supported (number of rankings
where a is ranked before c) should not be less than both the strength with which a  b and
the strength with which b  c are supported. They advocated that the winning ranking
should be the one that is the ‘closest’ to satisfying this assumption. This ‘closeness’ was
measured in terms of the minimum number of reversals.
There is a common pattern between these methods. In each of these ranking rules, a
condition is imposed on the profile of rankings in order to decide which ranking is the
winner. As they allow to undoubtedly decide the winning ranking, these important condi-
tions are called consensus states. A consensus state satisfies the following three properties:
anonymity (reassigning the rankings over the voters does not affect the belonging to the
consensus state), neutrality (if some permutation of candidates is applied to each voter’s
ranking, the same permutation should be observed in the consensus state) and unanimity
(if every voter provides the same ranking, then it belongs to the consensus state).
In the following definition, we consider the following notations. For any set X, P(X)
denotes the power set of A. For any permutation σ of {1, . . . , r}, σ(R) represents the
profile (j)σ(r)j=σ(1) obtained by permuting the order of the voters. For any permutation σ
of {1, . . . , k}, Rσ represents the profile (σ(j))rj=1 obtained by permuting the order of the
candidates.
Definition 3.1 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A consensus
state is a couple (X ,F ) where X ⊆ L(C )r is a set of profiles of r rankings and F : X →
P(L(C )) is a function satisfying the following three properties:
(i) Anonymity: for any R ∈ L(C )r, any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 2 such that ai1 6= ai2 and any
permutation σ of {1, . . . , r}, it holds that(
R ∈X ⇔ σ(R) ∈X ) ∧ (F (R) = F (σ(R))) .
(ii) Neutrality: for any R ∈ L(C )r, any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 2 such that ai1 6= ai2 and any
permutation σ of {1, . . . , k}, it holds that(
R ∈X ⇔ Rσ ∈X
) ∧ (σ(F (R)) = F (Rσ)) .
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(iii) Unanimity: for any ∈ L(C ), it holds that( r∈X ) ∧ (F (r) = ) .
The two most common consensus states in the rationalisation of ranking rules are una-
nimity, which holds when every voter expresses the same ranking on the set of candidates,
and presence of a (weak) Condorcet ranking, which holds when there exists a ranking such
that every candidate is preferred by more than (resp. at least) half of the number voters
to all candidates ranked at a worse position.
Note that a consensus state is usually quite restrictive and it is not satisfied by every profile
of rankings. Therefore, when aggregating a profile of rankings, the search for the ‘closest’
profile of rankings in the chosen consensus state needs to be addressed.
Several authors, such as Nitzan [106], Lerer and Nitzan [88], Campbell and Nitzan [27],
Meskanen and Nurmi [99, 100], Andjiga et al. [2] and Elkind et al. [49], have advocated
that (most) ranking rules can be characterized as minimizing the distance to a consensus
state for some appropriate distance function. This characterization is known as metric
rationalisation of ranking rules.
In that way, all these ranking rules based on a consensus state can be seen as a two-step
procedure:
(i) Search for R ′, the ‘closest’ profile of rankings in the chosen consensus state by means
of a distance function or metric.
(ii) Analysis of the consensus state to obtain the winning ranking .
In Figure 3.1, this two-step procedure is illustrated for the method of Kemeny.
Many ranking rules, such as plurality [6] or the Borda count [18], apparently do not require
any specific consensus state. However, as they determine the winning ranking by ordering
based on the total score awarded to each candidate, all scoring ranking rules [57, 102, 104,
169] (in particular plurality or the Borda count) can be characterized by the distance to the
set of profiles of rankings where the first-ranked candidate coincides for all rankings [99,
100].
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(1, 2, 3, 4)
(1,2,3,4)
(1,2,3,4)
(1,2,3,4)
(1,2,3,4)
(1,2,3,4)
(1,2,3,4)
(1,2,3,4)
...
(1,2,3,4)
(2,1,3,4)
(1,2,3,4)
(4,3,2,1)
(1,2,4,3)
(1,3,2,4)
(1,4,3,2)
...
R R ′

(i) (ii)
Figure 3.1: Diagram of the two-step procedure.
3.2 Monometrics
In this section, we introduce the concept of a monometric [126], which is closely related to
that of a distance function or metric. Like a distance function, a monometric satisfies the
axioms of non-negativity and coincidence, but a monometric requires compatibility with a
given betweenness relation [111] and does not impose symmetry nor the triangle inequality.
3.2.1 General case
The notion of a distance function or metric is a well-known concept in mathematics.
Definition 3.2 A function d : A × A → R is called a distance function (on the set A) if
it satisfies the following four properties:
(i) Non-negativity: for any a, b ∈ A, it holds that
d(a, b) ≥ 0 .
(ii) Coincidence: for any a, b ∈ A, it holds that
d(a, b) = 0 ⇔ a = b .
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(iii) Symmetry: for any a, b ∈ A, it holds that
d(a, b) = d(b, a) .
(iv) Triangle inequality: for any a, b, c ∈ A, it holds that
d(a, c) ≤ d(a, b) + d(b, c) .
A betweenness relation is a ternary relation, introduced by Pasch [111] and further de-
veloped by Huntington and Kline [75], that describes when an element is in between two
other ones. In what follows, we adhere to the formal relaxed definition given by Pitcher
and Smiley [130], requiring a minimal set of axioms. Actually, they also proposed addi-
tional axioms concerning transitivity. Further additional axioms have been proposed in
literature [55, 75, 111].
Definition 3.3 A ternary relation R on a set A is called a betweenness relation if it
satisfies the following two properties:
(i) Symmetry in the end points: for any a, b, c ∈ A, it holds that
(a, b, c) ∈ R ⇔ (c, b, a) ∈ R .
(ii) Closure: for any a, b, c ∈ A, it holds that(
(a, b, c) ∈ R ∧ (a, c, b) ∈ R) ⇔ b = c .
Remark 3.4 Note that, for any a, b ∈ A, (a, b, a) ∈ R implies that a = b. It suffices to see
that it always holds that (b, a, a) ∈ R due to the closure axiom and, therefore, (a, a, b) ∈ R
due to the symmetry in the end points. As it always holds that (a, a, b) ∈ R, due to the
closure axiom we conclude that, if it holds that (a, b, a) ∈ R, then a = b.
The formula ‘(a, b, c) ∈ R’ is read as ‘b is in between a and c’ and is denoted as [a, b, c]
when no confusion is possible.
Although no transitivity axioms are required here, they are necessary conditions in order
to guarantee the existence of an order relation ≤ that agrees with R, i.e., for which it holds
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that (a, b, c) ∈ R if and only if a = b or b = c or a ≤ b ≤ c or c ≤ b ≤ a. For further details
about the relationship between order relations and betweenness relations, we refer to [55].
After fixing a betweenness relation, monometrics can be introduced, which are functions
satisfying the non-negativity and coincidence axioms of a distance function, while preserv-
ing the given betweenness relation.
Definition 3.5 Let A and B be two sets such that A ⊆ B and let R be a betweenness
relation on B. A function M : A×B → R is called a monometric (w.r.t. R) if it satisfies
the following three properties:
(i) Non-negativity: for any a ∈ A and any b ∈ B, it holds that
M(a, b) ≥ 0 .
(ii) Coincidence: for any a ∈ A and any b ∈ B, it holds that
M(a, b) = 0 ⇔ a = b .
(iii) Compatibility: for any a ∈ A and any b, c ∈ B such that [a, b, c], it holds that
M(a, b) ≤M(a, c) .
In case the sets A and B coincide, we say that M is a monometric on A.
For any a ∈ A and any b ∈ B, M(a, b) is called the cost of changing a into b. The set A is
called the set of observable elements and the set B is called the set of reachable elements.
Note that, by considering an appropriate betweenness relation, every distance function can
be considered a monometric. In the following example, three generic betweenness relations
are proposed w.r.t. which every distance function is a monometric.
Proposition 3.6 A distance function d : A × A → R (on the set A) is a monometric
w.r.t. the three following betweenness relations:
(i) R1 = {(a, b, c) ∈ A3 | a = b ∨ b = c};
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(ii) R2 = {(a, b, c) ∈ A3 | d(a, c) = d(a, b) + d(b, c)};
(iii) R3 = R1 ∪ {(a, b, c) ∈ A3 | d(a, b) < d(a, c) ∧ d(c, b) < d(c, a)}.
Proof: We first prove that R1, R2 and R3 satisfy the two axioms of a betweenness relation
(on A).
Symmetry in the end points: for any a, b, c ∈ A, it holds that
(a, b, c) ∈ R1 ⇔ (a = b) ∨ (b = c)
⇔ (c = b) ∨ (b = a)
⇔ (c, b, a) ∈ R1 ,
and
(a, b, c) ∈ R2 ⇔ d(a, c) = d(a, b) + d(b, c)
⇔ d(c, a) = d(b, a) + d(c, b)
⇔ (c, b, a) ∈ R2 ,
due to the symmetry of d, and
(a, b, c) ∈ R3 ⇔ (d(a, b) < d(a, c) ∧ d(c, b) < d(c, a)) ∨ (a = b ∨ b = c)
⇔ (d(c, b) < d(c, a) ∧ d(a, b) < d(a, c)) ∨ (c = b ∨ b = a)
⇔ (c, b, a) ∈ R3 .
Closure: for any a, b, c ∈ A, it holds that(
(a, b, c) ∈ R1
) ∧ ((a, c, b) ∈ R1)
⇔ (a = b ∨ b = c) ∧ (a = c ∨ b = c)
⇔ b = c ,
and (
(a, b, c) ∈ R2
) ∧ ((a, c, b) ∈ R2)
⇔ d(a, c) = d(a, b) + d(b, c) ∧ d(a, b) = d(a, c) + d(c, b)
⇔ d(b, c) = 0
⇔ b = c ,
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and (
(a, b, c) ∈ R3
) ∧ ((a, c, b) ∈ R3)
⇔ ( (d(a, b) < d(a, c) ∧ d(c, b) < d(c, a)) ∨ (a = b ∨ b = c) )
∧ ( (d(a, c) < d(a, b) ∧ d(b, c) < d(b, a)) ∨ (a = c ∨ c = b) )
⇔ (d(a, b) < d(a, c) ∧ d(c, b) < d(c, a) ∧ d(a, c) < d(a, b) ∧ d(b, c) < d(b, a))
∨ (d(a, b) < d(a, c) ∧ d(c, b) < d(c, a) ∧ (a = c ∨ c = b) )
∨ ( (a = b ∨ b = c) ∧ d(a, c) < d(a, b) ∧ d(b, c) < d(b, a))
∨ ( (a = b ∨ b = c) ∧ (a = c ∨ c = b) )
⇔ (a = b ∨ b = c) ∧ (a = c ∨ c = b)
⇔ b = c .
Next, we prove that d satisfies the three axioms of a monometric (on A) w.r.t. R1, R2 and
R3. The non-negativity and coincidence axioms are trivially satisfied since d is a distance
function. We only need to prove the compatibility axiom.
Firstly, we prove it for R1. Let a, b, c ∈ A be such that (a, b, c) ∈ R1, then a = b or b = c.
Therefore, d(a, b) = 0 or d(a, b) = d(a, c). Hence,
d(a, b) ≤ max (0, d(a, c)) = d(a, c) .
Secondly, we prove it for R2. Let a, b, c ∈ A be such that (a, b, c) ∈ R2, then d(a, c) =
d(a, b) + d(b, c). Therefore,
d(a, b) = d(a, c)− d(b, c) ≤ d(a, c) .
Thirdly, we prove it for R3. Let a, b, c ∈ A be such that (a, b, c) ∈ R3, then d(a, b) < d(a, c)
or a = b or b = c. Therefore,
d(a, b) ≤ d(a, c) .
Thus, d is a monometric (on A) w.r.t. R1, R2 and R3. 
Note that the introduction of monometrics does not imply a rejection of the symmetry
property or the triangle inequality, but a call for attention to the fact that both properties
are not indispensable in the aggregation of rankings (although these properties are satisfied
by the most widespread monometrics used in the aggregation of rankings). Furthermore,
although any distance function can be seen as a monometric due to Propositon 3.6, it
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must be noted that requiring compatibility with a betweenness relation fixes a notion
of ‘closeness’ that needs to be preserved. After fixing a betweenness relation, not every
distance function can be seen as a monometric w.r.t. the fixed betweenness relation.
Different transformations of distance functions have called the attention of the scientific
community [44]. Here, we consider a natural transformation that takes the value of the
original function whenever this value does not exceed a fixed lower bound, but is penalized
and set to a fixed upper bound when it does.
Definition 3.7 For any function f : A × B → R and any two constants 0 < l ≤ u, the
function fl,u : A×B → R, defined as
fl,u(a, b) =
f(a, b) , if f(a, b) ≤ l,u , otherwise,
is called the (l, u)-penalized version of f .
Truncation [44] is a common transformation of a distance function, resulting in a so-called
truncated distance function, which can be been as an (l, l)-penalized distance function.
We are interested in fixing a maximum admissible disagreement. Therefore, we measure
the distance between elements, penalizing this measurement if this maximum admissible
disagreement is reached. In order to do so, we set the lower bound l and the upper
bound u such that l ≤ supa∈A,b∈B d(a, b) ≤ u. This penalized distance function might not
satisfy the triangle inequality, but still is a monometric if the original distance function
was. In general, we prove in the following proposition that any (l, u)-penalized version of
a monometric still is a monometric.
Proposition 3.8 Let A and B be two sets such that A ⊆ B and let R be a betweenness
relation on B. For any monometric M : A × B → R (w.r.t. R) and any two constants
0 < l ≤ u, the (l, u)-penalized version of Ml,u : A × B → R of M is a monometric
(w.r.t. R).
Proof: We prove that Ml,u satisfies the three axioms of a monometric w.r.t. R.
Non-negativity: for any a ∈ A and any b ∈ B, it holds that Ml,u(a, b) ∈ {M(a, b), u} and,
therefore, Ml,u(a, b) ≥ 0.
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Coincidence: for any a ∈ A and any b ∈ B, it holds that Ml,u(a, b) = 0 if and only if
M(a, b) = 0. Therefore, it holds that Ml,u(a, b) = 0 if and only if a = b.
Compatibility: for any a ∈ A and any b, c ∈ B such that (a, b, c) ∈ R, it holds that
M(a, b) ≤M(a, c). We distinguish four cases:
(i) Ml,u(a, b) = M(a, b) and Ml,u(a, c) = M(a, c). It holds that Ml,u(a, b) = M(a, b) ≤
M(a, c) = Ml,u(a, c).
(ii) Ml,u(a, b) = M(a, b) and Ml,u(a, c) = u. By definition, it holds that Ml,u(a, b) =
M(a, b) ≤ l ≤ u = Ml,u(a, c).
(iii) Ml,u(a, b) = u and Ml,u(a, c) = M(a, c). Note that this implies that (M(a, b) > l
or M(a, b) = l = u) and M(a, c) ≤ l. Note that (M(a, b) > l and M(a, c) ≤ l)
leads to an impossible case (M(a, b) ≤ M(a, c) ≤ l < M(a, b), a contraction) and
(M(a, b) = l = u and M(a, c) ≤ l) trivially implies that Ml,u(a, b) ≤Ml,u(a, c).
(iv) Ml,u(a, b) = u and Ml,u(a, c) = u. It trivially holds that Ml,u(a, b) ≤Ml,u(a, c).
Thus, Ml,u is a monometric w.r.t. R. 
3.2.2 Monometrics on L(C )
First of all, we clarify the notation that we will use from now on. Curly brackets {}
are used for representing a set of elements without considering a specific order among
them and parentheses () are used for representing an ordered list. Multi-sets, which are
sets of elements where duplicated elements are allowed, are denoted with double curly
brackets {{}}.
Distance functions on a set of rankings have been deeply studied in literature. Some
of the most well-known ones are the Kendall distance [82], the Hamming distance [73]
and the Cayley distance [29]. For the aggregation of rankings, these distance functions
have been used in order to look for the ‘closest’ profile of rankings satisfying some given
properties. However, distance functions are not the most appropriate type of functions for
this problem. Rather, our newly introduced concept of monometric turns out to be better
suited to represent the cost of changing a ranking into another one, as will be thoroughly
discussed in Section 3.5.
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Betweenness relations on L(C ) have been deeply studied [37, 80, 81]. In practical problems,
especially in social choice theory, Kemeny’s proposal [80], which is based on the Kendall
distance function between rankings, is the one that best preserves the preferences given by
the voters. Basically, the Kendall distance between two rankings 1 and 2 counts the
minimum number of consecutive candidates that need to be swapped in order to obtain
2 starting from 1 (or vice versa). The swap of two consecutive candidates in a ranking
is called a reversal.
Definition 3.9 Let C be a set of k candidates. The number of pairwise discordances be-
tween two rankings ,′∈ L(C ) is measured by means of the Kendall distance function K:
K(,′) = #{(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 2 | ai1 6= ai2 ∧ P(ai1) < P(ai2) ∧ P′(ai1) > P′(ai2)} .
Kemeny [80] proposed a related betweenness relation on L(C ). Basically, it says that a
ranking 2 is in between two rankings 1 and 3 if there exists a way of going from 1
to 3 with the fewest number of reversals that passes by 2.
Proposition 3.10 Let C be a set of k candidates. The ternary relation w on L(C ) defined
as
w =
{
(1,2,3) ∈ L(C )3 | K(1,3) = K(1,2) +K(2,3)
}
is a betweenness relation.
Proving that w is a betweenness relation is straightforward as the Kendall distance function
is a distance function and, therefore, it is symmetric and satisfies that two rankings are at
Kendall distance zero if and only if they coincide. A more formal proof can be found in
Proposition 3.6. For this particular betweenness relation, additional axioms of transitivity
are satisfied [55].
Figure 3.2 illustrates the elements that are in between the rankings a  b  c  d and
d  b  a  c according to the betweenness relation w. These rankings are a  b  d  c,
a  d  b  c, b  a  c  d, b  a  d  c, b  d  a  c and d  a  b  c.
Fixing a betweenness relation determines how ‘closeness’ is measured. After fixing a be-
tweenness relation on L(C ), if a ranking 2 is in between two rankings 1 and 3, then
the cost of changing 1 into 2 should not be larger than the cost of changing 1 into 3.
The cost of changing these rankings is measured by means of a monometric on L(C ).
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abcd
bacd acbd abdc
bcad cabd badc acdb adbc
cbad bcda bdac cadb adcb dabc
cbda bdca cdab dbac dacb
cdba dbca dcab
dcba
Figure 3.2: Graphical representation of w.
We have seen in Proposition 3.6 that, when considering an appropriate betweenness re-
lation, every distance function can be seen as a monometric. The goal is to choose a
meaningful betweenness relation determining our notion of ‘closeness’.
Any monometric defined w.r.t. Kemeny’s betweenness relation will be called a reversal-
based monometric. These monometrics are the most interesting ones in social choice theory
as they prevent from changing distant candidates in a ranking without changing close
candidates first. Some relevant reversal-based monometrics are:
(i) m1(1,2) = K(1,2). The monometric m1 counts the number of reversals needed
in order to go from a ranking to another one.
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(ii) m2(1,2) = 1 − δ(1,2) = 11 6=2 , where δ is the Kronecker delta that equals
one in case the variables are equal and zero otherwise. The monometric m2 is the
common zero-one distance function that equals zero if and only if both elements
coincide.
(iii) m3(1,2) = 2−p (with m3(,) = 0 for any ranking), where p is the first position
at which both rankings differ. The monometric m3 counts the number of high-ranked
candidates that need to be changed in order to go from a ranking to another one.
(iv) m4(1,2) = K(1,2)2. The monometric m4 computes the squared number of
reversals.
(v) m5(1,2) = Kl, k(k−1)
2
(1,2), where l ∈ {1, . . . , k(k−1)2 }. The monometric m5 fixes
a maximum admissible disagreement between rankings and counts the number of
reversals needed in order to go from a ranking to another one, penalizing this count
if this maximum admissible disagreement is reached.
Remark 3.11 Although m1, m2 and m3 are distance functions (m3 is even an ultramet-
ric1), not every monometric is a distance function. For instance, m4 and m5 are two
examples of a monometric that are not a distance function because they do not satisfy the
triangle inequality.
Two interesting examples of monometrics that are not reversal-based are the Hamming
distance function [73] and the Cayley distance function [29].
In the following example, monometrics on L(C ) are illustrated.
Example 3.12 Let 1: a  b  c  d and 2: b  a  d  c be two rankings on
C = {a, b, c, d}. Candidates a and b lead to a pairwise discordance between both rankings;
so do c and d. Hence,
{(u, v) ∈ C 2 | u 6= v ∧ P1(u) < P1(v) ∧ P2(u) > P2(v)} = {(a, b), (c, d)} .
Therefore,
K(1,2) = #{(a, b), (c, d)} = 2 .
1An ultrametric d (on a set A) is a distance function (on A) that satisfies the additional axiom d(a, c) ≤
max (d(a, b), d(b, c)), for any a, b, c ∈ A.
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Hence, the minimum number of reversals needed in order to go from 1 to 2 is two.
Let us denote by 3: b  a  c  d and 4: a  b  d  c. There are two possible ways of
going from 1 to 2 with the least number of reversals (two):
C1 : 1→3→2 ,
C2 : 1→4→2 ,
where →′ represents that  is changed into ′ by means of a unique reversal (K(
,′ ) = 1).
It holds that [1,1,2], [1,2,2], [1,3,2] and [1,4,2] considering Kemeny’s
betweenness relation. On the other hand, there exists no ∈ L(C ) such that [1,,2]
and, at the same time, 6∈ {1,2,3,4}.
Note that m1(1,2) = K(1,2) = 2 is the cost of changing 1 into 2 in terms of the
number of reversals.
Analogously, m2(1,2) = 1 − δ(1,2) = 1 represents the cost of changing 1 into
2 in terms of the number of rankings changed. This monometric will be of interest when
minimizing the number of rankings that need to be changed between two profiles of rankings.
As 1 and 2 do not coincide in their first ranked candidate, it holds that m3(1,2)
= 2−p = 2−1. This monometric is useful when the goal is to minimize the number of
high-ranked candidates that need to be changed in order to go from a ranking to another
one.
The cost of changing 1 into 2 in terms of the squared number of reversals equals m4(1
,2) = K(1,2)2 = 4.
Finally, m5 counts the number of reversals needed in order to go from a ranking to another
one, penalizing this count if a maximum admissible disagreement is reached. For l ≤ 2, it
holds that m5(1,2) = K(1,2) = 2 and, for l > 2, it holds that m5(1,2) = k(k−1)2 =
6.
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3.2.3 Monometrics on L(C )r
When dealing with the aggregation of rankings, it is common to work with profiles of
rankings instead of single rankings. A profile is denoted by R and, when n ∈ N profiles of
rankings of the same size r ∈ N are considered, they are denoted by R1, . . . ,Rn. For any
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we will denote by (ji )ri=1 the corresponding r rankings in Rj.
Some ranking rules require the given profile of rankings to satisfy some specific properties.
However, these properties are not always satisfied and the search for the ‘closest’ profile of
rankings satisfying these properties is addressed. This ‘closeness’ is measured by means of
monometrics on L(C )r. Note that any monometric on L(C ) obviously is a monometric on
L(C )r with r = 1.
Extending a betweenness relation on L(C ) to a betweenness relation on L(C )r can be
realised by comparing the elements of both profiles one to one.
Proposition 3.13 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters and w be a
betweenness relation on L(C ). The ternary relation W on L(C )r defined as
W =
{
(R1,R2,R3) ∈ L(C )r |
(∀i ∈ {1, . . . , r})((1i ,2i ,3i ) ∈ w)}
is a betweenness relation.
Proof: We prove that W satisfies the two axioms of a betweenness relation on L(C )r.
Symmetry in the end points: for any R1,R2,R3 ∈ L(C )r, it holds that
(R1,R2,R3) ∈ W ⇔
(∀i ∈ {1, . . . , r})((1i ,2i ,3i ) ∈ w)
⇔ (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , r})((3i ,2i ,1i ) ∈ w)
⇔ (R3,R2,R1) ∈ W .
Closure: for any R1,R2,R3 ∈ L(C )r, it holds that(
(R1,R2,R3) ∈ W
) ∧ ((R1,R3,R2) ∈ W)
⇔ (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , r})(((1i ,2i ,3i ) ∈ w) ∧ ((1i ,3i ,2i ) ∈ w))
⇔ (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , r})( 2i=3i )
⇔ R2 = R3 .
56 3.2 MONOMETRICS
Thus, W is a betweenness relation on L(C )r. 
W is called a ‘betweenness relation on L(C )r induced by w’. The formula ‘(R1,R2,R3) ∈
W ’ is read ‘R2 is in between R1 and R3’ and is denoted as [R1,R2,R3].
Since a ranking is a profile with just one element and both definitions coincide for r = 1,
using the same notation for a betweenness relation on L(C )r and a betweenness relation
on L(C ) is justified.
Given a monometric on L(C ), a monometric on L(C )r can be constructed through the use
of an ‘aggregation’ function.
Proposition 3.14 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters, m : L(C )×
L(C )→ R be a monometric on L(C ) (w.r.t. a betweenness relation w on L(C )) and W be
the betweenness relation on L(C )r induced by w. For any r-ary strictly increasing function
A : (R+)r → R+ such that A(0, . . . , 0) = 0, it holds that the function M : L(C )r×L(C )r →
R defined by
M(R1,R2) =
r
A
i=1
(
m(1i ,2i )
)
,
where
r
A
i=1
(xi) is a shorthand for A(x1, . . . , xr), is a monometric on L(C )r w.r.t. W
Proof: We prove that M satisfies the three axioms of a monometric on L(C )r w.r.t. W .
Non-negativity: immediate.
Coincidence: for any R1,R2 ∈ L(C )r, as A(x1, . . . , xr) = 0 if and only if
(∀i ∈ {1, . . . , r})(
xi = 0
)
and m is a monometric on L(C ), it holds that
M(R1,R2) :=
r
A
i=1
(
m(1i ,2i )
)
= 0
⇔ (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , r})(m(1i ,2i ) = 0)
⇔ (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , r})( 1i=2i )
⇔ R1 = R2 .
Compatibility: for any R1,R2,R3 ∈ L(C )r such that [R1,R2,R3], as A is increasing and
m is a monometric on L(C ), it holds that
M(R1,R2) =
r
A
i=1
(
m(1i ,2i )
) ≤ rA
i=1
(
m(1i ,3i )
)
= M(R1,R3) .
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Thus, M is a monometric on L(C )r w.r.t. W . 
In particular, the addition defines a monometric on L(C )r.
Corollary 3.15 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters, m : L(C ) ×
L(C )→ R be a monometric on L(C ) (w.r.t. a betweenness relation w on L(C )) and W be
the betweenness relation on L(C )r induced by w. The function M : L(C )r × L(C )r → R
defined as
M(R1,R2) =
r∑
i=1
m(1i ,2i )
is a monometric on L(C )r w.r.t. W .
Considering the monometrics on L(C ) introduced in Subsection 3.2.2, we obtain the fol-
lowing monometrics on L(C )r:
(i) M1
(
R1,R2
)
=
r∑
i=1
K
(1i ,2i ). The monometric M1 counts the number of reversals
needed in order to go from a profile of rankings to another one.
(ii) M2
(
R1,R2
)
=
r∑
i=1
1−δ(1i ,2i ). The monometric M2 counts the number of rankings
that differ from a profile of rankings to another one.
(iii) M3
(
R1,R2
)
=
r∑
i=1
m3
(1i ,2i ). The monometric M3 counts the number of high-
ranked candidates that need to be changed in order to go from a profile of rankings
to another one.
(iv) M4
(
R1,R2
)
=
r∑
i=1
K
(1i ,2i )2. The monometric M4 computes the squared number
of reversals.
(v) M5
(
R1,R2
)
=
r∑
i=1
K
l,
k(k−1)
2
(1i ,2i ) (with l ∈ {1, . . . , k(k−1)2 }). The monometric M5
fixes a maximum admissible disagreement between rankings and counts the number
of reversals needed in order to go from a profile of rankings to another one, penalizing
this count each time that this maximum admissible disagreement is reached.
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(vi) M6
(
R1,R2
)
= 1− δ(R1,R2). The monometric M6 only takes into account whether
or not two profiles of rankings differ. It must be noted that M6 is a monometric on
L(C )r that is not defined by means of a monometric on L(C ).
In the following example, these monometrics on L(C )r are illustrated.
Example 3.16 Let R1, R2 and R3 be the following profiles of rankings on C = {a, b, c, d}:
R1 = (11,12,13,14) =
(
a  b  c  d, a  b  d  c, d  c  a  b, d  c  b  a) ,
R2 = (21,22,23,24) =
(
a  b  d  c, d  c  a  b, d  c  b  a, d  c  b  a) ,
R3 = (31,32,33,34) =
(
a  b  d  c, d  c  b  a, d  c  b  a, a  b  c  d) .
It is easy to see that, considering Kemeny’s betweenness relation on L(C ), [1i ,2i ,3i ]
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. Therefore, it holds that [R1,R2,R3] considering the betweenness
relation on L(C )r induced by Kemeny’s betweenness relation on L(C ).
Furthermore,
M1(R1,R2) =
4∑
i=1
K(1i ,2i ) = 1 + 4 + 1 + 0 = 6 ,
M1(R1,R3) =
4∑
i=1
K(1i ,3i ) = 1 + 5 + 1 + 6 = 13 .
Note that it indeed holds that
M1(R1,R2) = 6 ≤ 13 = M1(R1,R3) .
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Other possible monometrics lead to2:
M2(R1,R2) =
4∑
i=1
1− δ(1i ,2i ) = 3 ,
M2(R1,R3) =
4∑
i=1
1− δ(1i ,3i ) = 4 ,
M3(R1,R2) =
4∑
i=1
m3
( 1i ,2i ) = 34 ,
M3(R1,R3) =
4∑
i=1
m3
( 1i ,3i ) = 54 ,
M4(R1,R2) =
4∑
i=1
K(1i ,2i )2 = 18 ,
M4(R1,R3) =
4∑
i=1
K(1i ,3i )2 = 63 ,
M5(R1,R2) =
4∑
i=1
K3,6
( 1i ,2i ) = 8 ,
M5(R1,R3) =
4∑
i=1
K3,6
( 1i ,3i ) = 14 ,
M6(R1,R2) = 1− δ(R1,R2) = 1 ,
M6(R1,R3) = 1− δ(R1,R3) = 1 .
The relationship between the costs of changing R1 into R2 and R1 into R3 are, of course,
still satisfied:
M2(R1,R2) = 3 ≤ 4 = M2(R1,R3) ,
M3(R1,R2) =
3
4
≤ 5
4
= M3(R1,R3) ,
M4(R1,R2) = 18 ≤ 63 = M4(R1,R3) ,
M5(R1,R2) = 8 ≤ 14 = M5(R1,R3) ,
M6(R1,R2) = 1 ≤ 1 = M6(R1,R3) .
2For the monometric M5, the maximum admissible disagreement is set to l = 3.
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3.2.4 Monometrics onMr(L(C ))
In some cases, a profile of rankings is given in the form of a multi-set where voters cannot
be related with their respective votes in order to preserve their privacy. These multi-
sets of rankings are called anonymised profiles of rankings. An anonymised profile is
denoted by Y and, when n ∈ N anonymised profiles of rankings of the same size r ∈ N
are considered, they are denoted by Y1, . . . ,Yn. The set of all anonymised profiles of r
rankings on C is denoted byMr(L(C )). Although no order is defined between the rankings
in an anonymised profile of rankings, we will assign a label to each ranking in order to
ease notations. For any j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we will denote by {{ji}}ri=1 the corresponding r
rankings in Yj. For a permutation σ ∈ Πr, where Πr = L({1, . . . , r}) denotes the set
of permutations of {1, . . . , r}, we will denote by σ(Y ) the profile of rankings where each
ranking of the anonymised profile of rankings Y is in the position given by σ.
After choosing a monometric, the notion of an optimal permutation triplet can be defined.
Intuitively, a permutation triplet is optimal if there are no other ways of re-ordering the
anonymised profiles leading to a lower cost considering the chosen monometric on L(C )r.
More formally, we introduce optimal permutation triplets in the following definition.
Definition 3.17 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters, Y1,Y2,Y3 ∈
Mr(L(C )) be three anonymised profiles and M be a monometric on L(C )r (w.r.t. a be-
tweenness relation on L(C )r). A permutation triplet (σ1, σ2, σ3) ∈ Π3r is called optimal
if 
M
(
σ1(Y1), σ2(Y2)
)
= min
σ,σ′∈Πr
M
(
σ(Y1), σ′(Y2)
)
,
M
(
σ1(Y1), σ3(Y3)
)
= min
σ,σ′∈Πr
M
(
σ(Y1), σ′(Y3)
)
,
M
(
σ2(Y2), σ3(Y3)
)
= min
σ,σ′∈Πr
M
(
σ(Y2), σ′(Y3)
)
.
The set of all optimal permutation triplets is denoted by ΘMr (Y1,Y2,Y3).
Although it may be non-intuitive at first sight, a betweenness relation on Mr(L(C )) de-
pends on a monometric on L(C )r. In the following example, the need of introducing
optimal permutation triplets for constructing a betweenness relation on Mr(L(C )) is il-
lustrated.
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Example 3.18 Let Y1, Y2 and Y3 be the following anonymised profiles of rankings on
C = {a, b, c, d}:
Y1 = {{11,12}} = {{a  b  c  d, d  c  b  a}} ,
Y2 = {{21,22}} = {{a  c  b  d, a  c  b  d}} ,
Y3 = {{31,32}} = {{a  b  c  d, d  c  b  a}} .
In case r = 2, it holds that Πr = {σI , σR}, with σI = (1, 2) and σR = (2, 1). We identify a
triplet of permutations (σI , σI , σR) ∈ Π3r such that
(
σI(Y1), σI(Y2), σR(Y1)
) ∈ W , where W
is the betweenness relation on L(C )r induced by Kemeny’s betweenness relation on L(C ).
This would contradict the closure axiom of a betweenness relation onMr(L(C )). One may
note that this non-intuitive result is due to the fact that (σI , σI , σR) may not be an optimal
permutation triplet (due to the coincidence axiom of a monometric).
Therefore, extending a betweenness relation on L(C )r to a betweenness relation on Mr
(L(C )) depends on the chosen monometric on L(C )r. In particular, we are interested in a
particular kind of monometrics on L(C )r.
Definition 3.19 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A mono-
metric M on L(C )r (w.r.t. a betweenness relation on L(C )r) is called order-invariant if,
for any three anonymised profiles Y1,Y2,Y3 ∈ Mr(L(C )), the following two statements
are equivalent:
(i) (σ1, σ2, σ3) ∈ ΘMr (Y1,Y2,Y3);
(ii)
(∀ε ∈ Π3)((σε(1), σε(2), σε(3)) ∈ ΘMr (Yε(1),Yε(2),Yε(3))).
Remark 3.20 In order to prove that a monometric is order invariant, it is sufficient to
prove that the following statements are equivalent:
(i) (σ1, σ2, σ3) ∈ ΘMr (Y1,Y2,Y3);
(ii) (σ2, σ3, σ1) ∈ ΘMr (Y2,Y3,Y1);
(iii) (σ3, σ1, σ2) ∈ ΘMr (Y3,Y1,Y2).
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Remark 3.21 Any symmetric monometric is, by definition of optimal permutation triplet,
order invariant. In particular, all the monometrics introduced in Subsection 3.2.3 are order
invariant.
The notion of an optimal permutation triplet defined by an order-invariant monometric on
L(C )r allows us to introduce a betweenness relation on Mr(L(C )). Obviously, different
monometrics on L(C )r may yield different betweenness relations on Mr(L(C )).
Proposition 3.22 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters, W be a be-
tweenness relation on L(C )r and M be an order-invariant monometric on L(C )r w.r.t. W .
The ternary relation W on Mr(L(C )) defined as
W =
(Y1,Y2,Y3) ∈Mr(L(C ))3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ΘMr (Y1,Y2,Y3) 6= ∅
∧(∀(σ1, σ2, σ3) ∈ ΘMr (Y1,Y2,Y3))((
σ1(Y1), σ2(Y2), σ3(Y3)
) ∈ W)

is a betweenness relation.
Proof: We prove thatW satisfies the two axioms of a betweenness relation onMr(L(C )).
Symmetry in the end points: for any Y1,Y2,Y3 ∈Mr(L(C )), it holds that(
Y1,Y2,Y3
) ∈W
⇔
ΘMr (Y1,Y2,Y3) 6= ∅(∀(σ1, σ2, σ3) ∈ ΘMr (Y1,Y2,Y3))((σ1(Y1), σ2(Y2), σ3(Y3)) ∈ W)
⇔
ΘMr (Y1,Y2,Y3) 6= ∅(∀(σ1, σ2, σ3) ∈ ΘMr (Y1,Y2,Y3))((σ3(Y3), σ2(Y2), σ1(Y1)) ∈ W)
⇔
(∗)
ΘMr (Y1,Y2,Y3) 6= ∅(∀(σ3, σ2, σ1) ∈ ΘMr (Y3,Y2,Y1))((σ3(Y3), σ2(Y2), σ1(Y1)) ∈ W)
⇔ (Y3,Y2,Y1) ∈W ,
(∗) as M is order invariant.
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Closure: for any Y1,Y2,Y3 ∈Mr(L(C )), it holds that(
(Y1,Y2,Y3) ∈W
) ∧ ((Y1,Y3,Y2) ∈W)
⇔

ΘMr (Y1,Y2,Y3) 6= ∅(∀(σ1, σ2, σ3) ∈ ΘMr (Y1,Y2,Y3))((σ1(Y1), σ2(Y2), σ3(Y3)) ∈ W)ΘMr (Y1,Y3,Y2) 6= ∅(∀(σ′1, σ′3, σ′2) ∈ ΘMr (Y1,Y3,Y2))((σ′1(Y1), σ′3(Y3), σ′2(Y2)) ∈ W)
⇔
(∗)

ΘMr (Y1,Y2,Y3) 6= ∅(∀(σ1, σ2, σ3) ∈ ΘMr (Y1,Y2,Y3))((
σ1(Y1), σ2(Y2), σ3(Y3)
) ∈ W ∧ (σ1(Y1), σ3(Y3), σ2(Y2)) ∈ W)
⇔
ΘMr (Y1,Y2,Y3) 6= ∅(∀(σ1, σ2, σ3) ∈ ΘMr (Y1,Y2,Y3))(σ2(Y2) = σ3(Y3))
⇔ Y2 = Y3 ,
(∗) as M is order invariant.
Thus, W is a betweenness relation on Mr(L(C )). 
W is called a ‘betweenness relation on Mr(L(C )) induced by W and M ’. The formula
‘(Y1,Y2,Y3) ∈W’ is read ‘Y2 is in between Y1 and Y3’ and is denoted as [Y1,Y2,Y3].
Given a monometric on L(C )r, we can construct a monometric on Mr(L(C )).
Proposition 3.23 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters, W be a
betweenness relation on L(C )r and M : L(C )r ×L(C )r → R be an order-invariant mono-
metric on L(C )r w.r.t. W . The function M :Mr(L(C ))×Mr(L(C ))→ R defined by
M(Y1,Y2) = min
σ,σ′∈Πr
M
(
σ(Y1), σ
′(Y2)
)
is a monometric on Mr(L(C )) w.r.t. W, the betweenness relation on Mr(L(C )) induced
by W and M .
Proof: We prove that M satisfies the three axioms of a monometric on Mr(L(C ))
w.r.t. W.
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Non-negativity: immediate.
Coincidence: for any Y1,Y2 ∈Mr(L(C )), it holds that
M(Y1,Y2) := min
σ,σ′∈Πr
M
(
σ(Y1), σ
′(Y2)
)
= 0
⇔ (∃σ1, σ2 ∈ Πr)(M(σ1(Y1), σ2(Y2)) = 0)
⇔ (∃σ1, σ2 ∈ Πr)(σ1(Y1) = σ2(Y2))
⇔ Y1 = Y2 .
Compatibility: for any Y1,Y2,Y3 ∈ Mr(L(C )) such that (Y1,Y2,Y3) ∈ W, it holds by
definition for any (σ1, σ2, σ3) ∈ ΘMr (Y1,Y2,Y3) that(
σ1(Y1), σ2(Y2), σ3(Y3)
) ∈W .
Hence,
M(Y1,Y2) = min
σ,σ′∈Πr
M
(
σ(Y1), σ
′(Y2)
)
= M
(
σ1(Y1), σ2(Y2)
)
≤M(σ1(Y1), σ3(Y3)) = min
σ,σ′∈Πr
M
(
σ(Y1), σ
′(Y3)
)
= M(Y1,Y3) .
Thus, M is a monometric on Mr(L(C )) w.r.t. W. 
The following corollary shows how any monometric on L(C ) naturally leads to a mono-
metric on Mr(L(C )).
Corollary 3.24 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters, w be a between-
ness relation on L(C ) and m : L(C ) × L(C ) → R be an order-invariant monometric on
L(C ) w.r.t. w. The function M :Mr(L(C ))×Mr(L(C ))→ R defined by
M(Y1,Y2) = min
σ∈Πr
r∑
i=1
m
( 1i ,2σ(i) )
is a monometric on Mr(L(C )) w.r.t. W, the betweenness relation on Mr(L(C )) induced
by W (the betweenness relation on L(C ) induced by w) and M (the monometric on L(C )
induced by the addition).
Considering the monometrics on L(C ) introduced in Subsection 3.2.2, we obtain the fol-
lowing monometrics on Mr(L(C )):
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(i) M1
(
Y1,Y2
)
= min
σ∈Πr
r∑
i=1
K
( 1i ,2σ(i) ). The monometric M1 counts the number of
reversals needed in order to go from an anonymised profile of rankings to another
one.
(ii) M2
(
Y1,Y2
)
= min
σ∈Πr
r∑
i=1
1− δ( 1i ,2σ(i) ). The monometric M2 counts the number of
rankings that differ from an anonymised profile of rankings to another one.
(iii) M3
(
Y1,Y2
)
= min
σ∈Πr
r∑
i=1
m3
( 1i ,2σ(i) ). The monometric M3 counts the number of
high-ranked candidates that need to be changed in order to go from an anonymised
profile of rankings to another one.
(iv) M4
(
Y1,Y2
)
= min
σ∈Πr
r∑
i=1
K
( 1i ,2σ(i) )2. The monometric M4 computes the the
squared number of reversals needed in order to go from an anonymised profile of
rankings to another one.
(v) M5
(
Y1,Y2
)
= min
σ∈Πr
r∑
i=1
K
l,
k(k−1)
2
( 1i ,2σ(i) ) (with l ∈ {1, . . . , k(k−1)2 }). The mono-
metric M5 fixes a maximum admissible disagreement between rankings and counts
the number of reversals needed in order to go from an anonymised profile of rank-
ings to another one, penalizing this count each time that this maximum admissible
disagreement is reached.
(vi) M6
(
Y1,Y2
)
= 1 − δ(Y1,Y2). The monometric M6 only takes into account whether
or not two anonymised profiles of rankings differ. It must be noted that M6 is a
monometric on Mr(L(C )) that is not defined by means of a monometric on L(C ).
Remark 3.25 As the addition is commutative, permutations of the first anonymised pro-
file are not needed.
In the following example, these concepts are illustrated.
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Example 3.26 Let Y1, Y2 and Y3 be the following anonymised profiles of rankings on
C = {a, b, c, d}:
Y1 = {{11,12}} = {{a  b  c  d, d  c  b  a}} ,
Y2 = {{21,22}} = {{a  d  b  c, d  c  b  a}} ,
Y3 = {{31,32}} = {{d  a  b  c, c  d  b  a}} .
In this example, we will consider W to be the betweenness relation on L(C )r induced by
Kemeny’s betweenness relation w on L(C ).
As was stated in Proposition 3.22, in case the monometric M1 (w.r.t. W ) on L(C )r given
by the sum of the Kendall distances is considered, a betweenness relation W1 onMr(L(C ))
is induced by W and M1.
In case r = 2, it holds that Πr = {σI , σR}, with σI = (1, 2) and σR = (2, 1). Con-
sidering M1, only (σI , σI) and (σR, σR) minimize M1
(
σ(Y1), σ′(Y2)
)
. Analogously, only
(σI , σI) and (σR, σR) minimize M1
(
σ(Y1), σ′(Y3)
)
and only (σI , σI) and (σR, σR) minimize
M1
(
σ(Y2), σ′(Y3)
)
. Therefore, there are only two optimal permutation triplets (σ1, σ2, σ3) ∈
ΘMr (Y1,Y2,Y3): (σI , σI , σI) and (σR, σR, σR).
Firstly, considering (σ1, σ2, σ3) = (σI , σI , σI), it holds that( 1σI(1),2σI(1),3σI(1) ) = ( 11,21,31 ) = (a b c d, a d b c, d a b c) ∈ w( 1σI(2),2σI(2),3σI(2) ) = ( 12,22,32 ) = (d c a b, d c b a, c d b a) ∈ w
and, therefore,
(
σI(Y1), σI(Y2), σI(Y3)
) ∈ W . Analogously, considering (σ1, σ2, σ3) =
(σR, σR, σR), it holds that( 1σR(1),2σR(1),3σR(1) ) = ( 12,22,32 ) = (d c a b, d c b a, c d b a) ∈ w( 1σR(2),2σR(2),3σR(2) ) = ( 11,21,31 ) = (a b c d, a d b c, d a b c) ∈ w
Therefore,
(
σR(Y1), σR(Y2), σR(Y3)
) ∈ W . Finally, as every optimal permutation triplet
belongs to W , it holds that (Y1,Y2,Y3) ∈W1.
Note that, in case the monometric M1 on Mr(L(C )) (w.r.t. W1) defined as
M1(Y ,Y ′) = min
σ,σ′∈Πr
M1
(
σ(Y ), σ′(Y ′)
)
,
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is considered, it holds that
M1(Y1,Y2) = min
σ,σ′∈Πr
M1
(
σ(Y1), σ
′(Y2)
)
= min
(
M1
(
σI(Y1), σI(Y2)
)
,M1
(
σI(Y1), σR(Y2)
)
,
M1
(
σR(Y1), σR(Y2)
)
,M1
(
σR(Y1), σI(Y2)
))
= min(3, 9, 3, 9) = 3 .
Analogously,
M1(Y1,Y3) = min
σ,σ′∈Πr
M1
(
σ(Y1), σ
′(Y3)
)
= min
(
M1
(
σI(Y1), σI(Y3)
)
,M1
(
σI(Y1), σR(Y3)
)
,
M1
(
σR(Y1), σR(Y3)
)
,M1
(
σR(Y1), σI(Y3)
))
= min(5, 7, 5, 7) = 5 .
Therefore, as expected due to (Y1,Y2,Y3) ∈W1, it holds that
M1(Y1,Y2) = 3 ≤ 5 = M1(Y1,Y3) .
On the other hand, in case the monometric M2 (w.r.t. W ) on L(C )r given by the sum
of the zero-one comparisons between rankings is considered, a betweenness relation W2 on
Mr(L(C )), is also induced by W and M2, as was stated in Proposition 3.22.
Now, considering M2, any couple of permutations minimizes M2
(
σ(Y1), σ′(Y2)
)
. Analo-
gously, any couple of permutations minimizes M2
(
σ(Y1), σ′(Y3)
)
and M2
(
σ(Y2), σ′(Y3)
)
.
Therefore, considering, for instance, (σI , σR, σI), it holds that
M2
(
σI(Y1), σR(Y2)
)
= min
σ,σ′∈Πr
M2
(
σ(Y1), σ′(Y2)
)
,
M2
(
σI(Y1), σI(Y3)
)
= min
σ,σ′∈Πr
M2
(
σ(Y1), σ′(Y3)
)
,
M2
(
σR(Y2), σI(Y3)
)
= min
σ,σ′∈Πr
M2
(
σ(Y2), σ′(Y3)
)
,
i.e., it is an optimal permutation triplet. However, as( 1σI(1),2σR(1),3σI(1) ) = ( 11,22,31 ) = (a b c d, d c b a, d a b c) 6∈ w ,( 1σI(2),2σR(2),3σI(2) ) = ( 12,21,32 ) = (d c a b, a d b c, c d b a) 6∈ w ,
it holds that
(
σI(Y1), σR(Y2), σI(Y3)
) 6∈ W .
Thus, (Y1,Y2,Y3) 6∈W2 (even though (Y1,Y2,Y3) ∈W1).
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3.3 Cost calculation as an optimization problem
Many problems related with monometrics can be formulated as optimization problems. In
this section, two particular problems are analysed: the calculation of the cost of changing an
anonymised profile of rankings into another one and the search for a ‘closest’ (anonymised)
profile of rankings satisfying a certain property.
3.3.1 Calculating the cost of changing an anonymised profile of rankings into
another one
Calculating the cost of changing a profile into another one considering a monometric on
L(C )r of the form
M
(
R1,R2
)
=
r∑
i=1
m
( 1i ,2i ) ,
where m is a monometric on L(C ), is a trivial problem.
However, calculating the cost of changing an anonymised profile into another one consid-
ering a monometric on Mr(L(C )) of the form
M
(
Y1,Y2
)
= min
σ
r∑
i=1
m
( 1i ,2σ(i) ) ,
where m is a monometric on L(C ), is not trivial as the best matching needs to be found.
The search for this best matching can be seen as an assignment problem [110], which is a
particular case of Integer Linear Programming (ILP).
In an assignment problem, there are a number of agents and the same number of tasks.
Each agent has an associated cost for performing each of the tasks. The goal of an assign-
ment problem is to search for a distribution of tasks with the minimum possible total cost
such that every agent performs one and exactly one task.
In our particular setting, we have two anonymised profiles Y1 and Y2 consisting of r
rankings. For solving the problem, we will define r2 variables xij taking values in {0, 1}.
For any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, xij = 1 means that the i-th ranking in Y1 is assigned to the j-th
ranking in Y2. Analogously, xij = 0 means that the i-th ranking in Y1 is not assigned to
the j-th ranking in Y2. As the assignment needs to be a bijection, the sums of the xij for
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either i’s or j’s needs to be equal to one. Also a matrix of costs C needs to be defined,
where the element Cij represents the cost of changing the i-th ranking in Y1 into the j-th
ranking in Y2.
The mathematical formulation of the problem is:
Minimize
r∑
i=1
r∑
j=1
Cijxij w.r.t. {xij}ri,j=1
s.t.
r∑
i=1
xij = 1, for any j ∈ {1, . . . , r} ,
r∑
j=1
xij = 1, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , r} ,
xij ≥ 0, for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , r} ,
xij ∈ Z, for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , r} .
Assignment problems are one of the fundamental problems in combinatorial optimization
and have been deeply studied. There exist several methods to solve this problem in poly-
nomial time, for instance, the Hungarian method [86].
3.3.2 Searching the ‘closest’ (anonymised) profile of rankings
In some cases, we are not interested in obtaining the cost of changing a profile of rankings
into another one, but in the ‘closest’ profile of rankings satisfying a certain property given
a profile of rankings R. In this case, we will no longer have an assignment problem, as the
‘tasks’ are unknown. However, a transportation problem can be defined [101].
In a transportation problem, we have a number of supply points and a number of demand
points. At each supply point certain product is produced and it needs to be transported to
the demand points satisfying the required demands at each demand point. Transporting a
unit of product from a supply point to a demand point has an associated cost. An optimal
transportation distribution needs to be defined such that the demand is satisfied.
Note that in our particular setting, each ranking in L(C ) is both a supply point and a
demand point. The quantity of product produced at each supply point is given by R
and, as the number of rankings needs to be preserved, all the produced units need to be
transported to a demand point. There are no demands at each demand point. Formalizing
the problem is similar to the assignment problem where (k!)2 variables xij taking values
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in N ∪ {0} are defined, k being the number of candidates in C . For any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k!},
xij = n means that n units of the i-th ranking in L(C ) are assigned to n units of the j-th
rankings in L(C ). In this case, we have an initial profile of rankings where each ranking i
appears si times. These si can be seen as the number of units of product that are produced
at each supply point. The goal is to distribute these products satisfying the required global
demand and a certain property P that can be defined as a linear condition on the profile
of rankings. The constraints used in the assignment problem need to be modified, leading
to the following problem:
Minimize
k!∑
i=1
k!∑
j=1
Cijxij w.r.t. {xij}k!i,j=1
s.t.
k!∑
j=1
xij = si, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k!} ,
xij ≥ 0, for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k!} ,
xij ∈ Z, for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k!} ,
P, the property to be satisfied by the profile of rankings .
Transportation problems with additional constraints can also be solved in polynomial
time [84]. Note that, on the one hand, in the calculation of the cost of changing a profile
of rankings into another one, this polynomial time is in terms of r, the number of rankings
in the profiles. On the other hand, in the calculation of the ‘closest’ profile of rankings
satisfying a fixed property, this polynomial time is in terms of k!, which turns out to be
an euphemism for non-polynomial time. This is an obvious computational drawback, even
though in some fields of application of the aggregation of rankings, for instance in social
choice theory, the number of candidates in C is typically quite small. The simplest case
where the property P requires all the rankings in the profile to be the same (Kemeny [80])
has called the attention of several researchers. Although to compute its winning ranking
is proved to be an NP-hard problem [9], several algorithms improving the performance of
the method have been proposed [1, 13, 77]. Further research on the computational aspects
of the search for the ‘closest’ profile of rankings still needs to be addressed in the general
case.
Note that in case the required property does not take the order of the voters into account,
every profile of rankings given by a permutation of an anonymised profile of rankings
satisfies the same property. In that case, the search for the ‘closest’ profile of rankings
satisfying certain property is equivalent to the search for the ‘closest’ anonymised profile
of rankings.
CHAPTER 3 RATIONALISATION OF RANKING RULES 71
3.3.3 The special case of the zero-one monometric
The complexity of the problem of finding the ‘closest’ profile of rankings may depend on
the chosen monometric. For instance, a less complex problem can be solved in case the
zero-one monometric on L(C )r is considered.
M2
(
R1,R2
)
=
r∑
i=1
1− δ( 1i ,2i ) .
In this case, as every change is equally costly, looking for the assignment that will lead to
the lowest cost is not necessary. Therefore, an easier Integer Linear Programming problem
can be defined.
Firstly, we will define k! positive integer variables that will be denoted by xi. Each xi will
represent the number of times the i-th ranking in L(C ) appears in the closest profile of
rankings. Analogously, each oi will represent the number of times the i-th ranking in L(C )
appears in the given profile of rankings.
We will minimize the zero-one monometric M2
(
R1,R2
)
, which can be written in terms of
our variables as:
1
2
k!∑
i=1
|xi − oi| . (3.1)
Note that, due to the absolute values, we have an Integer Non-Linear Programming problem
(INLP) instead of an Integer Linear Programming problem (ILP). Fortunately, an absolute
value constraint can be turned into two linear constraints by adding an additional positive
variable. In particular, minimizing Eq. (3.1) is equivalent to minimizing:
1
2
k!∑
i=1
yi ,
under the additional constraints, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k!},
xi − oi ≤ yi ,
oi − xi ≤ yi .
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Therefore, the problem to be optimized is the following:
Minimize
1
2
k!∑
i=1
yi w.r.t. {yi}k!i=1
s.t.
k!∑
i=1
xi = r ,
xi − oi ≤ yi ,
oi − xi ≤ yi ,
xi, yi ≥ 0, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k!} ,
xi, yi ∈ Z, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k!} ,
P, the property to be satisfied by the profile of rankings .
Although the computational cost of the algorithm is still polynomial in terms of k!, a
significant reduction in the number of variables was addressed (2k! instead of (k!)2) with
respect to the general case.
3.4 Hierarchical combination of monometrics
There exist many different monometrics defined according to different criteria: number of
reversals made, number of rankings changed, etc. Moreover, in general, the uniqueness of a
‘closest’ (anonymised) profile of rankings is not assured. An intuitive idea to reduce the set
of ‘closest’ (anonymised) profiles of rankings satisfying a fixed property is to hierarchically
combine monometrics.
In the following proposition, we will see that any convex combination of a finite number
of monometrics is a monometric.
Proposition 3.27 Let A and B be two sets such that A ⊆ B, let R be a betweenness
relation on B and M1, . . . ,Mn : A × B → R be n monometrics (w.r.t. R). For any
(α1, . . . , αn) ∈ [0, 1]n such that
∑n
i=1 αi = 1, the function M : A×B → R defined by
M(a, b) =
n∑
i=1
αiMi(a, b)
is a monometric w.r.t. R.
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Proof: We prove that M satisfies the three axioms of a monometric w.r.t. R.
Non-negativity: immediate.
Coincidence: for any a ∈ A, any b ∈ B and any (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ [0, 1]n, it holds that
M(a, b) :=
n∑
i=1
αiMi(a, b) = 0
⇔ (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n})(αi = 0 ∨Mi(a, b) = 0)
⇔ ∧ (∃i ∈ {1, . . . , n})(αi 6= 0 ∧Mi(a, b) = 0)
⇔ a = b .
Compatibility: for any a ∈ A and any b, c ∈ B such that [a, b, c] and any (α1, . . . , αn) ∈
[0, 1]n, it holds that
M(a, b) =
n∑
i=1
αiMi(a, b)
≤
n∑
i=1
αiMi(a, c)
= M(a, c) .
Thus, M is a monometric w.r.t. R. 
Remark 3.28 It must be noted that in the case of anonymised profiles of rankings, be-
tweenness relations induced by monometrics on L(C )r are commonly used. The result of
Proposition 3.27 does not hold when considering, instead of a fixed betweenness relation,
a different betweenness relation for each monometric. For instance, let us consider a be-
tweenness relation W on L(C )r. The function M :Mr(L(C )) ×Mr(L(C )) → R defined
by
M(Y1,Y2) =
n∑
i=1
αiMi(Y1,Y2)
where M1, . . . ,Mn are n monometrics onMr(L(C )) w.r.t. W1, . . . ,Wn (the n betweenness
relations on Mr(L(C )) induced by M1, . . . ,Mn) respectively, is not guaranteed to satisfy
compatibility w.r.t. W (the betweenness relation on Mr(L(C )) induced by M). This is
because ∩ni=1Wi is not necessarily included in W.
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According to these results, a hierarchical combination of two monometrics where the second
monometric is used as a tie-breaker method between all the ‘closest’ anonymised profiles
of rankings can be proposed.
Let us consider two monometrics on L(C )r bounded from above by an upper bound Bu
and such that the cost of changing any profile of rankings into a different one is bounded
from below by a lower bound Bl > 0. If we consider the function
M(R1,R2) = αM1(R1,R2) + (1− α)M2(R1,R2) ,
then we can express M2 as a tie-breaker of M1 considering any α ∈ ] BuBu+Bl , 1[. Analogously,
we can express M1 as a tie-breaker of M2 considering any α ∈ ]0, BlBu+Bl [.
These results can be trivially extended to monometrics on Mr(L(C )).
i Mi/Mi Bl Bu
1 M1/M1 1 rk(k−1)2
2 M2/M2 1 r
3 M3/M3 21−k r2
4 M4/M4 1
(
rk(k−1)
2
)2
5 M5/M5 1 rk(k−1)2
6 M6/M6 1 1
Table 3.1: Lower and upper bounds of the monometrics on L(C )r defined
in Subsection 3.2.3 (left) and of the monometrics on Mr(L(C )) defined in
Subsection 3.2.4 (right).
Note that, as can be seen in Table 3.1, the monometrics on L(C )r defined in Subsec-
tion 3.2.3 and the monometrics on Mr(L(C )) defined in Subsection 3.2.4 are bounded in
this way.
3.5 Monometric rationalisation of ranking rules
Under the name of metric rationalisation of ranking rules [2, 27, 49, 88, 100, 106], several
authors have discussed how most ranking rules can be characterized as minimizing the
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distance to a consensus state for some appropriate distance function. In this section, we
advocate for the use of a monometric instead, leading to the monometric rationalisation
of ranking rules.
However, when we are not dealing with a notion of closeness in the most geometrical sense,
the symmetry axiom of a distance function might not be necessary. Quoting Tversky and
Gati on the study of similarity measures [158, 159], one can understand that the term
closeness is not always interpreted as a symmetric term: “The poet writes ‘my love is as
deep as the ocean’, not ‘the ocean is as deep as my love’, because the ocean epitomizes
depth”.
Even more importantly, the triangle inequality of a distance function may not always be
linked to a notion of closeness. Quoting again Tversky and Gati, one may think about
how close two countries are: “Consider the similarity between countries: Jamaica is similar
to Cuba (because of geographical proximity); Cuba is similar to Russia (because of their
political affinity); but Jamaica and Russia are not similar at all. This example [...] suggests
that the perceived distance of Jamaica to Russia exceeds the perceived distance of Jamaica
to Cuba, plus that of Cuba to Russia - contrary to the triangle inequality.”
As another example, when thinking of a human, a centaur and a horse, the term closeness
is neither related with the triangle inequality (the perceived distance of a human to a horse
exceeds the perceived distance of a human to a centaur, plus that of a centaur to a horse).
Nevertheless, there is a clear betweenness relation: A centaur is between a human and a
horse and, therefore, a human should always be closer to a centaur than to a horse.
Figure 3.3: Images of a human (A), a centaur (B) and a horse (C).
Closeness is a vague term here. From a geometrical point of view, symmetry and the tri-
angle inequality are needed. Nevertheless, in the rationalisation of ranking rules, closeness
is not defined by a geometrical concept. Here, this closeness is related to the notion of
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(local) penalty function used in the aggregation of real numbers [25], where the axioms of
symmetry and the triangle inequality are no longer required, but an additional axiom of
quasi-convexity providing the penalty with a well-founded semantic basis is required. In
this work, this well-founded semantic basis is captured by requiring the preservation of a
natural betweenness relation. Therefore, closeness is no longer measured by a metric, but
by a monometric.
In that way, monometrics (instead of distance functions) should be considered in the ra-
tionalisation of ranking rules. Of course, a meaningful betweenness relation needs to be
fixed according to the nature of the considered problem. Although it may seem natural to
consider the one defined by Kemeny, this does not need to be an imposition.
The two-step procedure of the rationalisation of ranking rules is now as follows:
(i) Search for the ‘closest’ profile of rankings in the chosen consensus state by means of
a monometric.
(ii) Analysis of the consensus state to obtain the winning ranking.
Note that most consensus states do not take the order of the voters into account. Therefore,
every profile of rankings given by a permutation of an anonymised profile of rankings is in
the same consensus state of the anonymised profile as was explained in Subsection 3.3.2. In
case the order of the rankings is not relevant, the search for the ‘closest’ profile of rankings
in some consensus state is equivalent to the search for the ‘closest’ anonymised profile of
rankings in the same consensus state. This result allows us to systematically work with
anonymised profiles of rankings instead of profiles and to assure the privacy of the voters.
Conversely, we can, and will, directly work with profiles of rankings in order to ease the
understanding of this dissertation. Of course, when a consensus state takes the order of
the rankings into account (such as dictatorship or other weighted voting systems), this
anonymisation cannot be addressed.
We conclude that the use of a monometric better fits the spirit of the rationalisation of
ranking rules than the use of a distance function. Indeed, the (mono)metric rationalisa-
tion of ranking rules can be understood as a penalty-based approach for the aggregation
of rankings. Most of the times, as Yager described in his “general theory of information
aggregation” back in 1993 [166], aggregation outside the real line is understood as a process
of minimizing some notion of penalty that measures the deviation from a consensus ele-
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ment [62, 63]. Obviously, the ideas of Yager have long time been surpassed. However, over
the years, the use of penalty functions has shifted towards the aggregation of values in a
closed interval of the real line [24, 25, 26, 165, 167]. In this setting, the considered penalty
is more similar to the notion of monometric than to the notion of a distance function,
enforcing the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules over the metric rationalisation
of ranking rules.
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CHAPTER 4
Representations of votes
In the field of social choice theory, the preferences of the voters are usually compressed
into representations of votes gathering the most significant information. For instance, the
Borda count [18] reduces the preferences given by the voters to the scorix [125], which is a
matrix where the element at the i-th row and j-th column represents the number of times
that the i-th candidate is ranked at the j-th position in the profile of rankings given by
the voters. Besides the Borda count, all other scoring ranking rules [57, 102, 104, 169] also
reduce the profile of rankings given by the voters to the scoring matrix. Based on the ideas
of Condorcet [35], another representation of votes gathering a completely different type of
information is commonly used in social choice theory: the votrix [124]. The votrix is a
matrix where the element at the i-th row and j-th column represents the number of times
that the i-th candidate is preferred to the j-th candidate in the preferences given by the
voters. This type of representation of votes where candidates are head-to-head compared
with each other is said to be based on pairwise information. Many other representations of
votes based on pairwise information, such as the beatpath matrix [147] and the votex [124],
have been used in social choice theory.
4.1 The scorix
Let us recall that the position of candidate ai in ranking j is denoted by Pj(ai) (consid-
ering position 1 is the best). Each profile of rankings defines a matrix, henceforth called
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a scorix1 [125], where each row represents a candidate in C and each column represents a
position ` ∈ {1, . . . , k}. In that way, the element at the i-th row and `-th column equals
the number of times that the i-th candidate is ranked at the `-th position.
Definition 4.1 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A matrix
S ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r}k×k is called a scorix (plural scorices) on C if there exists a profile R of r
rankings on C such that, for any ai ∈ C and any ` ∈ {1, . . . , k}, it holds that
Si` = #{j ∈ {1, . . . , r} | Pj(ai) = `} .
The set of all scorices on C induced by any profile of r rankings on C is denoted by Sr(C ).
Remark 4.2 The notion of a scorix is well known [52, 53, 57, 58, 92, 93, 144, 154, 169]
in social choice theory, usually considered either in the form of a matrix or in the form of
an ensemble of vectors corresponding to the different rows of the scorix.
For any scorix S ∈ Sr(C ), the i-th row (i ∈ {1, . . . , k}) is called the vector of positions
of candidate ai and is denoted by Si. Note that, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, it holds that
Si ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r}k.
In order to illustrate how the scorix induced by a profile of rankings can be obtained, we
consider the following example.
Example 4.3 Consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and a profile of rankings
R = (i)3i=1 given by three voters. These rankings are shown in Table 4.1.
# i Rankings on C
1 a  b  c  d
1 a  d  b  c
1 d  a  c  b
Table 4.1: Frequency of the rankings on C expressed by three voters.
Note that candidate a is ranked twice at the first position and once at the second position
and it is not ranked at the third or fourth position in any of the rankings. Therefore, the
1Scorix is a contraction of the term ‘scoring matrix’.
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vector of positions of candidate a is (2, 1, 0, 0). In the same way, the vector of positions of
candidate b is (0, 1, 1, 1), the vector of positions of candidate c is (0, 0, 2, 1) and the vector
of positions of candidate d is (1, 1, 0, 1). The scorix is then given by:
S =

2 1 0 0
0 1 1 1
0 0 2 1
1 1 0 1
 .
As the number of candidates and the number of candidates ranked at each position are
constant, it is straightforward to see that a scorix always satisfies the properties listed in
the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. For any
scorix S ∈ Sr(C ), the following properties are fulfilled:
(i) Completeness in candidates: for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, it holds that
k∑
`=1
Si` = r .
(ii) Completeness in positions: for any ` ∈ {1, . . . , k}, it holds that
k∑
i=1
Si` = r .
Proof: Completeness in candidates: for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, ∑k`=1 Si` represents the total
number of times that the i-th candidate is ranked at any position; as every voter provides
a ranking on the set of candidates, it obviously equals r.
Completeness in positions: for any ` ∈ {1, . . . , k}, ∑ki=1 Si` represents the total number of
times that any candidate is ranked at the `-th position; as every voter provides a ranking
on the set of candidates, it obviously equals r. 
The following result, due to Fine and Fine [52], expresses that any matrix satisfying the
properties listed in Proposition 4.4 is a scorix, i.e., there exists a profile of rankings on
the set of candidates such that the element at the i-th row and `-th column of the matrix
equals the number of times that the i-th candidate is ranked at the `-th position.
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Proposition 4.5 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. Any
matrix S ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r}k×k satisfying the properties listed in Proposition 4.4 is a scorix.
4.2 The votrix
The strength of support of candidate ai1 over candidate ai2 is then defined as the number
of times that candidate ai1 is preferred to candidate ai2 :
s(ai1 , ai2) = #{j ∈ {1, . . . , r} | ai1 j ai2} .
This strength of support defines a matrix V , henceforth called a votrix2 [124], where the
element at the i-th row and the j-th column is the strength of support of the i-th candidate
over the j-th candidate.
Definition 4.6 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A matrix
V ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r}k×k is called a votrix (plural votrices) on C if there exists a profile R of r
rankings on C such that, for any ai, aj ∈ C , it holds that
Vij = s(ai, aj) .
The set of all votrices on C induced by any profile of r rankings on C is denoted by Vr(C ).
Remark 4.7 The notion of a votrix is well known [35, 170] in social choice theory.
In order to illustrate how the votrix induced by a profile of rankings can be obtained, we
consider the following example.
Example 4.8 Consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and a profile of rankings
R = (i)3i=1 given by three voters provided in Table 4.1.
Note that the strength of support of candidate a over candidate b equals three, as a is
preferred to b in all three rankings. Analogously, the strength of support of candidate b over
2Votrix is a contraction of the term ‘voting matrix’.
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# i Rankings on C
1 a  b  c  d
1 a  d  b  c
1 d  a  c  b
Table 4.2: Frequency of the rankings on C expressed by three voters.
candidate a equals zero, as there is no ranking where b is preferred to a. The votrix is then
given by:
V =

0 3 3 2
0 0 2 1
0 1 0 1
1 2 2 0
 .
Compressing a profile of rankings into a votrix is a common tool in social choice theory [170].
Unfortunately, recovering a profile of rankings from a given votrix is not possible. More-
over, necessary and sufficient conditions that a matrix needs to satisfy in order to be a
representation of a profile of rankings are also unknown for a number of candidates greater
than or equal to six [61, 94]. In the following proposition, some properties of votrices are
listed.
Proposition 4.9 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. For any
votrix V ∈ Vr(C ), the following properties are fulfilled:
(i) Strictness: for any ai1 ∈ C , it holds that
Vi1i1 = 0 .
(ii) Reciprocity: for any two different ai1 , ai2 ∈ C , it holds that
Vi1i2 + Vi2i1 = r .
(iii) Triangle inequality: for any ai1 , ai2 , ai3 ∈ C , it holds that
Vi1i2 + Vi2i3 ≥ Vi1i3 .
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Proof: Strictness: evident.
Reciprocity: for any two different ai1 , ai2 ∈ C , it holds that
Vi1i2 + Vi2i1 = s(ai1 , ai2) + s(ai2 , ai1)
= #{j ∈ {1, . . . , r} | ai1 j ai2}
+ #{j ∈ {1, . . . , r} | ai2 j ai1}
=#{j ∈ {1, . . . , r} | ai1 j ai2 ∨ ai2 j ai1} = r ,
as ai1 j ai2 and ai2 j ai1 are disjoint events.
Triangle inequality: for any ai1 , ai2 , ai3 ∈ C , it holds that
Vi1i2 + Vi2i3 = s(ai1 , ai2) + s(ai2 , ai3)
= #{j ∈ {1, . . . , r} | ai1 j ai2}
+ #{j ∈ {1, . . . , r} | ai2 j ai3}
≥ #{j ∈ {1, . . . , r} | ai1 j ai3}
= s(ai1 , ai3) = Vi1i3 . 
Note that these properties are the necessary and sufficient conditions that a matrix needs
to satisfy in order to be a representation of a profile of rankings for a set of at most five
candidates [61]. Although the sufficiency does not hold, they obviously remain necessary
conditions for a set of six or more candidates. Even though a characterization of votrices is
not known, we can identify a set of matrices that are ‘close’ to being votrices, by imposing
the necessary conditions listed in Proposition 4.9.
Definition 4.10 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A matrix
V ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r}k×k is called a quasivotrix (plural quasivotrices) on C if it satisfies the
properties listed in Proposition 4.9. The set of all quasivotrices on C with r voters is
denoted by VQr (C ).
Of course, any votrix is a quasivotrix, i.e., Vr(C ) ⊆ VQr (C ).
We recall that a common notion in social choice theory related to the votrix is that of
the Condorcet ranking, which is a ranking such that every candidate is preferred by more
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than half of the voters to all the candidates ranked at a worse position than him/her.
Analogously, a weak Condorcet ranking is a ranking such that every candidate is preferred
by not less than half of the voters to all the candidates ranked at a worse position than
him/her.
Definition 4.11 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C given
by the voters and V ∈ Vr(C ) be the votrix induced by R.
(i) A ranking  on C is called the Condorcet ranking if, for any ai, aj ∈ C such that
ai  aj, it holds that Vij > Vji.
(ii) A ranking  on C is called a weak Condorcet ranking if, for any ai, aj ∈ C such that
ai  aj, it holds that Vij ≥ Vji.
The Condorcet ranking is clearly unique, but there might exist several weak Condorcet
rankings. The existence of the Condorcet ranking or the existence of at least one weak
Condorcet ranking are not assured.
4.3 The votex
When a voter is providing a ranking a  b  c, he is actually declaring that he supports a
over c stronger than both a over b and b over c. This is not explicitly taken into account
in the votrix and a new tool gathering this additional information is introduced here. To
that end, we will provide a few notations that will be used throughout this paper. Let
C 26= = {(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 2 | ai1 6= ai2}, K+ = {1, . . . , k − 1}, K− = {1 − k, . . . ,−1} and
K = K− ∪ K+.
Now, we will consider the ‘relative position’ of a candidate ai1 w.r.t. a different candidate
ai2 . This relative position of ai1 w.r.t. ai2 can be obtained as Pj(ai2) − Pj(ai1) for each
possible j ∈ {1, . . . , r}. This difference can take any value in K. Collecting the information
given by all the voters, we denote by ni(ai1 , ai2) the absolute frequency for the value i of
the relative position of ai1 w.r.t. ai2 , that is, the number of voters considering that ai1 is i
positions before ai2 (or after when considering negative values of i):
ni(ai1 , ai2) = #{j ∈ {1, . . . , r} | Pj(ai2)− Pj(ai1) = i} .
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Note that ni(ai1 , ai2) = n−i(ai2 , ai1). Of course, these frequencies of relative positions can
be obtained for any couple of candidates in C 26=.
In order to illustrate how the frequencies of relative positions given by a profile of rankings
can be obtained, we consider the following example.
Example 4.12 Consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and a profile of rankings
R = (i)3i=1 given by three voters provided in Table 4.1.
# i Rankings on C
1 a  b  c  d
1 a  d  b  c
1 d  a  c  b
Table 4.3: Frequency of the rankings on C expressed by three voters.
It holds that n3(a, d) = 1, n−1(a, d) = 1, n1(a, d) = 1 and ni(a, d) = 0 for any i ∈
K\{−1, 1, 3}, since in the first ranking a is preferred to d and there are two candidates
in between them, in the second ranking a is preferred to d and there are no candidates in
between them and in the third ranking d is preferred to a and there are no candidates in
between them. Thus, the frequency distribution of relative positions for the couple (a, d) is
given by
i −3 −2 −1 1 2 3
ni(a, d) 0 0 1 1 0 1
Relative positions will always be listed from 1 − k to k − 1 (not including 0). Hence, this
frequency distribution can be denoted just by (0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1).
The frequency distributions for all couples of candidates are given by:
(a, b) → (0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 0) (c, a) → (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)
(a, c) → (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) (c, b) → (0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0)
(a, d) → (0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1) (c, d) → (0, 2, 0, 1, 0, 0)
(b, a) → (0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0) (d, a) → (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0)
(b, c) → (0, 0, 1, 2, 0, 0) (d, b) → (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1)
(b, d) → (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) (d, c) → (0, 0, 1, 0, 2, 0)
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Note that, as can be seen in Example 4.12, any profile of rankings R defines a function
of the form W : C 26= → {0, 1, . . . , r}2k−2. This function will be henceforth called the
votex3 [124] induced by the profile R.
Definition 4.13 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A function
W : C 26= → {0, 1, . . . , r}2k−2 is called a votex (plural votices) on C if there exists a profile
R of r rankings on C such that, for any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26= and any i ∈ K, it holds that
W (ai1 , ai2)(i) = ni(ai1 , ai2) .
The set of all votices on C induced by any profile of r rankings on C is denoted by Wr(C ).
Given a votex it is always possible to obtain the corresponding votrix. Unfortunately, the
converse is not possible.
Proposition 4.14 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters and W : C 26= → {0, 1, . . . , r}2k−2 be the votex induced by R. Then the
votrix induced by R can be obtained from the votex by means of the formula:
Vi1i2 =
∑
i∈K+
W (ai1 , ai2)(i) ,
for any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=. Obviously, Vi1i1 = 0 for any ai1 ∈ C .
Proof:
The result follows from the fact that
⋃
i∈K+{Pj(ai2)− Pj(ai1) = i} = {ai1 j ai2}. 
As in the case of the votrix, necessary and sufficient conditions that a function W : C 26= →
{0, 1, . . . , r}2k−2 needs to satisfy in order to be the votex of a profile of rankings are un-
known.
In the following proposition, some properties of votices are listed. They can be seen as
necessary conditions that a function W : C 26= → {0, 1, . . . , r}2k−2 needs to satisfy in order
3Votex is a contraction of the words ‘voting’ and ‘vertex’. Note that a votex is the set of all frequency
distributions induced by a voting profile on the vertices of the Hasse diagram of the order relation A (see
Definition 5.16).
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to be a votex. These properties are completeness (for each couple of candidates the sum
of the frequencies should be equal to the number of voters), reciprocity (the distribution of
frequencies of any couple (ai1 , ai2) should be opposite to the distribution of frequencies of
the couple (ai2 , ai1)), regularity (the total number of couples of candidates at each relative
position is fixed), peakedness (if two candidates are not consecutive there should be a
candidate in between them), the triangle inequality (if ai1 is preferred to ai3 by more than
half of the number of voters, then for any other candidate ai2 it is not possible that ai3
is preferred to ai2 by more than half of the number of voters and, at the same time, ai2
is preferred to ai1 by more than half of the number of voters) and maximality (if two
candidates ai1 and ai2 are at maximum distance, then only ai1 and ai2 can be ranked first
or last).
Proposition 4.15 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. For any
votex W ∈ Wr(C ), the following properties are fulfilled:
(i) Completeness: for any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=:∑
i∈K
ni(ai1 , ai2) = r .
(ii) Reciprocity: for any i ∈ K and any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=:
ni(ai1 , ai2) = n−i(ai2 , ai1) .
(iii) Regularity: for any i ∈ K: ∑
(u,v)∈C 26=
ni(u, v) = r(k − |i|) .
(iv) Peakedness: for any ai1 ∈ C and any i ∈ K+\{1}:∑
u∈C \{ai1}
ni(ai1 , u) ≤
∑
u∈C \{ai1}
ni−1(ai1 , u) ,
∑
u∈C \{ai1}
ni(u, ai1) ≤
∑
u∈C \{ai1}
ni−1(u, ai1) ,
for any ai1 ∈ C and any i ∈ K−\{−1}:∑
u∈C \{ai1}
ni(ai1 , u) ≤
∑
u∈C \{ai1}
ni+1(ai1 , u) ,
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∑
u∈C \{ai1}
ni(u, ai1) ≤
∑
u∈C \{ai1}
ni+1(u, ai1) .
(v) Triangle inequality: for any three different ai1 , ai2 , ai3 ∈ C :∑
i∈K+
ni(ai1 , ai2) +
∑
i∈K+
ni(ai2 , ai3) ≥
∑
i∈K+
ni(ai1 , ai3) ,
∑
i∈K−
ni(ai1 , ai2) +
∑
i∈K−
ni(ai2 , ai3) ≥
∑
i∈K−
ni(ai1 , ai3) .
(vi) Maximality: for any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=:∑
u∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
nk−1(ai1 , u) +
∑
v∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
nk−1(v, ai2) ≤
∑
i∈K+\{k−1}
ni(ai1 , ai2) ,
∑
u∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
n1−k(ai1 , u) +
∑
v∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
n1−k(v, ai2) ≤
∑
i∈K−\{1−k}
ni(ai1 , ai2) .
Proof: Completeness: for any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=,
∑
i∈K
ni(ai1 , ai2) is the number of voters.
Reciprocity: for any i ∈ K+ and any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=, if ai1 is ranked i positions before ai2 ,
then ai2 is ranked i positions after ai1 . Similarly, for any i ∈ K− and any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=,
if ai1 is ranked |i| positions after ai2 , then ai2 is ranked |i| positions before ai1 . Therefore,
ni(ai1 , ai2) = n−i(ai2 , ai1).
Regularity: consider the notation
1(x = i) =
1, if x = i,0, if x 6= i.
We have that ∑
(u,v)∈C 26=
ni(u, v) =
∑
(u,v)∈C 26=
r∑
j=1
1 (Pj(v)− Pj(u) = i)
=
r∑
j=1
∑
(u,v)∈C 26=
1 (Pj(v)− Pj(u) = i)
=
r∑
j=1
(k − |i|) = r(k − |i|) ,
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since there are exactly k − |i| couples of candidates with relative position i.
Peakedness: for any ai1 ∈ C and any i ∈ K+\{1}:∑
u∈C \{ai1}
ni(ai1 , u) =
∑
u∈C \{ai1}
r∑
j=1
1 (Pj(u)− Pj(ai1) = i)
=
r∑
j=1
∑
u∈C \{ai1}
1 (Pj(u)− Pj(ai1) = i)
=
r∑
j=1
1 (k − Pj(ai1) ≥ i)
≤
r∑
j=1
1 (k − Pj(ai1) ≥ i− 1)
=
r∑
j=1
∑
u∈C \{ai1}
1 (Pj(u)− Pj(ai1) = (i− 1))
=
∑
u∈C \{ai1}
ni−1(ai1 , u) .
The other three peakedness formulas can be proved analogously.
Triangle inequality: for any (u, v) ∈ C 26=, it is immediate that
∑
i∈K+ ni(u, v) is equal to the
number of voters that preferred u to v, that is,
∑
i∈K+
ni(u, v) =
r∑
j=1
1 (u j v) .
Thus, for any three different ai1 , ai2 , ai3 ∈ C , we have that∑
i∈K+
ni(ai1 , ai2) +
∑
i∈K+
ni(ai2 , ai3) =
r∑
j=1
(1 (ai1 j ai2) + 1 (ai2 j ai3))
≥
r∑
j=1
1 (ai1 j ai3)
=
∑
i∈K+
ni(ai1 , ai3) ,
due to the transitivity of the rankings j.
The other triangle inequality formula can be proved analogously.
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Maximality: for any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=:∑
u∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
nk−1(ai1 , u) +
∑
v∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
nk−1(v, ai2)
=
r∑
j=1
 ∑
u∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
1 (Pj(u)− Pj(ai1) = k − 1)
+
∑
v∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
1 (Pj(ai2)− Pj(v) = k − 1)

=
r∑
j=1
 ∑
u∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
1 (Pj(ai1) = 1, Pj(u) = k)
+
∑
v∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
1 (Pj(v) = 1, Pj(ai2) = k)

=
r∑
j=1
 ∑
u∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
1 (Pj(ai1) = 1, 1 < Pj(ai2) < k, Pj(u) = k)
+
∑
v∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
1 (Pj(v) = 1, 1 < Pj(ai1) < k, Pj(ai2) = k)

=
r∑
j=1
(
1 (Pj(ai1) = 1, 1 < Pj(ai2) < k)
+ 1 (1 < Pj(ai1) < k, Pj(ai2) = k)
)
≤
r∑
j=1
1 (1 ≤ Pj(ai2)− Pj(ai1) < k − 1) =
∑
K+\{k−1}
ni(ai1 , ai2).
The other maximality formula can be proved analogously. 
Remark 4.16 Assuming reciprocity is fulfilled, the regularity, peakedness, triangle inequal-
ity and maximality properties can be reduced to:
Regularity: for any i ∈ K+: ∑
(u,v)∈C 26=
ni(u, v) = r(k − i) .
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Peakedness: for any ai1 ∈ C and any i ∈ K+\{1}:∑
u∈C \{ai1}
ni(ai1 , u) ≤
∑
u∈C \{ai1}
ni−1(ai1 , u) ,
for any ai1 ∈ C and any i ∈ K−\{−1}:∑
u∈C \{ai1}
ni(ai1 , u) ≤
∑
u∈C \{ai1}
ni+1(ai1 , u) .
Triangle inequality: for any three different ai1 , ai2 , ai3 ∈ C :∑
i∈K+
ni(ai1 , ai2) +
∑
i∈K+
ni(ai2 , ai3) ≥
∑
i∈K+
ni(ai1 , ai3) .
Maximality: for any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=:∑
u∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
nk−1(ai1 , u) +
∑
v∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
nk−1(v, ai2) ≤
∑
i∈K+\{k−1}
ni(ai1 , ai2) .
A set of necessary properties that a function W : C 26= → {0, 1, . . . , r}2k−2 needs to satisfy
in order to be a votex has been given in Proposition 4.15. It is important to analyse
the independence of these properties proving that none of them can be eliminated. An
illustrative example showing that all the properties listed in Proposition 4.15 are indeed
independent and that none of them is irrelevant is shown right after.
Example 4.17 Consider a set C = {a, b, c, d} of four candidates and three voters. In
this example, we consider functions W : C 26= → {0, 1, . . . , r}2k−2 fulfilling all the properties
listed in Proposition 4.15 except for one. Reciprocity will be assumed in all cases, except in
the one concerning reciprocity, in order to ease notations. Of course, none of the following
functions is a votex as, as stated in Proposition 4.15, they must satisfy all the properties.
Completeness:
W : C 26= −→ {0, 1, 2, 3}6 W : C 26= −→ {0, 1, 2, 3}6
W (a, b) = (0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0) W (b, c) = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0)
W (a, c) = (0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0) W (b, d) = (0, 2, 2, 0, 0, 0)
W (a, d) = (3, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) W (c, d) = (0, 1, 2, 0, 0, 0)
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Completeness is the only property that is not satisfied:∑
i∈K
ni(a, d) = 4 6= 3 = r .
Reciprocity:
W : C 26= −→ {0, 1, 2, 3}6 W : C 26= −→ {0, 1, 2, 3}6
W (a, b) = (1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) W (c, a) = (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1)
W (a, c) = (0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0) W (c, b) = (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0)
W (a, d) = (1, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0) W (c, d) = (0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
W (b, a) = (0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1) W (d, a) = (0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0)
W (b, c) = (0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0) W (d, b) = (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1)
W (b, d) = (1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) W (d, c) = (0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 0)
Reciprocity is not satisfied as:
n−2(a, c) = 2 6= 1 = n2(c, a) .
Regularity:
W : C 26= −→ {0, 1, 2, 3}6 W : C 26= −→ {0, 1, 2, 3}6
W (a, b) = (0, 1, 2, 0, 0, 0) W (b, c) = (0, 1, 2, 0, 0, 0)
W (a, c) = (0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0) W (b, d) = (0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0)
W (a, d) = (2, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) W (c, d) = (0, 1, 2, 0, 0, 0)
Regularity is not satisfied as:∑
(u,v)∈C 26=
n3(u, v) = 2 6= 3 = r(k − |i|) .
Peakedness:
W : C 26= −→ {0, 1, 2, 3}6 W : C 26= −→ {0, 1, 2, 3}6
W (a, b) = (0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 1) W (b, c) = (0, 1, 2, 0, 0, 0)
W (a, c) = (0, 2, 0, 1, 0, 0) W (b, d) = (0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0)
W (a, d) = (2, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) W (c, d) = (0, 1, 2, 0, 0, 0)
Peakedness is not satisfied as:∑
u∈C \{a}
n3(a, u) = 1 6≤ 0 =
∑
u∈C \{a}
ni−1(a, u) .
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Maximality:
W : C 26= −→ {0, 1, 2, 3}6 W : C 26= −→ {0, 1, 2, 3}6
W (a, b) = (0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0) W (b, c) = (0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0)
W (a, c) = (2, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) W (b, d) = (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0)
W (a, d) = (0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0) W (c, d) = (0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
Maximality is not satisfied as:∑
u∈C \{b}
nk−1(a, u) +
∑
v∈C \{a}
nk−1(v, b) = 1 6≤ 0 =
∑
i∈K+\{k−1}
ni(a, b) .
Triangle inequality:
It must be remarked that we could not identify an example of a function W : C 26= →
{0, 1, . . . , r}2k−2 fulfilling all the properties listed in Proposition 4.15 except for the trian-
gle inequality with four candidates. Therefore, we provide an example for a set of five
candidates C = {a, b, c, d, e} and corresponding C 26=.
W : C 26= −→ {0, 1, 2, 3}8 W : C 26= −→ {0, 1, 2, 3}8
W (a, b) = (0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0) W (b, d) = (0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
W (a, c) = (0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) W (b, e) = (0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0)
W (a, d) = (1, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) W (c, d) = (0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0)
W (a, e) = (1, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) W (c, e) = (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)
W (b, c) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 0, 0) W (d, e) = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1)
The triangle inequality is not satisfied as:∑
i∈K+
ni(c, b) +
∑
i∈K+
ni(b, a) = 2 6≥ 3 =
∑
i∈K+
ni(c, a) .
As necessary and sufficient conditions that a function W : C 26= → {0, 1, . . . , r}2k−2 needs
to satisfy in order to be a votex are unkown, a family of characterizable functions will be
defined. A function W : C 26= → {0, 1, . . . , r}2k−2 will be called a quasivotex if it satisfies
the necessary conditions listed in Proposition 4.15.
Definition 4.18 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A function
W : C 26= → {0, 1, . . . , r}2k−2 is called a quasivotex (plural quasivotices) on C if it satisfies
the properties listed in Proposition 4.15. The set of all quasivotices on C with r voters is
denoted by WQr (C ).
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Of course, any votex is a quasivotex, i.e., Wr(C ) ⊆ WQr (C ).
4.4 The beatpath matrix
Due to the close relation of the method of Schulze and the beatpath matrix, the content
of this section is closely related to the content of Subsection 2.2.12. A reader aware of the
content of Subsection 2.2.12 could only glance through this section.
In a recent paper [147], Schulze formalized the ranking rule that he first discussed in public
mailing lists in 1997. This ranking rule is based on the use of beatpaths, which lead to
another natural representation of votes: the beatpath matrix. Recall that a path from a
candidate ai1 to a candidate ai2 , denoted by ai1→ai2 , is a list of couples
(
(ai, ai+1)
)n
i=1
such
that a1 = ai1 , a
n+1 = ai2 and (a
1, . . . , an+1) are pairwisely different. The set of all paths
from a candidate ai1 to a candidate ai2 is denoted by P(ai1 , ai2).
The weakest link of a path
(
(ai, ai+1)
)n
i=1
from ai1 to ai2 is the couple (a
i, ai+1) such that
the number of voters preferring ai to ai+1 (called the strength of the weakest link4) is the
minimum among all the couples in
(
(ai, ai+1)
)n
i=1
. A path from ai1 to ai2 that maximizes
the strength of the weakest link is called a beatpath5 from ai1 to ai2 .
Definition 4.19 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A matrix
B ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r}k×k is called a beatpath matrix on C if there exists a profile R of r rankings
on C such that, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C , it holds that
Bi1i2 = max→∈P(ai1 ,ai2 )
min
(ai,ai+1)∈→
#{j ∈ {1, . . . , r} | ai j ai+1} .
Remark 4.20 In Schulze’s original proposal [147], the strength of the weakest link is given
by the couple formed by the number of voters preferring ai1 to ai2 and the number of voters
preferring ai2 to ai1. However, as in the setting of this paper each voter provides his/her
4In Schulze’s original proposal [147], the strength of the weakest link is given by the couple formed by
the number of voters preferring ai1 to ai2 and the number of voters preferring ai2 to ai1 . Nevertheless, as
in the setting of this dissertation each voter provides his/her preferences in the form of a ranking on the
set of candidates, the first element of the couple determines the second one.
5Schulze [147] actually allows candidates to appear several times in the path. Nevertheless, both
approaches are equivalent when maximizing the strength of the weakest link.
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preferences in the form of a ranking on the set of candidates, the first element of the couple
determines the second one.
In order to illustrate how the beatpath matrix induced by a profile of rankings can be
obtained, we consider the following example.
Example 4.21 Consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and a profile of rankings
R = (i)14i=1 given by fourteen voters. These rankings are shown in Table 4.4.
# i Rankings on C
6 c  b  a  d
5 a  d  b  c
3 b  a  d  c
Table 4.4: Frequency of the rankings on C expressed by 14 voters.
There are five different paths from a candidate ai1 to a candidate ai2. For instance, for
going from a to b, there are the following five possible paths:(
(a, b)
)
leading to min(5) = 5 ,(
(a, c), (c, b)
)
leading to min(8, 6) = 6 ,(
(a, d), (d, b)
)
leading to min(14, 5) = 5 ,(
(a, c), (c, d), (d, b)
)
leading to min(8, 6, 5) = 5 ,(
(a, d), (d, c), (c, b)
)
leading to min(14, 8, 6) = 6 .
The paths maximizing the strength of the weakest link, leading to a value of six, are(
(a, c), (c, b)
)
and
(
(a, d), (d, c), (c, b)
)
. Therefore, the element of the beatpath matrix cor-
responding to (a, b), which is the element at the first row and second column, equals six.
The beatpath matrix induced by the profile R is
BR =

− 6 8 14
9 − 8 9
6 6 − 6
6 6 8 −
 .
CHAPTER 5
Monotonicity of a representation of votes
Monotonicity is a common desired property in mathematical modelling exercises, and its
importance has been acknowledged in several disciplines, e.g. in machine learning [12, 28,
43, 90] and fuzzy modelling [128, 155, 156, 160, 161]. However, real-life data is often
imperfect and does not fully comply with the monotonicity hypothesis. One option then
is to (minimally) adjust the data set restoring the monotonicity [132, 134, 135]. This is
particularly important as, for instance, in machine learning, some algorithms cannot be
trained with non-monotone datasets [134].
5.1 Monotonicity of the scorix
Stochastic dominance is a popular tool for the comparison of probability distributions [89].
It has been shown to have applications in decision theory [89], economics [10, 72], machine
learning [132, 163, 164] and social choice theory [124, 154]. Stochastic dominance estab-
lishes a relation between probability distributions that is based on the pairwise comparison
of the corresponding cumulative probability distributions. A probability distribution is said
to (first-order) stochastically dominate another probability distribution if the cumulative
probability distribution of the first one is smaller than or equal to the cumulative probabil-
ity distribution of the second one at any point. Similarly, a probability distribution is said
to second-order stochastically dominate another probability distribution if the cumulative
of the cumulative probability distribution of the first one is smaller than or equal to the
cumulative of the cumulative probability distribution of the second one at any point. It
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is known that (first-order) dominance implies second-order dominance [89]. In a similar
way, two dominance relations (first-order dominance and second-order dominance) between
vectors of positions are defined.
Definition 5.1 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters and A =
(A1, . . . , Ak), B = (B1, . . . , Bk) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r}k be the vectors of positions of two candi-
dates.
(i) A is said to (first-order) dominate B, denoted by AD1 B, if, for any j ∈ {1, . . . , k},
it holds that
j∑
i=1
Ai ≥
j∑
i=1
Bi .
(ii) A is said to second-order dominate B, denoted by AD2 B, if, for any ` ∈ {1, . . . , k},
it holds that ∑`
j=1
j∑
i=1
Ai ≥
∑`
j=1
j∑
i=1
Bi .
These dominance relations have already been analysed by several authors in the context
of scoring ranking rules. Fine and Fine [52] introduced the positional rule, which is a
pre-order relation on the set of candidates that assigns candidate ai1 a better ranking than
candidate ai2 if the vector of positions of candidate ai1 dominates the vector of positions of
candidate ai2 . Stein et al. [154] proved that the vector of positions of candidate ai1 strictly
dominates1 the vector of positions of another candidate ai2 if and only if there is no scoring
ranking rule ranking candidate ai2 at a better position than candidate ai1 . They also proved
that if the dominance is of second order, then this result holds for convex scoring ranking
rules. Llamazares and Pen˜a [92] used this dominance relation to interpret a well-known
result by Saari [142, 144] (a candidate is a first ranked candidate for every scoring ranking
rule if and only if it is a first ranked candidate for every t-approval scoring ranking rule)
from a new point of view: the vector of positions of a candidate dominates the vector of
positions of all the other candidates if and only if it is a first ranked candidate for every
scoring ranking rule. The notion of (strict) dominance between vectors of positions is a
weaker version of the notions of positional dominance [60] and permutation dominance [56]
introduced by Fishburn.
1A is said to strictly dominate B, denoted by AB1 B, if ADB and A 6= B.
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As can be seen, this dominance relation has called the attention of several researchers. Here,
we propose to consider this dominance relation for introducing a consensus state [100, 126].
In that way, a ranking is considered a winning ranking when this dominance relation holds
for all couples in the ranking. Note that we write 1-monotonicity in case of first-order
dominance and, analogously, we write 2-monotonicty in case of second-order dominance.
Definition 5.2 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A scorix
S ∈ Sr(C ) is said to be
(i) 1-monotone (or just monotone) w.r.t. a ranking  on C if, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such
that ai1  ai2, it holds that
Si1 D1 Si2 .
(ii) 2-monotone w.r.t. a ranking  on C if, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1  ai2, it
holds that
Si1 D2 Si2 .
Obviously, the scorix induced by most profiles of rankings is not monotone w.r.t. any
ranking. The set of all profiles of rankings with a monotone scorix can be understood as
a consensus state for the rationalisation of ranking rules. An interesting study subject is
the relation between different notions of consensus states. In particular, monotonicity and
2-monotonicity of the scorix are two concepts that are obviously weaker than unanimity,
but that respectively assure that all scoring ranking rules and all convex scoring ranking
rule coincide.
Theorem 5.3 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C given by
the voters, S ∈ Sr(C ) be the scorix induced by R and  be a ranking on C . The following
statements hold:
(i) If R is the unanimous profile where every voter expresses , then S is monotone
w.r.t. .
(ii) If S is monotone w.r.t. , then S is 2-monotone w.r.t. .
(iii) If S is monotone w.r.t. , then every scoring ranking rule defines a ranking with ties
on the set of candidates that is linearly extended by .
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(iv) If S is 2-monotone w.r.t. , then every convex scoring ranking rule defines a ranking
with ties on the set of candidates that is linearly extended by .
Proof: Statement (i). If R is the unanimous profile where every voter expresses , then
S is the matrix such that, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the i-th row is a vector where the j-th
component equals r if j is the position at which the i-th candidate is ranked in  and zero
otherwise. Therefore, S is monotone w.r.t. .
Statement (ii) is straightforward due to the fact that (first-order) dominance implies
second-order dominance.
Statement (iii) is a direct consequence of Theorem 1(a)2 in [154], when applied to all the
couples in .
Statement (iv) is a direct consequence of Theorem 1(b)2 in [154], when applied to all the
couples in . 
5.2 Recursive monotonicity of the scorix
In social choice theory, there are two large families of ranking rules: ranking rules based
on positional information [144] and ranking rules based on pairwise information [143].
Connecting both positional and pairwise election outcomes is a relevant topic in social
choice theory [145]. As a result of Theorem 5.3, we know that all ranking rules belonging
to the most prominent family of ranking rules based on positional information — scoring
ranking rules — lead to the same outcome in case the scorix is monotone. However, a
relation with the methods based on pairwise comparisons has not yet been established.
In order to describe such relation, the notion of sub-scorix needs to be introduced. As
a sub-scorix is related to the concept of restriction of a profile to a subset of the set of
candidates, the latter notion is introduced first.
Definition 5.4 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. For any non-empty C ′ ⊆ C , the restriction of R to C ′ is the profile
2Note that Stein et al. [154] actually considered strict dominance. However, the proof is analogous for
the case where dominance instead of strict dominance is considered.
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R ′ = (′j)rj=1 of r rankings on C ′ such that, for any j ∈ {1, . . . , r} and any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C ′,
it holds that ai1 ′j ai2 if ai1 j ai2.
A matrix is said to be a sub-scorix of a scorix if it is the scorix associated with the restriction
of the given profile of rankings to a subset of the set of candidates.
Definition 5.5 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C given by
the voters and S ∈ Sr(C ) be the scorix induced by R. For any non-empty subset C ′ ⊆ C , a
matrix S ′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r}k′×k′ (where k′ = |C ′|) is called the sub-scorix (plural sub-scorices)
of S on C ′ if S ′ is the scorix on C ′ induced by the restriction of R to C ′.
The fact that S ′ is the sub-scorix of S on a non-empty subset C ′ ⊆ C is denoted by S ′bS.
Remark 5.6 A scorix has 2k − 1 sub-scorices.
Remark 5.7 Any sub-scorix of a scorix on a singleton is a scalar expressing the number
of voters.
These concepts are illustrated in the following example.
Example 5.8 Let C = {a, b, c, d} be a set of candidates and R = {1,2,3} be the
profile from Example 4.3. We recall that 1: a  b  c  d, 2: d  a  c  b,
3: a  d  b  c and the scorix induced by R is given by:
S =

2 1 0 0
0 1 1 1
0 0 2 1
1 1 0 1
 .
Consider C ′ = {a, b, c} ⊆ C . The restriction of R to C ′ is the profile R ′ = {′1,′2,′3}
with ′1: a  b  c, ′2: a  c  b and ′3: a  b  c. The scorix induced by R ′ is given
by:
S ′ =
3 0 00 2 1
0 1 2
 .
Thus, S ′ is the sub-scorix of S on C ′ and, therefore, it holds that S ′bS.
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In the same way a scorix can be monotone, the respective sub-scorices can also be mono-
tone. The monotonicity of all the sub-scorices of a scorix leads to a stronger type of
monotonicity: recursive monotonicity.
Definition 5.9 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters.
(i) A scorix S ∈ Sr(C ) is said to be recursively monotone w.r.t. a ranking  on C if,
for any non-empty subset C ′ ⊆ C , the sub-scorix S ′ of S on C ′ is monotone w.r.t.
the restriction3 of  to C ′.
(ii) A scorix S ∈ Sr(C ) is said to be strictly recursively monotone w.r.t. a ranking 
on C if, for any non-empty subset C ′ ⊆ C , the sub-scorix S ′ of S on C ′ is stricly
monotone w.r.t. the restriction of  to C ′.
Again, the scorix induced by most profiles of rankings is not recursively monotone w.r.t.
any ranking.
Remark 5.10 Recursive monotonicity of the scorix actually is a property of the profile
of rankings and not of its scorix. This means that, given a scorix, it is not possible to
identify whether or not it is recursively monotone without knowing the profile of rankings.
For instance, consider the two profiles of rankings listed in Table 5.1.
R1 R2
a  b  c a  c  b
a  c  b a  c  b
b  a  c b  a  c
b  c  a b  a  c
c  a  b c  b  a
Table 5.1: Profiles R1 and R2 of five rankings.
The scorices S1 and S2 induced by R1 and R2 coincide:
S1 = S2 =
2 2 12 1 2
1 2 2
 .
3As a ranking is a special case of a profile with just one ranking, the restriction of a ranking to a subset
of the set of candidates follows from Definition 5.4.
CHAPTER 5 MONOTONICITY OF A REPRESENTATION OF VOTES 103
In case we consider C ′ = {b, c} ⊆ C , the corresponding restrictions R ′1 and R ′2 of R1 and
R2 to C ′ are listed in Table 5.2.
R ′1 R
′
2
b  c c  b
c  b c  b
b  c b  c
b  c b  c
c  b c  b
Table 5.2: Profiles R′1 (left) and R′2 (right) of five rankings.
The scorices S ′1 and S
′
2 induced by R
′
1 and R
′
1 are given by:
S ′1 =
(
3 2
2 3
)
, S ′2 =
(
2 3
3 2
)
.
Note that, in contrast to S ′1, S
′
2 is not monotone w.r.t. b  c. Therefore, S2 is not recur-
sively monotone w.r.t. a  b  c (while S1 is).
We conclude that indeed recursive monotonicity is a property of the profile of rankings and
not of its scorix. Nevertheless, in order to ease the way of referring to this property, the
term recursive monotonicity of the scorix will be used.
Due to the definition of sub-scorix, the following lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 5.11 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C given
by the voters and S ∈ Sr(C ) be the scorix induced by R. The following statements hold:
(i) A ranking  on C is a weak Condorcet ranking if and only if any sub-scorix S ′ of S
on a subset C ′ of C of cardinality two is monotone w.r.t. the restriction of  to C ′.
(ii) A ranking  on C is the Condorcet ranking if and only if any sub-scorix S ′ of S on
a subset C ′ of C of cardinality two is strictly monotone w.r.t. the restriction of 
to C ′.
The former lemma shows that, in case the set consists of three candidates, recursive mono-
tonicity of the scorix is nothing else but monotonicity of the scorix plus presence of a
(weak) Condorcet ranking.
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Corollary 5.12 Let C be a set of three candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters, S ∈ Sr(C ) be the scorix induced by R and  be a ranking on C . The
following statements hold:
(i) S is recursively monotone w.r.t.  if and only if S is monotone w.r.t.  and  is a
weak Condorcet ranking.
(ii) S is strictly recursively monotone w.r.t.  if and only if S is strictly monotone w.r.t.
 and  is the Condorcet ranking.
Recursive monotonicity of the scorix obviously is a stronger property than monotonicity
of the scorix and a weaker property than unanimity. Furthermore, as we prove in the
following theorem, it guarantees the existence of a weak Condorcet ranking.
Theorem 5.13 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C given
by the voters, S ∈ Sr(C ) be the scorix induced by R and  be a ranking on C . The
following statements hold:
(i) If R is the unanimous profile where every voter expresses , then S is recursively
monotone w.r.t. .
(ii) If S is recursively monotone w.r.t. , then S is monotone w.r.t. .
(iii) If S is recursively monotone w.r.t. , then the first ranked candidate according to 
is a weak Condorcet winner and  is a weak Condorcet ranking.
(iv) If S is recursively monotone w.r.t. , then every elimination method based on a
scoring ranking rule defines a ranking with ties on the set of candidates that is linearly
extended by .
Proof: Statement (i). If R is the unanimous profile where every voter expresses ,
then S is the matrix where, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the i-th row is a vector where the j-th
component equals r if j is the position at which the i-th candidate is ranked in  and to
zero otherwise. Furthermore, any sub-scorix S ′bS will be of the same form considering the
restriction of  to the corresponding non-empty subset C ′ ⊆ C . Therefore, S is recursively
monotone w.r.t. .
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Statement (ii). By definition of recursive monotonicity, any sub-scorix S ′bS is monotone
w.r.t. the corresponding restriction of . As SbS, it trivially follows that S is monotone
w.r.t. .
Statement (iii). Direct result of Lemma 5.11.
Statement (iv). As S is monotone w.r.t. , the first set of ` eliminated candidates
{ai1 , . . . , ai`} corresponds to the last ` ranked candidates in . Now, the current set
of candidates is C ′ = C \{ai1 , . . . , ai`} and the sub-scorix S ′ of S on C ′ is, due to the
recursive monotonicity of S w.r.t. , monotone w.r.t. the restriction of  to C ′. There-
fore, proceeding analogously as above, we prove that every elimination method based on
a scoring ranking rule defines a ranking with ties on the set of candidates that is linearly
extended by . 
The following result concerning the relation between a Condorcet ranking and a Borda
ranking follows from Theorem 5.13.
Corollary 5.14 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. If the scorix S ∈ Sr(C ) induced by R is recursively monotone w.r.t.
a ranking  on C , then  is a weak Condorcet ranking and linearly extends the Borda
ranking (with ties).
Corollary 5.15 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. If the scorix S ∈ Sr(C ) induced by R is strictly recursively monotone
w.r.t. a ranking  on C , then  is the Condorcet ranking and the Borda ranking.
From the previous corollary, we conclude that (strict) recursive monotonicity is a property
that links the works of Borda [18] and Condorcet [35], leading to the same social outcome.
Therefore, recursive monotonicity of the scorix can be understood as a necessary condition
for Condorcet and Borda to finally agree.
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5.3 Monotonicity of the votrix
In the context of social choice theory, there are many references to monotonicity (also
known as positive association of social and individual values) as a desirable property for
ranking rules [3, 60, 152]. In 2014, Rademaker and De Baets [133] proposed a new appli-
cation of monotonicity in social choice theory. According to their proposal, for a ranking
a  b  c, monotonicity means that the strength with which a  c is supported should
not be less than both the strength with which a  b and the strength with which b  c
are supported. They advocated that the ranking that best reflects the preferences of the
voters should be the one that is the closest to satisfying this assumption.
More formally, given a ranking  on C , a strict partial order relation between couples of
candidates can be defined.
Definition 5.16 Let C be a set of k candidates. A ranking  on C induces a strict partial
order relation A on C 26= such that, for any two different (ai1 , aj1), (ai2 , aj2) ∈ C 26=, it holds
that
(ai1 , aj1) A (ai2 , aj2) if (ai1  aj1) ∧ (aj2  ai2) ∧ (ai1  aj1 ∨ aj2  ai2) .
Figure 5.1 displays the Hasse diagram of the order relation A for the ranking a  b  c  d.
(a, d)
(a, c) (b, d)
(a, b) (b, c) (c, d)
(b, a) (c, b) (d, c)
(d, a)
(c, a) (d, b)
Figure 5.1: Hasse diagram of the order relation A for the ranking a  b 
c  d.
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According to Rademaker and De Baets, if the strength of support is decreasing on A, then
the strength of support is said to be monotone. Note that this property of the strength
of support can be understood as a property of the votrix itself. Therefore, from now on,
if the strength of support is decreasing on A, then the votrix is called monotone w.r.t. .
The definition is naturally extended to any quasivotrix.
Definition 5.17 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A quasiv-
otrix V ∈ VQr (C ) is said to be monotone w.r.t. a ranking  on C (with corresponding A)
if, for any (ai1 , aj1), (ai2 , aj2) ∈ C 26= such that (ai1 , aj1) A (ai2 , aj2), it holds that
Vi1j1 ≥ Vi2j2 .
Obviously, the votrix induced by most profiles of rankings is not monotone w.r.t. any
ranking. The set of all profiles of rankings with a monotone votrix can be understood as a
consensus state for the rationalisation of ranking rules for which most methods based on
pairwise information lead to the same social outcome, as will be discussed in Section 5.7.
Remark 5.18 The fact that there exists a ranking w.r.t. which the votrix is monotone
implies the property of strong stochastic transitivity [138]. A weaker property, usually
referred to as weak stochastic transitivity, has also called the attention of researchers [136].
As we will work with votrices and quasivotrices and they fulfill the reciprocity property
mentioned in Proposition 4.9, the lower half of the diagram defined by A does not actually
provide additional information beyond that provided by the upper half. To exploit this
knowledge, we may use the strict partial order relation A+ instead of A.
Definition 5.19 Let C be a set of k candidates. A ranking  on C induces a strict partial
order relation A+ on C 26= such that, for any two different (ai1 , aj1), (ai2 , aj2) ∈ C 26=, it holds
that
(ai1 , aj1) A+ (ai2 , aj2) if ai1  ai2  aj2  aj1 .
Figure 5.2 displays the Hasse diagram of the order relation A+ for the ranking a  b 
c  d.
Evidently, if the strength of support is decreasing on A+ and, at the same time, equals at
least half of the number of voters, then the votrix is monotone w.r.t. .
108 5.4 MONOTONICITY OF THE VOTEX
(a, d)
(a, c) (b, d)
(a, b) (b, c) (c, d)
Figure 5.2: Hasse diagram of the order relation A+ for the ranking a  b 
c  d.
Proposition 5.20 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters, V ∈ VQr (C )
be a quasivotrix and  be a ranking on C (with corresponding A and A+). The following
three statements are equivalent:
(i) A quasivotrix V ∈ VQr (C ) is monotone w.r.t. .
(ii) For any (ai1 , aj1), (ai2 , aj2) ∈ C 26= such that (ai1 , aj1) A+ (ai2 , aj2), it holds that Vi1j1 ≥
Vi2j2 and, for any ai, aj ∈ C such that ai  aj, it holds that Vij ≥ r2 .
(iii) For any (ai1 , aj1), (ai2 , aj2) ∈ C 26= such that (ai1 , aj1) A+ (ai2 , aj2), it holds that Vi1j1 ≥
Vi2j2 and, for any ai, aj ∈ C such that ai  aj and @a` ∈ C satisfying ai  a`  aj,
it holds that Vij ≥ r2 .
5.4 Monotonicity of the votex
With the votex representation, monotonicity can no longer be represented as the decrease
of the strength of support. Nevertheless, similarly to stochastic dominance, we introduce a
way to compare frequency distributions of couples of candidates based on their cumulative
frequency distributions.
Definition 5.21 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. For
any quasivotex W ∈ WQr (C ) and any (ai1 , aj1), (ai2 , aj2) ∈ C 26=, we say that W (ai1 , aj1)
dominates W (ai2 , aj2), denoted as W (ai1 , aj1)DW (ai2 , aj2), if, for any j ∈ K, it holds that
Nj(ai1 , aj1) ≤ Nj(ai2 , aj2) ,
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where Nj denotes the cumulative absolute frequency, i.e., Nj(u, v) =
∑
i∈K
i≤j
ni(u, v).
For any possible ranking  on C , we have an associated strict partial order relation A
between couples of candidates (see Definition 5.16). Among all these rankings, we would
like to consider the one that is the closest to imposing monotonicity w.r.t. on the provided
votex.
Definition 5.22 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A quasivotex
W ∈ WQr (C ) is said to be monotone w.r.t. a ranking  on C (with corresponding A) if,
for any (ai1 , aj1), (ai2 , aj2) ∈ C 26= such that (ai1 , aj1) A (ai2 , aj2), it holds that
W (ai1 , aj1)DW (ai2 , aj2) .
Obviously, the votex induced by most profiles of rankings is not monotone w.r.t. any
ranking. The set of all profiles of rankings with a monotone votex can be understood as
a consensus state for the rationalisation of ranking rules for which most methods based
on pairwise information lead to the same social outcome and that (unlike most methods
based on pairwise information) also exploits the given positional information.
An interesting study subject is the relation between different notions of consensus states.
For instance, if a profile of rankings is the unanimous profile where every voter expresses
the ranking , then the corresponding votrix and votex are monotone w.r.t. . In the
following theorem, we establish a relation between four different notions of consensus:
unanimity, monotonicity of the votex, monotonicity of the votrix and presence of a weak
Condorcet ranking.
Theorem 5.23 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C given
by the voters, V ∈ Vr(C ) be the votrix induced by R, W ∈ Wr(C ) be the votex induced by
R and  be a ranking on C . The following statements hold:
(i) If R is the unanimous profile where every voter expresses , then W is monotone
w.r.t. .
(ii) If W is monotone w.r.t. , then V is monotone w.r.t. .
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(iii) If V is monotone w.r.t. , then the first ranked candidate according to  is a weak
Condorcet winner and  is a weak Condorcet ranking.
(iv) If V is monotone w.r.t.  and r is an odd number, then the first ranked candidate
according to  is the Condorcet winner and  is the Condorcet ranking.
Proof: Let : a1  . . .  ak be the considered ranking.
Statement (i). If R is the unanimous profile where every voter expresses  then, for any
(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=, W (ai1 , ai2) is the vector where ni2−i1(ai1 , ai2) = r and ni(ai1 , ai2) = 0 for
any i ∈ K\{i2 − i1}. It is immediate to see that W is monotone w.r.t. .
Statement (ii). If W is monotone w.r.t.  then, for any (ai1 , aj1), (ai2 , aj2) ∈ C 26= such that
(ai1 , aj1) A (ai2 , aj2), it holds that W (ai1 , aj1)DW (ai2 , aj2).
As a result of Proposition 4.14, we know that, for any (a`, a`′) ∈ C 26=, it holds that
V`,`′ =
∑
i∈K+
W (a`, a`′)(i) .
Therefore, for any (ai1 , aj1), (ai2 , aj2) ∈ C 26= such that (ai1 , aj1) A (ai2 , aj2), it holds that
Vi1,j1 ≥ Vi2,j2 . Thus, V is monotone w.r.t. .
Statement (iii). If V is monotone w.r.t.  then, for any i ∈ {2, . . . , k}, it holds that
V1,i ≥ Vi,1 .
In words, the number of voters preferring a1 to any ai is not smaller than the number of
voters preferring ai to a1, i.e., a1 is a weak Condorcet winner.
We now remove a1 and consider C ′ = C \{a1}. Then the restricted votrix on C will be
monotone w.r.t. ′: a2 ′ . . . ′ ak and we proceed analogously as above. Proceeding
iteratively, it is straightforward to prove that  is a weak Condorcet ranking.
Statement (iv) is a consequence of statement (iii) and of the fact that a weak Condorcer
winner (resp. ranking) always is the Condorcet winner (resp. ranking) in case the number
of voters is odd. 
Monotonicity of the votrix and monotonicity of the votex are two properties lying in be-
tween unanimity and the presence of a weak Condorcet ranking. Other properties such as
simple majority [95], absolute majority [139] or majorities based on difference of votes [65]
have no immediate relation with monotonicity of the votrix or the votex.
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5.5 Monotonicity of the beatpath matrix
The strict partial order relation between couples of candidates given in Definition 5.16 is
also used for defining monotonicity of the beatpath matrix [122].
Definition 5.24 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A beatpath
matrix B is said to be monotone w.r.t. a ranking  on C if, for any (ai1 , aj1), (ai2 , aj2) ∈ C 26=
such that (ai1 , aj1) A (ai2 , aj2), it holds that
Bi1j1 ≥ Bi2j2 .
Again, the beatpath matrix induced by most profiles of rankings is not monotone w.r.t.
any ranking.
Note that monotonicity of the beatpath matrix is a weaker property than monotonicity of
the votrix and, therefore, than monotonicity of the votex and unanimity.
Theorem 5.25 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C given
by the voters, V ∈ Vr(C ) be the votrix induced by R, B be the beatpath matrix induced by
R and  be a ranking on C . If V is monotone w.r.t. , then B is monotone w.r.t. .
Proof: In order to ease the understanding, and just throughout this proof, we consider
the notation r(i) to refer to the label corresponding to the candidate ranked at the i-th
position in . We first prove that, if V is monotone w.r.t. , then the beatpath from a
candidate ai1 to a different candidate ai2 is the couple (ai1 , ai2) in case ai1  ai2 and the
list of couples
(
(a`, a`+1)
)r(i2)−1
`=r(i1)
in case ai2  ai1 . This is illustrated in Figure 5.3.
1. The case ai1  ai2 . Suppose that there is a path from ai1 to ai2 such that the
strength of its weakest link is greater than the strength of support of ai1 over ai2 . We
distinguish three cases:
(a) There is a candidate ai3 in the path such that ai3  ai1  ai2 . Therefore, one of
the couples in the path is such that the first element is preferred to the second
one by less than half of the number of voters, a contradiction with the fact that
the strength of the weakest link is greater than the strength of support of ai1
over ai2 .
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(a, d)
(a, c) (b, d)
(a, b) (b, c) (c, d)
(b, a) (c, b) (d, c)
(d, a)
(c, a) (d, b)
Bij = Vij
Bij = min
`∈[i,j]
V`,`+1
Figure 5.3: Characterization of the beatpath matrix B in case the votrix V
is monotone.
(b) There is a candidate ai3 in the path such that ai1  ai2  ai3 . Therefore, one of
the couples in the path is such that the first element is preferred to the second
one by less than half of the number of voters, a contradiction with the fact that
the strength of the weakest link is greater than the strength of support of ai1
over ai2 .
(c) Any candidate ai3 in the path is such that ai1  ai3  ai2 . Therefore, as V
is monotone w.r.t. , the strength of support of ai1 over ai2 is greater than or
equal to the strength of all the links in the path, a contradiction with the fact
that the strength of the weakest link is greater than the strength of support of
ai1 over ai2 .
2. The case ai2  ai1 . Suppose that there is a path from ai2 to ai1 such that the
strength of its weakest link is greater than the lowest strength of support of a` over
a`+1, for ` ∈ {r(i1), . . . , r(i2) − 1}. We prove that, for any (a`, a`+1) with ` ∈
{r(i1), . . . , r(i2)− 1}, there is a couple (aj1 , aj2) in the path such that (a`, a`+1) A
(aj1 , aj2) or (a`, a`+1) = (aj1 , aj2). Let us suppose that, for a fixed ` ∈ {r(i1), . . . ,
r(i2) − 1}, there is no (aj1 , aj2) in the path such that (a`, a`+1) A (aj1 , aj2) or
(a`, a`+1) = (aj1 , aj2). It follows that there is no (aj1 , aj2) in the path such that a` 
aj1 or that aj2  a`+1 or that (a`, a`+1) = (aj1 , aj2). However, as ai2  a`+1  a`  ai1 ,
there needs to be a couple (aj1 , aj2) in the path such that aj2  a`+1  a`  aj1 due
to the transitivity of , the definition of path and the fact that a` and a`+1 are
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consecutive candidates in . We conclude that a`  aj1 or that aj2  a`+1 or that
(a`, a`+1) = (aj1 , aj2), a contradiction.
Finally, as V is monotone w.r.t. , the strength of the weakest link in the path is
smaller than or equal to the strength of the lowest strength of support of a` over
a`+1, for ` ∈ {r(i1), . . . , r(i2)− 1}, a contradiction.
We conclude that, in case V is monotone w.r.t. the ranking , the beatpath matrix B
equals V for couples in the upper half of the diagram of A and that for any couple in the
lower half of the diagram it equals the minimum of the values of V in the upper row of
the lower half of the diagram that dominate the chosen couple. Thus, as V is monotone
w.r.t. , B obviously is decreasing on A and, therefore, monotone w.r.t. . 
Unfortunately, the search for monotonicity of the beatpath matrix is not easily characteri-
zable as a transportation problem (see Chapter 6 for a discussion on how all other searches
can be addressed by solving a transportation problem). For this reason, monotonicity
of the beatpath matrix will no longer be considered in the computational studies of this
dissertation.
5.6 Monotonicity of the (anonymised) profile
Any (anonymised) profile is determined by the number of times that each ranking is voted4.
We denote by nR ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r}k! the vector of absolute frequencies of R, where nR(i)
is the absolute frequency of the i-th ranking in L(C ), i.e., the number of voters that
have expressed the i-th ranking in L(C ) in the profile R. Analogously, we denote by
fR ∈ {0, 1r , . . . , 1}k! the vector of relative frequencies of R, where fR(i) is the relative
frequency of the i-th ranking in L(C ) in the profile R. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , k!}, it obviously
holds that
r · fR(i) = nR(i) .
In addition, it holds that
k!∑
i=1
nR(i) = r ∧
k!∑
i=1
fR(i) = 1 .
4Here, we do not take the order of the voters into account.
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The set of all possible vectors f ∈ {0, 1
r
, . . . , 1}k! that can be seen as the vector of relative
frequencies of a profile R of r rankings on C is denoted by Rr(C ).
Each ranking  on C defines an order relation w≥ on L(C ) according to how far two
rankings in L(C ) are from  in terms of reversals. For any i,j∈ L(C ), the fact that
(i,j) ∈ w≥ is denoted by i w≥ j.
Proposition 5.26 Let C be a set of k candidates and  be a ranking on C . The relation
w≥ defined as
w≥ = {(i,j) ∈ L(C )2 | (∀(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 2) (((ai1  ai2) ∧ (ai1 j ai2))⇒ (ai1 i ai2))}
is an order relation on L(C ).
Proof: We prove that w≥ satisfies reflexivity, antisymmetry and transitivity.
Reflexivity: holds trivially.
Antisymmetry: for any i,j∈ L(C ), if i w≥ j and j w≥ i, then it holds that:(∀(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 2) (((ai1  ai2) ∧ (ai1 j ai2))⇒ (ai1 i ai2)) ,(∀(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 2) (((ai1  ai2) ∧ (ai1 i ai2))⇒ (ai1 j ai2)) .
Therefore, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1  ai2 , it holds that
(ai1 i ai2)⇔ (ai1 j ai2) .
As  is complete, if ai1 6 ai2 , then it holds that ai1 = ai2 or ai2  ai1 . If ai1 = ai2 , then,
as i and j are irreflexive by definition of ranking, it is trivial to see that (ai1 i ai2)⇔
(ai1 j ai2). If ai2  ai1 , then it holds that (ai2 i ai1) ⇔ (ai2 j ai1), or, equivalently,
(ai2 6i ai1) ⇔ (ai2 6j ai1). As i and j are complete and ai2  ai1 , it holds that
(ai1 i ai2)⇔ (ai1 j ai2).
Hence, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C , it holds that
(ai1 i ai2)⇔ (ai1 j ai2) ,
i.e., it holds that i=j.
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Transitivity: for any i,j,`∈ L(C ), if i w≥ j and j w≥ `, then it holds that(∀(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 2) (((ai1  ai2) ∧ (ai1 j ai2))⇒ (ai1 i ai2)) ,(∀(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 2) (((ai1  ai2) ∧ (ai1 ` ai2))⇒ (ai1 j ai2)) .
Hence, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1  ai2 , it holds that
(ai1 ` ai2)⇒ (ai1 j ai2)⇒ (ai1 i ai2) ,
i.e., it holds that i w≥ `.
Thus, w≥ is an order relation on L(C ). 
Figure 5.4 displays the Hasse diagram of the order relation w≥, where a  b  c  d is
the ranking assumed to be the true ranking on a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d}.
Clearly, every ranking i is closer (in terms of reversals) to  than j if it holds that
i w≥ j.
Under the assumption that there exists a true ranking  on C , it seems natural that the
vector of frequencies of the given profile of rankings should be decreasing on the Hasse
diagram of the order relation w≥. A profile of rankings satisfying this property is said to be
monotone w.r.t. the ranking .
Definition 5.27 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters and  be a
ranking on C .
(i) A vector of relative frequencies f ∈ Rr(C ) is said to be monotone w.r.t.  if, for any
i,j∈ L(C ), it holds that( i w≥ j )⇒ (f(i) ≥ f(j)) .
(ii) A vector of absolute frequencies n is said to be monotone w.r.t.  if the corresponding
vector of relative frequencies f = n
r
is monotone w.r.t. .
(iii) A profile R of rankings on C is said to be monotone w.r.t.  if the corresponding
vector of relative frequencies of R is monotone w.r.t. .
Obviously, not all profiles of rankings are monotone w.r.t. a at least one ranking.
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abcd
bacd acbd abdc
bcad cabd badc acdb adbc
cbad bcda bdac cadb adcb dabc
cbda bdca cdab dbac dacb
cdba dbca dcab
dcba
Figure 5.4: Hasse diagram of the order relation w≥ for the ranking a  b 
c  d, where xyzt is a shorthand for x  y  z  t.
Remark 5.28 If the profile of rankings is monotone w.r.t. a ranking  on the set of
candidates, then  is a most frequent ranking in the profile of rankings.
Monotonicity of the profile of rankings implies the existence of a true ranking on the set
of candidates instead of a compromise ranking.
Obviously, monotonicity of the profile of rankings is a weaker condition than unanimity.
Theorem 5.29 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. If R is the unanimous profile where every voter expresses , then R
is monotone w.r.t. .
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Proof: The result follows immediately from the fact that, in case R is the unanimous
profile where every voter expresses , it holds that  is the ranking at the top of the Hasse
diagram of the order relation w≥. 
5.7 Acclamation
The main aim of this dissertation is to analyse the conditions under which determining
the winning ranking on the set of candidates is obvious. Unanimity obviously is one of
this situations and, unfortunately, it is the only situation under which the winning ranking
on the set of candidates is indisputably determined. Fortunately, as discussed in the
previous sections, monotonicity of different representations of votes can be understood as
a cornerstone of social choice theory where almost all ranking rules lead to the same social
outcome.
First, recursive monotonicity of the scorix assures that all ranking rules based on positional
information lead to the same ranking on the set of candidates. Second, monotonicity of
the votrix assures that all ranking rules based on pairwise information lead to the same
ranking on the set of candidates. Note that monotonicity of the profile is not linked to an
agreement of a family of ranking rules. Rather, as discussed in the upcoming Chapter 7,
monotonicity of the profile may lead to winning rankings that significantly differ from
the rest of the ranking rules. Rather, as discussed in Section 5.6, monotonicity of the
profile is linked to the real existence of a true ranking on the set of candidates, i.e., the
philosophy advocated by Rousseau [139] and Condorcet [35] where personal preferences
are not considered, to identify the ‘general will’. This phylosophy is clearly described by
Arrow [4]: “each individual has two orderings, one which governs him in his everyday
actions, and one which would be relevant under some ideal conditions and which is in
some sense truer than the first ordering. It is the latter which is considered relevant to
social choice, and it is assumed that there is complete unanimity with regard to the truer
individual ordering”.
In this section, we propose to jointly consider these three types of monotonicity in order to
define a weaker condition than unanimity, but that still leads to an obvious social outcome.
From now on, a ranking w.r.t. which the scorix is recursively monotone, the votrix is
monotone and the profile is monotone, is referred to as an acclaimed ranking [119].
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Definition 5.30 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C given
by the voters, S ∈ Sr(C ) be the scorix induced by R and V ∈ Vr(C ) be the votrix induced
by R. A ranking  on C is called the acclaimed ranking for R if the following three
statements hold:
(i) R is monotone w.r.t. .
(ii) S is recursively monotone w.r.t. .
(iii) V is monotone w.r.t. .
Remark 5.31 The term acclamation historically refers to a voting system used in Ancient
Greece, where the winning candidate was decided by the (loudest) shouts of the people [69].
In case there exists an acclaimed ranking for a given profile of rankings, we say that the
profile belongs to the acclamation consensus state.
By definition, acclamation is obviously a weaker consensus state than unanimity and a
stronger consensus state than (recursive) monotonicity of the scorix, monotonicity of the
votrix and monotonicity of the profile.
Theorem 5.32 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C given
by the voters, V ∈ Vr(C ) be the votrix induced by R, W ∈ Wr(C ) be the votex induced by
R and  be a ranking on C . The following statements hold:
(i) If R is the unanimous profile where every voter expresses , then  is the acclaimed
ranking for R.
(ii) If  is the acclaimed ranking for R, then R is monotone w.r.t. .
(iii) If  is the acclaimed ranking for R, then S is (recursively) monotone w.r.t. .
(iv) If  is the acclaimed ranking for R, then V is monotone w.r.t. .
(v) If  is the acclaimed ranking for R, then the first ranked candidate according to 
is a weak Condorcet winner and  is a weak Condorcet ranking.
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(vi) If  is the acclaimed ranking for R and r is an odd number, then the first ranked
candidate according to  is the Condorcet winner and  is the Condorcet ranking.
Proof:
Statement (i) is a consequence of Theorems 5.3, 5.23 and 5.29.
Statements (ii), (iii) and (iv) are straightforward due to the definition of an acclaimed
ranking.
Statements (v) and (vi) are a consequence of Theorem 5.23. 
We recall here that the introduction of consensus states broader than unanimity, but that
still lead to an obvious ranking on the set of candidates, represents a valuable topic in the
field of social choice theory. This is due to the fact that the broader the consensus state,
the less the ranking rule based on the search for this consensus state depends on the chosen
monometric. Unfortunately, it also holds that the broader the consensus state, the weaker
the support for the winning ranking associated with the consensus state. For this reason,
we advocate for the use of acclamation, which is the broadest consensus state for which
we could not identify a prominent ranking rule disagreeing with the associated winning
ranking.
As illustrated in Table 5.3, in case  is the acclaimed ranking for a given profile of rankings,
the ranking  is a winning ranking and/or the first ranked candidate in  is a winning
candidate for the most prominent voting rules. In Table 5.3, a symbol X (resp. −) in
the column WC means that the first ranked candidate in the acclaimed ranking is (resp.
does not need to be) a Winning Candidate for the method corresponding to the row; a
symbol X (resp. −) in the column UWC means that the first ranked candidate in the
acclaimed ranking is (resp. does not need to be) the Unique Winning Candidate for the
method corresponding to the row; a symbol X (resp. −) in the column WR means that
the acclaimed ranking is (resp. does not need to be) a Winning Ranking for the method
corresponding to the row; and a symbol X (resp. −) in the column UWR means that
the acclaimed ranking is (resp. does not need to be) the Unique Winning Ranking for the
method corresponding to the row. The symbol ∗ means that the method corresponding to
the row is not explicitly defined for identifying a winning ranking.
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Method WC UWC WR UWR
Plurality [153] X - X -
Borda count [18] X X X X
Veto [141] X - X -
Best-worst voting systems [66] X - X -
Scoring (ranking) rules [169] X - X -
Elimination methods based on a
scoring (ranking) rule [121]
X - X -
Simple majority rule [95] X X X X
Dodgson [46] X X * *
Condorcet’s least-reversals [99] X X * *
Kemeny [80] X X X X
Copeland [40] X X X X
Tideman [157] X X X X
Schulze [147] X X X X
Simpson [85, 151] X X X -
Bucklin [23] X - * *
Table 5.3: Concordance with the notion of acclamation by the most promi-
nent methods in social choice theory.
For plurality, the Borda count, veto, best-worst voting systems, scoring (ranking) rules
and elimination methods based on a scoring (ranking) rule, the facts that the first ranked
candidate in the acclaimed ranking is a winning candidate and that the acclaimed ranking
is a winning ranking are a direct result from Theorem 5.13. This theorem also implies
that the first ranked candidate in the acclaimed ranking is the unique winning candidate
for the Borda count and that the acclaimed ranking is the unique winning ranking for the
Borda count. We prove that the uniqueness is not assured for the remaining ranking rules
mentioned in this paragraph by providing a counterexample.
Consider the set C = {a, b, c, d} of k = 4 candidates and the profile R of r = 28 rankings
given in Table 5.4.
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Ranking Freq. Ranking Freq. Ranking Freq. Ranking Freq.
a  b  c  d 4 b  a  c  d 3 c  a  b  d 1 d  a  b  c 1
a  b  d  c 3 b  a  d  c 2 c  a  d  b 1 d  a  c  b 1
a  c  b  d 1 b  c  a  d 2 c  b  a  d 1 d  b  a  c 1
a  c  d  b 1 b  c  d  a 1 c  b  d  a 0 d  b  c  a 0
a  d  b  c 1 b  d  a  c 2 c  d  a  b 0 d  c  a  b 0
a  d  c  b 1 b  d  c  a 1 c  d  b  a 0 d  c  b  a 0
Table 5.4: Profile R of r = 28 rankings on C = {a, b, c, d}.
The scorix induced by R is:
S =

11 9 6 2
11 9 4 4
3 5 10 10
3 5 8 12
 .
Although a  b  c  d is the acclaimed ranking for R, all rankings a  b  c  d,
a  b  d  c, b  a  c  d and b  a  d  c are winning rankings for the plurality
rule. Analogously, in case we reverse the order of the candidates in all rankings in the
profile, we obtain a profile R ′ where, although d  c  b  a is the acclaimed ranking
for R ′, all rankings c  d  a  b, c  d  b  a, d  c  a  b and d  c  b  a
are winning rankings for the veto rule. As best-worst voting systems, scoring (ranking)
rules and elimination methods based on a scoring (ranking) rule have both the plurality
and the veto rules as a particular case, we conclude that the first ranked candidate in the
acclaimed ranking does not need to be the unique winner, and the acclaimed ranking does
not need to be the unique winning ranking for any of the aforementioned ranking rules.
By definition of the simple majority rule, in case of existence of the Condorcet ranking
– which is assured to coincide with the acclaimed ranking in case the latter exists – the
(unique) winning candidate coincides with the first ranked candidate in the Condorcet
ranking and the (unique) winning ranking coincides with the Condorcet ranking. Similarly,
as both the method of Dodgson and Condorcet’s least-reversals methods are based on the
search for the candidate that is the closest to becoming the Condorcet winner, in case
of existence of the Condorcet winner, the (unique) winning candidate for both methods
coincides with the first ranked candidate in the Condorcet ranking.
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The methods of Kemeny, Copeland, Tideman, Schulze and Simpson are Condorcet meth-
ods, i.e., in case of existence of a Condorcet winner, they select this Condorcet winner as
the unique winning candidate. Moreover, the first four are additionally Condorcet ranking
methods, i.e., in case of existence of a Condorcet ranking, they select this Condorcet rank-
ing as the unique winning ranking. Due to the property of monotonicity of the votrix, the
method of Simpson, which ranks the candidates according to their greatest pairwise defeat,
is trivially assured to select the acclaimed ranking as the winning ranking. However, the
uniqueness is not assured in this case.
Consider the set C = {a, b, c, d} of k = 4 candidates and the profile R of r = 11 rankings
given in Table 5.5.
Freq. Rankings on C
6 a  b  c  d
5 b  a  c  d
Table 5.5: Profile R of r = 11 rankings on C = {a, b, c, d}.
The votrix induced by R is:
S =

0 6 11 11
5 0 11 11
0 0 0 11
0 0 0 0
 .
Note that candidates c and d have the same greatest pairwise defeat. Therefore, although
a  b  c  d is the acclaimed ranking for R, both rankings a  b  c  d and
a  b  d  c are winning rankings for the method of Simpson.
As the vector of positions of candidate a (strictly) dominates the vectors of positions of
all other candidates, we conclude that the first ranked candidate in the acclaimed ranking
is a winning candidate for the method of Bucklin. For proving that the uniqueness does
not hold, we consider again the profile R of r = 28 rankings given in Table 5.4. Note that
there is no candidate that is ranked at the first position by more than half of the number
of voters. Therefore, according to the method of Bucklin, we need to consider also the
number of times that each candidate is ranked at the second position. Now, candidates a
and b are ranked at the first or second position by 20 voters, which is more than half of the
number of voters. Therefore, candidates a and b are winning candidates for the method of
Bucklin, while candidate b is not the first ranked candidate in the acclaimed ranking.
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We conclude this chapter with Figure 5.5 illustrating the relations between the different
types of consensus states discussed here. In this figure, an arrow indicates that the con-
sensus state from which the arrow starts implies the consensus state to which the arrow
points.
Recursively
monotone
scorix
Monotone
scorix
Monotone
votrix
Monotone
profile
Unanimity
Acclamation
Monotone
votex
Weak
Condorcet
ranking
Monotone
beatpath
matrix
Figure 5.5: Relation between the different consensus states.
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CHAPTER 6
The search for monotonicity as an
optimization problem
In this chapter, the search for all different types of monotonicity is addressed as an opti-
mization problem. This chapter is divided into two different sections. First, the search for
monotonicity is addressed by making changes in the representation of votes. Second, the
search for monotonicity is addressed by making changes in the profile of rankings. Although
both approaches are described here, we will only consider the latter after the conclusion of
this chapter. This is due to the fact that the search for monotonicity by means of changes
in the profile of rankings, unlike the search for monotonicity by means of changes in the
representation of votes, does not disregard all the information that is lost when contracting
the profile of rankings into a representation of votes. Moreover, in case we count changes
in the profile of rankings, the closeness to any consensus states becomes comparable with
the closeness to any other consensus states. The search for the same property by means
of a distance function at the representation level and of a distance function at the profile
level is a common topic in the field of social choice theory. For instance, the search for
a Condorcet winner [35] is addressed by means of a distance function at the votrix level
and of a distance function at the profile level by two well-known methods: Condorcet’s
least-reversal method [99] and Dodgson’s method [46].
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6.1 Changes in the representation of votes
In this section, we discuss the search for a monotone representation of votes. Note that, un-
like in the case of the scorix, the search for a monotone votrix (resp. votex) does not assure
the obtained construct to be a votrix (resp. votex), but a quasivotrix (resp. quasivotex).
6.1.1 Search for a monotone scorix
As discussed in [125], a natural ranking rule can be defined by searching for a construct
that satisfies the properties mentioned in Proposition 4.4 and that at the same time is
monotone w.r.t. a ranking on the set of candidates. Fortunately, as Fine and Fine proved
in [52], scorices are characterizable by means of the properties listed in Proposition 4.4,
thus the search for the closest scorix satisfying monotonicity can be addressed. This closest
scorix has an associated cost that is calculated by means of a monometric on Sr(C ).
Definition 6.1 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A function
M : Sr(C )×Sr(C )→ R is called a monometric on Sr(C ) if it satisfies the following three
properties:
(i) Non-negativity: for any S, S ′ ∈ Sr(C ), it holds that
M(S, S ′) ≥ 0 .
(ii) Coincidence: for any S, S ′ ∈ Sr(C ), it holds that
M(S, S ′) = 0⇔ S = S ′ .
(iii) Compatibility: for any S, S ′, S ′′ ∈ Sr(C ) such that, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
(Si D1 S ′i D1 S ′′i ) ∨ (S ′′i D1 S ′i D1 Si) ,
it holds that
M(S, S ′) ≤M(S, S ′′) .
For any two scorices S, S ′ ∈ Sr(C ), M(S, S ′) is referred to as the cost of changing S into S ′.
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Definition 6.2 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters,  be a ranking
on C , S ∈ Sr(C ) be a scorix and M : Sr(C )× Sr(C )→ R be a monometric on Sr(C ). A
closest monotone scorix S ′ ∈ Sr(C ) to S (w.r.t. ) is a scorix that is monotone w.r.t. 
and such that there exists no scorix S ′′ ∈ Sr(C ) that is monotone w.r.t.  and, at the same
time,
M(S, S ′′) < M(S, S ′) .
Thus, for each ranking , we have the corresponding cost associated with a closest mono-
tone scorix (measured by means of the chosen monometric on Sr(C )). An optimal ranking
should be one whose corresponding closest monotone scorix is the closest to the scorix
given by the voters.
Definition 6.3 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C given
by the voters, SR ∈ Sr(C ) be the scorix induced by R and M : Sr(C ) × Sr(C ) → R be
a monometric on Sr(C ). An optimal ranking  (with a corresponding closest monotone
scorix S ∈ Sr(C )) is a ranking for which it holds that there exists no ranking ′ (with a
corresponding closest monotone scorix S ′ ∈ Sr(C )) such that
M(SR , S
′) < M(SR , S) .
Note that the search for a closest 2-monotone scorix can be addressed in an analogous way.
Definition 6.4 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters,  be a ranking
on C , S ∈ Sr(C ) be a scorix and M : Sr(C ) × Sr(C ) → R be a monometric on Sr(C ).
A closest 2-monotone scorix S ′ ∈ Sr(C ) to S (w.r.t. ) is a scorix that is 2-monotone
w.r.t.  and such that there exists no scorix S ′′ ∈ Sr(C ) that is 2-monotone w.r.t.  and,
at the same time,
M(S, S ′′) < M(S, S ′) .
The resolution of the problem is addressed for an interesting monometric on Sr(C ) based
on the total amount of changes in the vectors of positions of all the candidates. This leads
to the resolution of an Integer Linear Programming problem (ILP problem). The proposed
monometric on Sr(C ) is given by the sum of the absolute differences of the cumulative
vectors of positions of all candidates:
M(S, S ′) =
k∑
i=1
k∑
`=1
∣∣∣∣∣∑`
j=1
(
Sij − S ′ij
)∣∣∣∣∣ . (6.1)
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Obviously, in case the given scorix is not monotone w.r.t. any ranking on the set of candi-
dates, different monometrics on Sr(C ) might lead to different optimal rankings.
We will now prove that Eq. (6.1) defines a monometric1 on Sr(C ).
Proposition 6.5 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters and M :
Sr(C )× Sr(C )→ R be defined as in Eq. (6.1). Then M is a monometric on Sr(C ).
Proof: We will prove that M satisfies the three axioms of a monometric on Sr(C ).
Non-negativity. Immediate.
Coincidence. As it is a sum of absolute values, for any S, S ′ ∈ Sr(C ), M(S, S ′) = 0 if and
only if
∑`
j=1 Sij =
∑`
j=1 S
′
ij, for any i, ` ∈ {1, . . . , k}. This is equivalent to saying that
S = S ′.
Compatibility. For any S, S ′, S ′′ ∈ Sr(C ) satisfying that, for any i, ` ∈ {1, . . . , k},(∑`
j=1
Sij ≥
∑`
j=1
S ′ij ≥
∑`
j=1
S ′′ij
)
∨
(∑`
j=1
Sij ≤
∑`
j=1
S ′ij ≤
∑`
j=1
S ′′ij
)
,
the following is fulfilled:
M(S, S ′) =
k∑
i=1
k∑
`=1
∣∣∣∣∣∑`
j=1
(
Sij − S ′ij
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤
k∑
i=1
k∑
`=1
∣∣∣∣∣∑`
j=1
(
Sij − S ′′ij
)∣∣∣∣∣ = M(S, S ′′) .
Thus, M is a monometric on Sr(C ). 
In order to search for an optimal ranking, we will need to solve an Integer Linear Program-
ming problem for each possible ranking. The number of unknown variables (elements of
the scorix) and the number of constraints (given by the properties of Proposition 4.4) in
the optimization problem will depend on the number of candidates k:
(i) Number of (positive integer) variables: k2.
1As it is symmetric and satisfies the triangle inequality, Eq. (6.1) actually defines a distance function
that satisfies the additional axiom of compatibility.
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(ii) Completeness in candidates constraints (equalities): k.
(iii) Completeness in positions constraints (equalities): k.
(iv) Monotonicity constraints (inequalities): (k − 1)2.
More specifically, the Integer Linear Programming problem to be resolved is then encoded
in the following way. Firstly, we will define k2 integer variables that will be denoted by
xi` (xi` ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r}), where i, ` ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Note that xi` denotes the number of times
that the i-th candidate is ranked at the `-th position in the monotone scorix that we are
looking for.
We intend to minimize M(S, S ′), which can be written as
k∑
i=1
k∑
`=1
∣∣∣∣∣∑`
j=1
(xij − oij)
∣∣∣∣∣ , (6.2)
where the values oi` represent the number of times that the i-th candidate is ranked at the
`-th position in the given profile of rankings.
It must be noted that Eq. (6.2) is a sum of absolute values and will lead to an Integer
Non-Linear Programming problem instead of an ILP problem. Fortunately, we can define
a family of auxiliary variables yi` (where i, ` ∈ {1, . . . , k}) such that minimizing Eq. (6.2)
is equivalent to minimizing:
k∑
i=1
k∑
`=1
yi` , (6.3)
under the additional constraints, for any i, ` ∈ {1, . . . , k}:
∑`
j=1
(xij − oij) ≤ yi` , (6.4)
∑`
j=1
(oij − xij) ≤ yi` , (6.5)
yi` ≥ 0 . (6.6)
As we are looking for a closest monotone scorix, we need to require the properties listed
in Proposition 4.4. These properties are encoded as follows.
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Completeness in candidates: for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}:
k∑
`=1
xi` = r . (6.7)
Completeness in positions: for any ` ∈ {1, . . . , k}:
k∑
i=1
xi` = r . (6.8)
Additionally, we require the new scorix to be monotone. As D1 defines a transitive rela-
tion on the set of vectors of positions, in order to reduce the number of constraints, the
dominance relation can be required for consecutive elements in the ranking, i.e., mono-
tonicity can be required w.r.t. the covering relation  associated with the ranking .
More formally, the covering relation is defined as:
= {(ai1 , ai2) ∈| (@i3 ∈ {1, . . . , k})(ai1  ai3  ai2)} .
Monotonicity: for any ` ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1} and any i1, i2 ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that ai1  ai2 :∑`
j=1
xi1j ≥
∑`
j=1
xi2j . (6.9)
Therefore, the cost of a closest monotone scorix w.r.t.  is the minimum value of Eq. (6.3)
under the constraints of Eqs. (6.4)–(6.9).
Remark 6.6 The cost of a closest 2-monotone scorix w.r.t.  is the minimum value of
Eq. (6.3) under the constraints of Eqs. (6.4)–(6.8) and additionally requiring the following
condition: for any ` ∈ {1, . . . , k} and any i1, i2 ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that ai1  ai2:∑`
j=1
j∑
i=1
xi1j ≥
j∑
i=1
∑`
j=1
xi2j . (6.10)
Proposition 6.7 There exists a solution of the Integer Linear Programming problem of
minimizing Eq. (6.3) under the constraints of Eqs. (6.4)–(6.9).
Proof: There exists a finite number of possible scorices with k candidates and r voters.
Each scorix has an associated cost of changing the scorix given by the voters into this
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new scorix defined by Eq. (6.2). As we are minimizing the function over a finite set,
if the feasible region has at least one element, then there is an optimal solution of the
optimization problem minimizing Eq. (6.2) under the constraints of Eqs. (6.7)–(6.9). Let
us prove the existence of this optimal solution by showing that there exists at least one
solution satisfying all the constraints.
Consider the profile of rankings where all r rankings are identical to the ranking  w.r.t.
which the monotonicity is required. The scorix S ∈ Sr(C ) induced by this particular
profile is obviously monotone w.r.t. . Furthermore, as it is a scorix, it will also fulfill all
the properties listed in Proposition 4.4. Thus, S is a solution of the optimization problem
and, therefore, there exists an optimal solution.
Finally, we know that minimizing the function defined in Eq. (6.2) under the constraints
of Eqs. (6.7)–(6.9) is equivalent to minimizing the function defined in Eq. (6.3) under the
constraints of Eqs. (6.4)–(6.9). 
Remark 6.8 The existence of a solution of the Integer Linear Programming problem of
minimizing Eq. (6.3) under the constraints of Eqs. (6.4)–(6.8) and (6.10) is analogously
proved.
6.1.2 Search for a monotone (quasi)votrix
If the votrix induced by a profile of rankings is monotone w.r.t. a ranking , then  is called
an optimal ranking. If there is no such ranking, then the cost of imposing monotonicity
w.r.t. each possible ranking is computed. This cost is measured by means of a monometric
on VQr (C ).
Definition 6.9 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A function
M : VQr (C ) × VQr (C ) → R is called a monometric on VQr (C ) if it satisfies the following
three properties:
(i) Non-negativity: for any V, V ′ ∈ VQr (C ), it holds that
M(V, V ′) ≥ 0 .
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(ii) Coincidence: for any V, V ′ ∈ VQr (C ), it holds that
M(V, V ′) = 0⇔ V = V ′
(iii) Compatibility: for any V, V ′, V ′′ ∈ VQr (C ) such that, for any two i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k},
(Vij ≥ V ′ij ≥ V ′′ij ) ∨ (Vij ≤ V ′ij ≤ V ′′ij ) ,
it holds that
M(V, V ′) ≤M(V, V ′′) .
For any two (quasi)votrices V, V ′ ∈ VQr (C ), M(V, V ′) is referred to as the cost of changing
V into V ′.
Definition 6.10 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters,  be a ranking
on C , V ∈ Vr(C ) be a votrix and M : VQr (C )×VQr (C )→ R be a monometric on VQr (C ). A
closest monotone quasivotrix V ′ ∈ VQr (C ) to V is a quasivotrix that is monotone w.r.t. 
and such that there exists no quasivotrix V ′′ ∈ VQr (C ) that is monotone w.r.t.  and, at
the same time,
M(V, V ′′) < M(V, V ′) .
Thus, for each ranking , we have the corresponding cost associated with a closest mono-
tone quasivotrix (measured by means of the chosen monometric on VQr (C )). An optimal
ranking should be one whose corresponding closest monotone quasivotrix is the closest to
the original votrix.
Definition 6.11 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C given
by the voters, VR ∈ Vr(C ) be the votrix induced by R and M : VQr (C ) × VQr (C ) → R be
a monometric on VQr (C ). An optimal ranking  (with a corresponding closest monotone
quasivotrix V ∈ VQr (C )) is a ranking for which it holds that there exists no ranking ′
(with a corresponding closest monotone quasivotrix V ′ ∈ VQr (C )) such that
M(VR , V
′) < M(VR , V ) .
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The cost of imposing monotonicity w.r.t. a given ranking on C was calculated in [133]
as the sum of absolute differences between two quasivotrices. More formally, for any two
quasivotrices V, V ′ ∈ VQr (C ), the following monometric on VQr (C ) was considered:
M(V, V ′) =
1
2
k∑
i,j=1
|Vij − V ′ij| . (6.11)
Although in [133] only reciprocity was taken into account, we propose to extend that
proposal by looking for a closest monotone quasivotrix to the given votrix.
We will now prove that Eq. (6.11) defines a monometric on VQr (C ).
Proposition 6.12 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters and M :
VQr (C )× VQr (C )→ R be defined as in Eq. (6.11). Then M is a monometric on VQr (C ).
Proof: We will prove that M satisfies the three axioms of a monometric on VQr (C ).
Non-negativity. Immediate.
Coincidence. As it is a sum of absolute values, for any V, V ′ ∈ VQr , M(V, V ′) = 0 if and
only if Vij = V
′
ij, for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. This is equivalent to saying that V = V ′.
Compatibility. For any V, V ′, V ′′ ∈ VQr (C ) such that, for any two i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k},
(Vij ≥ V ′ij ≥ V ′′ij ) ∨ (Vij ≤ V ′ij ≤ V ′′ij ) ,
the following is fulfilled:
M(V, V ′) =
1
2
k∑
i,j=1
|Vij − V ′ij|
≤ 1
2
k∑
i,j=1
|Vij − V ′′ij | = M(V, V ′′) .
Thus, M is a monometric on VQr (C ). 
In their work, Rademaker and De Baets were able to calculate the cost of a closest mono-
tone matrix satisfying reciprocity by solving a flow network problem [132, 133, 134, 135].
However, we propose to consider an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) problem instead,
in order to consider new properties such as the triangle inequality.
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The number of unknown variables (elements of the matrix) and the number of constraints
(given by the properties of Proposition 4.9) in the ILP problem depend on the number
of candidates k. Note that strictness does not need to be considered in the ILP problem
and only elements that are not on the diagonal are taken into account. In addition, due
to reciprocity, half of these non-diagonal values become superfluous. Therefore, only the
triangle inequality and monotonicity need to be considered. This yields the following
numbers of constraints:
(i) Number of (positive integer) variables:
k(k − 1)
2
.
(ii) Triangle inequality constraints (inequalities): k(k − 1)(k − 2).
(iii) Monotonicity constraints (inequalities): (k − 1)2.
More specifically, the Integer Linear Programming problem to be resolved is then encoded
in the following way. Firstly, we will define k(k−1)
2
integer variables that will be denoted
by xi (xi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r}), where i ∈ {1, . . . , k(k−1)2 }. Note that xi denotes the strength of
support of the i-th couple in C 26= (where, for simplicity, the elements in C
2
6= are listed starting
from top to bottom and in each level from left to right in the diagram of A+). We will
denote by i(u,v) the index corresponding to a couple (u, v) ∈ C 26= and by i(ai1 ,aj1 ) o i(ai2 ,aj2 )
the fact that (ai1 , aj1) A+ (ai2 , aj2) for a given ranking .
We now aim to minimize the cost M(V, V ′) given by Eq. (6.11). In terms of the variables
of the ILP problem, this cost is given by
k(k−1)
2∑
i=1
|xi − oi| , (6.12)
where the values oi represent the corresponding values of the votrix induced by the given
profile of rankings.
It must be noted that Eq. (6.12) is a sum of absolute values and will lead to an Integer
Non-Linear Programming (INLP) problem instead of an ILP problem. Fortunately, such
absolute values can be easily handled. A well-known result in optimization theory [110] is
that we can define a family of auxiliary variables (yi)
k(k−1)
2
i=1 such that minimizing Eq. (6.12)
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is equivalent to minimizing:
k(k−1)
2∑
i=1
yi , (6.13)
under the additional constraints, for any i ∈
{
1, . . . , k(k−1)
2
}
,
xi − oi ≤ yi , (6.14)
oi − xi ≤ yi , (6.15)
yi ≥ 0 . (6.16)
The constraints associated with the triangle inequality and monotonicity can be given in
the following way:
Triangle inequality: for any three different ai1 , ai2 , ai3 ∈ C :
xi(ai1 ,ai2 )
+ xi(ai2 ,ai3 )
≥ xi(ai1 ,ai3 ) , (6.17)
where xi(v,u) equals xi(u,v) when u  v.
Monotonicity: for any i1, i2 ∈ {1, . . . , k(k−1)2 } such that i1 o i2:
xi1 ≤ xi2 . (6.18)
For any i ∈ { (k−1)(k−2)
2
+ 1, . . . , k(k−1)
2
}:
xi ≥ r
2
. (6.19)
Therefore, the cost of a closest monotone quasivotrix w.r.t.  is the minimum value of
Eq. (6.13) under the constraints of Eqs. (6.14)–(6.19).
When dealing with an optimization problem, the existence of a solution and its uniqueness
are relevant matters of study. In our case, the uniqueness is not necessary as we are
interested in the cost of changing a votrix to a closest monotone quasivotrix and not in
the closest monotone quasivotrix in itself. However, the existence of a solution is indeed
an important question to be studied.
Proposition 6.13 There exists a solution of the Integer Linear Programming problem of
minimizing Eq. (6.13) under the constraints of Eqs. (6.14)–(6.19).
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Proof: There exists a finite number of possible quasivotrices with k candidates and
r voters. Each quasivotrix has an associated cost w.r.t. the original votrix defined by
Eq. (6.12). This cost takes a value in N ∪ {0} and is bounded from below by 0. As we are
minimizing the function over a finite set, if the feasible region has at least one element,
then there is an optimal solution of the optimization problem minimizing Eq. (6.12) under
the constraints of Eqs. (6.17)–(6.19). Let us prove the existence of this optimal solution
by showing that there exists at least one solution satisfying all the constraints.
Consider the profile of rankings where all r rankings are identical to the ranking  w.r.t.
which the monotonicity is required. The votrix V ∈ Vr(C ) induced by this particular
profile is obviously monotone w.r.t. . Furthermore, as it is a votrix, it will also fulfill all
the properties listed in Proposition 4.9. Thus, V is a solution of the optimization problem
and, therefore, there exists an optimal solution.
Finally, we know that minimizing the function defined in Eq. (6.12) under the constraints
of Eqs. (6.17)–(6.19) is equivalent to minimizing the function defined in Eq. (6.13) under
the constraints of Eqs. (6.14)–(6.19). 
6.1.3 Search for a monotone (quasi)votex
Of course, it is possible that a votex is not monotone w.r.t. a ranking on the set of candi-
dates. Unfortunately, it can be even the case that it is not monotone w.r.t. any ranking.
In that case, the goal would be to look for a new votex such that it is monotone w.r.t.
at least one ranking. Obviously, among all the possible monotone votices, we want the
closest to the observed one. Unfortunately, as we have discussed in the previous chapter,
votices are not characterizable and, whenever a change in a votex is made, we can no longer
assure that it still continues being a votex. Therefore, we will need to look for the closest
monotone quasivotex as it can easily be characterized. The cost of imposing monotonicity
on a votex can be measured by means of a monometric on WQr (C ).
Definition 6.14 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A function
M :WQr (C )×WQr (C )→ R is called a monometric on WQr (C ) if it satisfies the following
three properties:
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(i) Non-negativity: for any W,W ′ ∈ WQr (C ), it holds that
M(W,W ′) ≥ 0 .
(ii) Coincidence: for any W,W ′ ∈ WQr (C ), it holds that
M(W,W ′) = 0⇔ W = W ′ .
(iii) Compatibility: for any W,W ′,W ′′ ∈ WQr (C ) such that, for any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=,(
W (ai1 , ai2)DW ′(ai1 , ai2)DW ′′(ai1 , ai2)
)∨(W ′′(ai1 , ai2)DW ′(ai1 , ai2)DW (ai1 , ai2)) ,
it holds that
M(W,W ′) ≤M(W,W ′′) .
For any two (quasi)voticesW,W ′ ∈ WQr (C ), M(W,W ′) is referred to as the cost of changing
W into W ′.
After fixing a monometric on WQr (C ), we look for the closest quasivotex to the original
one such that it is monotone w.r.t. .
Definition 6.15 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters,  be a ranking
on C , W ∈ Wr(C ) be a votex and M :WQr (C )×WQr (C )→ R be a monometric onWQr (C ).
A closest monotone quasivotex W ′ ∈ WQr (C ) to W is a quasivotex that is monotone w.r.t. 
and such that there exists no quasivotex W ′′ ∈ WQr (C ) that is monotone w.r.t.  and, at
the same time,
M(W,W ′′) < M(W,W ′) .
Thus, for each ranking , we have the corresponding cost associated with a closest mono-
tone quasivotex. An optimal ranking should be one whose corresponding closest monotone
quasivotex is the closest to the original votex.
Definition 6.16 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C given
by the voters, WR ∈ Wr(C ) be the votex induced by R and M :WQr (C )×WQr (C )→ R be
a monometric on WQr (C ). An optimal ranking  (with a corresponding closest monotone
quasivotex W ∈ WQr (C )) is a ranking for which it holds that there exists no ranking ′
(with a corresponding closest monotone quasivotex W ′ ∈ WQr (C )) such that
M(WR ,W
′) < M(WR ,W ) .
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For each possible ranking  on C , a closest monotone quasivotex needs to be identified.
All the rankings whose corresponding closest monotone quasivotex has a minimal cost are
declared optimal rankings.
Note that the existence of both a closest monotone quasivotex and an optimal ranking is
assured. However, the uniqueness of neither of them can be assured.
Now that the problem setting has been established, the resolution of the problem can be
addressed. We have introduced an optimization problem whose characteristics depend on
the nature of the monometric on WQr (C ). In the following, we will analyse the particu-
lar case of a natural and intuitive monometric on WQr (C ) based on the total amount of
changes in the cumulative frequencies. This leads to the resolution of an Integer Linear
Programming problem (ILP problem).
Our proposal is based on the changes in the cumulative frequencies, where we can see
reflected the changes between distant positions in the frequency distributions. It must be
remarked that these changes will be made in the votex and not in the profile of rankings.
The proposed monometric on WQr (C ) is given by:
M(W,W ′) =
∑
(u,v)∈C 26=
m (W (u, v),W ′(u, v)) , (6.20)
where, for any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=,
m (W (ai1 , ai2) , W
′(ai1 , ai2)) =
∑
j∈K
|Ni(ai1 , ai2)−N ′i(ai1 , ai2)| .
We will now prove that Eq. (6.20) defines a monometric on WQr (C ).
Proposition 6.17 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters and M :
WQr (C )×WQr (C )→ R be defined as in Eq. (6.20). Then M is a monometric on WQr (C ).
Proof: We will prove that M satisfies the three axioms of a monometric on WQr (C ).
Non-negativity. Immediate.
Coincidence. As it is a sum of absolute values, for any W,W ′ ∈ WQr (C ), M(W,W ′) = 0
if and only if Ni(ai1 , ai2) = N
′
i(ai1 , ai2), for any j ∈ K and any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=. This is
equivalent to saying that W = W ′.
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Compatibility. For any W,W ′,W ′′ ∈ WQr (C ) satisfying, for any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=,(
W (ai1 , ai2)DW ′(ai1 , ai2)DW ′′(ai1 , ai2)
) ∨ (W ′′(ai1 , ai2)DW ′(ai1 , ai2)DW (ai1 , ai2)) ,
the following is fulfilled by definition of D:
M(W,W ′) =
∑
(u,v)∈C 26=
∑
i∈K
|Ni(u, v)−N ′i(u, v)|
≤
∑
(u,v)∈C 26=
∑
i∈K
|Ni(u, v)−N ′′i (u, v)| = M(W,W ′′) .
Thus, M is a monometric on WQr (C ). 
Once a monometric on WQr (C ) has been fixed, the search for an optimal ranking can be
addressed. Analogously to the votrix case, we will need to solve an Integer Linear Program-
ming problem for each possible ranking. The number of unknown variables (frequencies of
the votex) and the number of constraints (given by the properties of Proposition 4.15) in the
ILP problem will depend on the number of candidates k. Due to reciprocity, some of these
constraints become superfluous as the frequency distribution of each couple (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=
characterizes the frequency distribution of the couple (ai2 , ai1) (and vice versa). Neverthe-
less, for defining the monotonicity constraints, we cannot focus on A+ instead of A as in
the votrix case. This yields the following numbers of constraints:
(i) Number of (positive integer) variables: k(k − 1)2.
(ii) Completeness constraints (equalities):
k(k − 1)
2
.
(iii) Regularity constraints (equalities): (k − 1).
(iv) Peakedness constraints (inequalities): 2k(k − 2).
(v) Triangle inequality constraints (inequalities): k(k − 1)(k − 2).
(vi) Maximality constraints (inequalities): k(k − 1).
(vii) Monotonicity constraints (inequalities): 4(k − 1)2(k − 2) + (k − 1)2.
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More specifically, the Integer Linear Programming problem to be resolved is then encoded
in the following way. Firstly, we will define k(k− 1)2 integer variables that will be denoted
by xi,j (xi,j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r}), where i ∈ {1, . . . , k(k−1)2 } and j ∈ {1, . . . , 2(k − 1)}. Note
that xi,j denotes the j-th component of the frequency distribution of the i-th couple in C 26=
(where, for simplicity, the elements in C 26= are listed starting from top to bottom and in
each level from left to right in the Hasse diagram of the order relation A). We will denote
by i(u,v) the index corresponding to a couple (u, v) ∈ C 26= and by i(ai1 ,aj1 )o i(ai2 ,aj2 ) the fact
that (ai1 , aj1) A (ai2 , aj2) for a given ranking .
We intend to minimize M(W,W ′), which can be written as
k(k−1)
2∑
i=1
2k−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
j∑
k=1
(xi,k − oi,k)
∣∣∣∣∣+
k(k−1)
2∑
i=1
2k−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
2k−1∑
k=j
(xi,k − oi,k)
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where the values oi,j represent the values of the frequency distributions of the votex induced
by the given profile of rankings, or, equivalently,
2
k(k−1)
2∑
i=1
2k−1∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
j∑
k=1
(xi,k − oi,k)
∣∣∣∣∣ . (6.21)
It must be noted that Eq. (6.21) is a sum of absolute values and we will have an INLP
problem instead of an ILP problem. We can define a family of auxiliary variables yi,j where
i ∈
{
1, . . . , k(k−1)
2
}
and j ∈ {1, . . . , 2k − 1} such that minimizing Eq. (6.21) is equivalent
to minimizing:
2
k(k−1)
2∑
i=1
2k−1∑
j=1
yi,j , (6.22)
under the additional constraints, for any i ∈
{
1, . . . , k(k−1)
2
}
and any j ∈ {1, . . . , 2k − 1},
j∑
k=1
(xi,k − oi,k) ≤ yi,j , (6.23)
j∑
k=1
(oi,k − xi,k) ≤ yi,j , (6.24)
yi,j ≥ 0 . (6.25)
As we are looking for a closest monotone quasivotex, we will need to require the properties
listed in Proposition 4.15. These properties are encoded as follows.
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Completeness: for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k(k−1)
2
}:
2k−2∑
j=1
xi,j = r . (6.26)
Regularity: for any j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}:
k(k−1)
2∑
i=1
xi,j +
k(k−1)
2∑
i=1
xi,2k−1−j = jr . (6.27)
Peakedness: for any ai1 ∈ C and any j ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}:∑
u∈C \{ai1}
xi(ai1 ,u),j−1
+
∑
u∈C \{ai1}
xi(u,ai1 ),2k−j
≤
∑
u∈C \{ai1}
xi(ai1 ,u),j
+
∑
u∈C \{ai1}
xi(u,ai1 ),2k−1−j
.
(6.28)
for any ai1 ∈ C and any j ∈ {k, . . . , 2k − 3}:∑
u∈C \{ai1}
xi(ai1 ,u),j+1
+
∑
u∈C \{ai1}
xi(u,ai1 ),2k−2−j
≤
∑
u∈C \{ai1}
xi(ai1 ,u),j
+
∑
u∈C \{ai1}
xi(u,ai1 ),2k−1−j
.
(6.29)
Triangle inequality: for any three different ai1 , ai2 , ai3 ∈ C :
2k−2∑
j=k
xi(ai1 ,ai2 ),j
+
2k−2∑
j=k
xi(ai2 ,ai3 ),j
≥
2k−2∑
j=k
xi(ai1 ,ai3 ),j
, (6.30)
where xi(v,u),j equals xi(u,v),2k−j−1 when u  v.
Maximality: for any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=:
∑
i(ai1 ,u)
u∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
xi(ai1 ,u),2k−2
+
∑
i(v,ai2 )
v∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
xi(v,ai2 ),2k−2
≤
2k−1∑
j=k
xi(ai1 ,ai2 ),j
, (6.31)
where xi(v,u),j equals xi(u,v),2k−j−1 when u  v.
Additionally, we want to require the new quasivotex to be monotone.
Monotonicity: for any j ∈ {1, . . . , 2(k − 1)} and any i1, i2 ∈ {1, . . . , k(k−1)2 } such that
i1 o i2:
j∑
`=1
xi1,` ≤
j∑
`=1
xi2,` . (6.32)
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For any j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} and any i ∈ { (k−1)(k−2)
2
+ 1, . . . , k(k−1)
2
}:
j∑
`=1
xi,` ≤
2(k−1)∑
`=2k−1−j
xi,` . (6.33)
Therefore, the cost of a closest monotone quasivotex w.r.t.  is the minimum value of
Eq. (6.22) under the constraints of Eqs (6.23)–(6.33).
Proposition 6.18 There exists a solution of the Integer Linear Programming problem of
minimizing Eq. (6.22) under the constraints of Eqs. (6.23)–(6.33).
Proof: There exists a finite number of possible quasivotices with k candidates and r vot-
ers. Each quasivotex has an associated cost w.r.t. the original votex defined by Eq. (6.21).
As we are minimizing the function over a finite set, if the feasible region has at least one ele-
ment, then there is an optimal solution of the optimization problem minimizing Eq. (6.21)
under the constraints of Eqs. (6.26)–(6.33). Let us prove the existence of this optimal
solution by showing that there exists at least one solution satisfying all the constraints.
Consider the profile of rankings where all r rankings are identical to the ranking  w.r.t.
which the monotonicity is required. The votex W ∈ Wr(C ) induced by this particular
profile is obviously monotone w.r.t. . Furthermore, as it is a votex, it will also fulfill
all the properties listed in Proposition 4.15. Thus, W is a solution of the optimization
problem and, therefore, there exists an optimal solution.
Finally, we know that minimizing the function defined in Eq. (6.21) under the constraints
of Eqs. (6.26)–(6.33) is equivalent to minimizing the function defined in Eq. (6.22) under
the constraints of Eqs. (6.23)–(6.33). 
The search for monotonicity by making changes in the representation of votes is computa-
tionally friendlier than the search for monotonicity by making changes in the profile. How-
ever, letting aside the fact that the obtained construct is not assured to be a votrix/votex,
it is not possible to compare the cost of imposing monotonicity on different representations
of votes. Therefore, in the following section we will address the search for monotonicity by
making changes in the profile of rankings.
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6.2 Changes in the profile of rankings
Since the early 2000s, the field of social choice is facing a computational turn. The subfield
of computational social choice is calling the attention of the scientific community to the fact
that not only the normative properties of ranking rules are to be studied, but that also the
execution time of these ranking rules needs to be taken into account [21]. One of the most
prominent examples of ranking rules that are computationally unfriendly is the method of
Kemeny [80], which has been extensively analysed from a computational point of view [9].
The Kemeny score problem (given a profile and a nonnegative integer k, is there a ranking
that has score at most k?) is proved to be NP-complete, while the Kemeny winner problem
(given a profile and a candidate ai, is there a ranking that has minimum score and ranks
ai first?), the Kemeny ranking problem (given a profile and two candidates ai1 and ai2 , is
there a ranking that has minimum score and ranks ai1 at a better position than ai2?) and
the Kemeny rank aggregation problem (given a profile, find a ranking that has minimum
score) are proved to be NP-hard (see Chapter 4 of [21]). Obviously, the corresponding
adaptation of these problems to the search for monotonicity of a representation of votes
is computationally harder. In [126], we proposed an algorithm for identifying the optimal
ranking running in factorial time. We recall this algorithm throughout this section.
Although many betweenness relations on L(C )r may be considered, as discussed in [126],
the most interesting betweenness relation in the field of social choice is the one given by
Kemeny [80]. A profile of rankings R ′ = (′j)rj=1 is said to be in between two other profiles
of rankings R = (j)rj=1 and R ′′ = (′′j )rj=1, denoted by [R,R ′,R ′′], if it holds that
r∑
j=1
K(j,′′j ) =
r∑
j=1
K(j,′j) +
r∑
j=1
K(′j,′′j ) ,
where K denotes the Kendall distance function [82] defined, for any two rankings 1 and
2, as K(1,2) = #{(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26= | ai1 1 ai2 ∧ ai2 2 ai1}.
Definition 6.19 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A function
M : L(C )r×L(C )r → R is called a monometric if it satisfies the following three properties:
(i) Non-negativity: for any R,R ′ ∈ L(C )r, it holds that M(R,R ′) ≥ 0.
(ii) Coincidence: for any R,R ′ ∈ L(C )r, it holds that M(R,R ′) = 0⇔ R = R ′.
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(iii) Compatibility: for any R,R ′,R ′′ ∈ L(C )r such that [R,R ′,R ′′], it holds that
M(R,R ′) ≤M(R,R ′′).
The ranking that is the closest to imposing monotonicity on the representation of votes
should then be considered the optimal ranking. Of course, this optimal ranking depends
on the chosen representation of votes.
Definition 6.20 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. Let M : L(C )r × L(C )r → R be a monometric and consider a fixed
representation of votes.
(i) A closest profile of rankings with a monotone representation of votes is a profile of
rankings R ′ such that there exists a ranking  w.r.t. which the representation of
votes induced by R ′ is monotone and for which it holds that there exists no profile
of rankings R ′′ such that there exists a ranking  w.r.t. which the representation of
votes induced by R ′′ is monotone, while M(R,R ′′) < M(R,R ′).
(ii) An optimal ranking  is a ranking imposing monotonicity on at least one closest
profile of rankings with a monotone representation of votes.
As there exists a finite number of profiles of r rankings on C , the existence of both a
closest profile of rankings with a monotone scorix/votrix/votex and an optimal ranking is
assured2. Unfortunately, the uniqueness cannot be assured.
As discussed by Pe´rez-Ferna´ndez et al. [126] for a more general problem setting, the search
for a closest profile of rankings satisfying some desired property can be addressed as a
transportation problem [101] in case the property can be expressed as a constraint of an
Integer Linear Programming problem. Indeed, monotonicity of all previously discussed
representations of votes can be expressed as a transportation problem. In a transportation
problem, we have a number of supply points and a number of demand points. At each
supply point certain product is produced and it needs to be transported to the demand
points satisfying the required demands at each demand point. Transporting a unit of
2Unlike the setting of [124] where changes are considered in the votrix/votex leading to the introduction
of the notion of quasivotrix/quasivotex, here changes are considered in the profile of rankings. Therefore,
by definition, the votrix/votex associated to the new profile can always be obtained.
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product from a supply point to a demand point has an associated cost. An optimal
transportation distribution needs to be defined such that the demand is satisfied.
In our setting, each ranking in L(C ) is both a supply point and a demand point. The
production in the supply point corresponding to a ranking  on C represents the frequency
of this ranking in the profile of rankings R given by the voters. The demand in the demand
point corresponding to a ranking  on C represents the frequency of this ranking in the
closest profile of rankings R ′ with a monotone representation of votes.
A general demand needs to be satisfied (the number of rankings in R ′ needs to be equal to
the number of rankings in R). Formalizing the problem, (k!)2 variables xij taking values
in N ∪ {0} are defined, k being the number of candidates in C . For any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k!},
xij = n means that n units of the i-th ranking in L(C ) are assigned to the j-th ranking in
L(C ). In this case, we have an initial profile of rankings where each ranking i appears si
times. These si’s can be seen as the number of units of product that are produced at each
supply point. We are then dealing with the following optimization problem:
Minimize
k!∑
i=1
k!∑
j=1
Cijxij w.r.t. {xij}k!i,j=1
s.t.
k!∑
j=1
xij = si, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k!} ,
xij ≥ 0, for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k!} ,
xij ∈ Z, for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k!} ,
under the additional constraint of monotonicity of the representation of votes w.r.t. the
ranking ∈ L(C ).
A transportation problem can be solved in polynomial time [84]. Unfortunately, this poly-
nomial time is in terms of the number of variables, which equals k! in our setting. This
is an obvious computational drawback, even though in social choice theory, the number of
candidates in C is typically quite small. The development of a more efficient3 method for
searching for a closest profile of rankings with a recursively monotone scorix remains an
open problem.
3Note that two similar ranking rules, such as the methods of Dodgson [46] and Kemeny [80], are proved
to be NP-hard problems [9].
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CHAPTER 7
Monotonicity and axiomatic social choice
theory
7.1 Axiomatic social choice theory
The study of properties that a ranking rule may or may not satisfy is a relevant matter
of study in social choice theory [3, 60, 133, 152]. Unfortunately, as Arrow stated in [3],
there is no ranking rule simultaneously satisfying all the properties that can be considered
desirable. In the following, we will briefly introduce the most common ones:
(i) Non-dictatorship: there is no voter whose ranking is always elected as the winning
ranking.
(ii) Anonymity: reassigning the rankings over the voters does not change the outcome.
(iii) Neutrality: if some permutation of candidates is applied to each voter’s ranking,
the same permutation should be observed in the winning ranking.
(iv) Non-imposition: for any ranking on the set of candidates there exists a profile of
rankings such that this ranking is the winning ranking.
(v) Unanimity (Pareto efficiency): if every voter prefers a candidate over another
one, then this must also be the case in the winning ranking.
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(vi) Independence of irrelevant alternatives: the order between two candidates de-
pends only on the individual preferences between these two candidates.
The properties fulfilled by the ranking rules proposed in this dissertation may depend on the
chosen monometric. It is immediate to see that, when considering the Kendall distance
function and considering changes in the profile of rankings, the first four properties are
trivially satisfied. Unanimity can also be proved to be satisfied (it suffices to see that, if
every voter prefers ai1 over ai2 , then it trivially holds that the cost of the closest profile of
rankings in the chosen consensus state where the winning ranking  satisfies that ai1  ai2
is lower than or equal to the cost of the closest profile of rankings in the chosen consensus
state where the winning ranking is the result of permuting candidates ai1 and ai2 in ).
On the other hand, independence of irrelevant alternatives is not satisfied as monotonic-
ity is a global property and does not depend only on the individual preferences between
two candidates. Arrow’s impossibility theorem [3] states that there is no ranking rule
satisfying, at the same time, non-dictatorship, unanimity and independence of irrelevant
alternatives. Therefore, as non-dictatorship and unanimity are satisfied, independence of
irrelevant alternatives cannot be satisfied.
Finding axiomatic characterizations of ranking rules is an important aspect in the field of
social choice theory. As pointed out by Merlin [97], Arrow’s theorem [3] can be understood
as an axiomatization of dictatorship. Characterizations of the simple majority rule [95],
scoring functions [169], best-worst voting systems [66] and other voting rules have been
proposed. Characterizing the search for monotonicity is still an open problem that will be
addressed in the near future.
7.2 Independence of all proposed ranking rules
In this section, we prove the independence of the ranking rules proposed in this dissertation
w.r.t. each other. The most important comparisons are detailed in an illustrative subsec-
tion. Note that, throughout this section, the Kendall distance function will be considered
as monometric.
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7.2.1 The search for monotonicity of the scorix and the search for recursive
monotonicity of the scorix
In this subsection, we prove that the search for monotonicity of the scorix and the search
for recursive monotonicity of the scorix are independent w.r.t. each other by providing a
profile of rankings for which both methods lead to a different winning ranking. Consider
the profile of r = 20 rankings listed in Table 7.1.
# i Rankings on C
5 b  c  d  a
4 b  c  a  d
3 a  d  c  b
2 c  a  d  b
2 d  a  c  b
1 a  c  b  d
1 a  c  d  b
1 b  a  c  d
1 c  d  a  b
Table 7.1: Expressed rankings and their frequency.
On the one hand, in case we address the search for monotonicity of the scorix, the optimal
ranking is c  a  b  d with a cost of six, while the ranking c  b  a  d leads to a
cost of seven. On the other hand, in case we address the search for recursive monotonicity
of the scorix, the optimal ranking is c  b  a  d with a cost of seven, while the ranking
c  a  b  d leads to a cost of eight. Therefore, the search for monotonicity of the scorix
and the search for recursive monotonicity of the scorix are independent w.r.t. each other.
7.2.2 The search for (recursive) monotonicity of the scorix and all scoring rank-
ing rules
In this subsection, we prove that the search for monotonicity and the search for recursive
monotonicity of the scorix are independent w.r.t. all scoring ranking rules by considering
two examples that lead to contradictory conditions on the weights of the considered scoring
ranking rule.
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On the one hand, we consider the profile of r = 20 rankings listed in Table 7.2.
# i Rankings on C
5 b  d  a  c
5 b  d  c  a
5 d  a  c  b
4 a  c  d  b
1 a  d  c  b
Table 7.2: Expressed rankings and their frequency.
The scorix induced by the profile of rankings listed in Table 7.2 is:
S =

5 5 5 5
10 0 0 10
0 4 11 5
5 11 4 0
 .
Applying the search for monotonicity of the scorix, the optimal ranking is d  b  a  c
with a cost of eight. Analogously, applying the search for recursive monotonicity of the
scorix, the optimal ranking is also d  b  a  c with a cost of eight. As b  a in the
optimal ranking, any scoring ranking rule coinciding with both methods will satisfy that
the score s(b) of candidate b is greater than the score s(a) of candidate a. In particular, it
holds that
s(b) = 10α1 + 10α4 > 5α1 + 5α2 + 5α3 + 5α4 = s(a) . (7.1)
On the other hand, we consider the profile of r = 20 rankings listed in Table 7.3.
The scorix induced by the profile of rankings listed in Table 7.3 is:
S =

5 5 5 5
10 0 1 9
0 6 11 3
5 9 3 3
 .
Applying the search for monotonicity of the scorix, the optimal ranking is d  a  b  c
with a cost of six. Analogously, applying the search for recursive monotonicity of the
scorix, the optimal ranking is also d  a  b  c with a cost of eight. As a  b in the
optimal ranking, any scoring ranking rule coinciding with both methods will satisfy that
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# i Rankings on C
4 a  d  c  b
4 b  d  c  a
3 b  c  a  d
3 d  a  c  b
2 b  a  d  c
2 d  c  a  b
1 a  d  b  c
1 b  c  d  a
Table 7.3: Expressed rankings and their frequency.
the score s(a) of candidate a is greater than the score s(b) of candidate b. In particular, it
holds that
s(a) = 5α1 + 5α2 + 5α3 + 5α4 > 10α1 + α3 + 9α4 = s(b) . (7.2)
As the intersection of Eqs. (7.1) and (7.2) with the constraints on the weights of a scoring
ranking rule (α1 ≥ α2 ≥ α3 ≥ α4 ≥ 0 and α1 > α4) is empty, we conclude that there exists
no scoring ranking rule satisfying at the same time both constraints. Therefore, the search
for (recursive) monotonicity of the scorix is proved to be independent w.r.t. all scoring
ranking rules.
7.2.3 The search for monotonicity of the votrix and the search for monotonicity
of the votex
In this subsection, we prove that the search for monotonicity of the votrix and the search
for monotonicity of the votex are independent w.r.t. each other by providing a profile of
rankings for which both methods lead to a different winning ranking. Consider the profile
of r = 20 rankings listed in Table 7.4.
On the one hand, in case we address the search for monotonicity of the votrix, the optimal
ranking is c  b  a  d with a cost of one, while the ranking b  c  a  d leads to a
cost of six. On the other hand, in case we address the search for monotonicity of the votex,
the optimal ranking is b  c  a  d with a cost of 13, while the ranking c  b  a  d
leads to a cost of 14. Therefore, the search for monotonicity of the votrix and the search
for monotonicity of the votex are independent w.r.t. each other.
152 7.2 INDEPENDENCE OF ALL PROPOSED RANKING RULES
# i Rankings on C
5 b  c  d  a
4 b  c  a  d
3 a  d  c  b
2 c  a  d  b
2 d  a  c  b
1 a  c  b  d
1 a  c  d  b
1 b  a  c  d
1 c  d  a  b
Table 7.4: Expressed rankings and their frequency.
7.2.4 The search for monotonicity of the votrix and the search for a Condorcet
ranking and unanimity
In this subsection, we prove that the search for monotonicity of the votrix is independent
w.r.t. the search for a Condorcet ranking and unanimity by providing a profile of rankings
for which the first method leads to a different winning ranking than the other two methods.
We consider the profile of r = 20 rankings listed in Table 7.5.
# i Rankings on C
11 a  b  c  d
9 b  c  d  a
Table 7.5: Expressed rankings and their frequency.
When searching for monotonicity of the votrix, the optimal ranking is b  a  c  d with
a cost of ten. Note that the cost associated with the Condorcet ranking, a  b  c  d,
equals 18. Therefore, the search for monotonicity of the votrix is independent w.r.t. the
search for a Condorcet ranking. As in case a Condorcet ranking exists it always is the
Kemeny winner, the independence w.r.t. the search for unanimity also holds.
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7.2.5 The search for monotonicity of the profile and the search for all other con-
sensus states
In this subsection, we prove that the search for monotonicity of the profile is independent
w.r.t. the search for all other consensus states by providing a profile of rankings for which
the first method leads to a different winning ranking than all the other methods. We
consider the profile of r = 20 rankings listed in Table 7.6.
# i Rankings on C
9 a  b  c  d
6 b  a  c  d
3 b  c  a  d
2 b  c  d  a
Table 7.6: Expressed rankings and their frequency.
Note that the profile of rankings is monotone w.r.t. the ranking a  b  c  d. Therefore,
it is the optimal ranking and trivially leads to a cost of zero. Note that this optimal
ranking differs from the Condorcet ranking, b  a  c  d, which leads to a cost of two.
Therefore, the search for monotonicity of the profile is independent w.r.t. the search for
the Condorcet ranking and w.r.t. all Condorcet-consistent ranking rules. In addition, the
optimal ranking according to the search for all other consensus states discussed in this
dissertation is also b  a  c  d. Therefore, the search for monotonicity of the profile is
proved to be independent w.r.t. the search for all other consensus states here discussed.
7.2.6 The search for monotonicity of the scorix and the search for monotonicity
of the votrix
In this subsection, we prove that the search for monotonicity of the scorix and the search
for monotonicity of the votrix are independent w.r.t. each other by providing a profile of
rankings for which both methods lead to a different winning ranking. Consider the profile
of r = 20 rankings listed in Table 7.7.
On the one hand, in case we address the search for monotonicity of the scorix, the optimal
ranking is b  a  c  d with a cost of seven, while the ranking b  a  d  c leads
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# i Rankings on C
8 b  c  d  a
7 a  b  c  d
4 b  d  c  a
1 a  d  b  c
Table 7.7: Expressed rankings and their frequency.
to a cost of eight. On the other hand, in case we address the search for monotonicity of
the votrix, the optimal ranking is b  a  d  c with a cost of nine, while the ranking
b  a  c  d leads to a cost of ten. Therefore, the search for monotonicity of the scorix
and the search for monotonicity of the votrix are independent w.r.t. each other.
7.2.7 The search for acclamation and the search for a Condorcet ranking and
unanimity
In this subsection, we prove that the search for monotonicity of the votrix is independent
w.r.t. the search for a Condorcet ranking and unanimity by providing a profile of rankings
for which the first method leads to a different winning ranking than the other two methods.
We consider the profile of r = 20 rankings listed in Table 7.5.
As previously discussed, the ranking a  b  c  d is the Condorcet ranking of the profile
of rankings. Therefore, it is the optimal ranking according to the search for a Condorcet
ranking and for unanimity. Nevertheless, when searching for acclamation, it leads to a
cost of 18, which is lower than 16, the cost associated with the ranking b  a  c  d.
Therefore, the search for acclamation is independent w.r.t. the search for a Condorcet
ranking and unanimity.
7.2.8 The search for a Condorcet ranking and the search for unanimity
In this subsection, we prove that the search for a Condorcet ranking and the search for
unanimity are independent w.r.t. each other by providing a profile of rankings for which
both methods lead to a different winning ranking. This is a well-known result in social
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choice theory and we refer to an example profile given in [83]. This profile of r = 34
rankings is listed in Table 7.8.
# i Rankings on C
9 a  b  c  d
5 a  c  b  d
5 b  d  c  a
5 c  d  b  a
5 d  b  a  c
5 d  c  a  b
Table 7.8: Expressed rankings and their frequency.
On the one hand, in case we address the search for a Condorcet ranking, the optimal
rankings are b  c  d  a, b  d  a  c and d  a  b  c with a cost of six, while the
ranking a  b  c  d leads to a cost of eight. On the other hand, in case we address the
search for unanimity, the unique optimal ranking is a  b  c  d with a cost of 95, while
the costs associated with the other three rankings equals 97. Therefore, the search for a
Condorcet ranking and the search for unanimity are independent w.r.t. each other.
7.2.9 Summary
In this subsection, we provide a summary (see Table 7.9) of the set of optimal rankings
in the search for all different consensus states mentioned in this dissertation for different
profiles of rankings.
The reader may notice that the five considered profiles lead to an exhaustive comparison1
of the independence of the search for the eight different consensus states analysed in this
dissertation w.r.t. each other. It suffices to check that, for any two consensus states, there
is at least one profile of rankings for which the intersection of both sets of optimal rankings
is empty.
1The search for a Condorcet ranking and the search for unanimity are not proved to be independent
w.r.t. each other in Table 7.9, but in the profile of rankings listed in Table 7.8.
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Search for Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.5 Table 7.6 Table 7.7
Monotonicity
c  a  b  d d  b  a  c b  a  c  d b  a  c  d b  a  c  d
of the scorix
Recursive monotonicity
c  b  a  d d  b  a  c b  a  c  d b  a  c  d b  a  c  d
of the scorix
Monotonicity
c  b  a  d d  b  a  c b  a  c  d b  a  c  d b  a  d  c
of the votrix
Monotonicity
b  c  a  d b  d  a  c
d  b  a  c b  a  c  d b  a  c  d
b  a  c  d
of the votex b  c  a  d
b  c  d  a
Monotonicity
c  a  b  d d  b  a  c a  b  c  d a  b  c  d b  c  a  d
of the profile b  c  d  a
Condorcet ranking
b  c  a  d
b  d  a  c a  b  c  d b  a  c  d b  c  d  ac  a  b  d
c  b  a  d
Acclamation c  a  b  d d  a  b  c b  a  c  d b  a  c  d b  c  a  d
d  b  a  c b  c  d  a
Unanimity
b  c  a  d
b  d  a  c a  b  c  d b  a  c  d b  c  d  ac  a  b  d
c  b  a  d
Table 7.9: Search for all consensus states and corresponding sets of optimal
rankings.
CHAPTER 8
Impact of ties on the representations of
votes
8.1 The three-way setting
In the previous chapters, we have discussed several monotonicity-based ranking rules fo-
cused on the search for a profile of rankings with a monotone representation of votes. We
consider here the special case where each voter is assumed to provide a ranking with ties
on the set of candidates, which is a common situation in real-life problems where voters
might consider two or more candidates equally suitable [117]. This situation subsumes a
three-way decision [168], where each voter needs to decide whether ‘candidate a is better
than candidate b’, ‘candidate b is better than candidate a’ or ‘candidates a and b are equally
suitable’. This type of decision can be seen as a representation of bipolar information [34]
on a three-label bipolar qualitative scale. As each voter directly provides a ranking with
ties on the set of candidates, the relations ‘the first candidate is better than the second
candidate’ (and its transpose) and ‘both candidates are equally suitable’ are considered to
be transitive.
In this case, every voter is allowed to provide a weak order relation %j on C , i.e., a complete
and transitive relation on C that might not be antisymmetric. Any weak order relation %
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can be written as the union of two relations  and ∼, where:
 = {(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 2 | (ai1 % ai2) ∧ (ai2 6% ai1)} ,
∼ = {(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 2 | (ai1 % ai2) ∧ (ai2 % ai1)} .
The relation , called ranking with ties (or strict weak order relation), is irreflexive, tran-
sitive and antisymmetric and the relation ∼, called indifference relation, is reflexive, tran-
sitive and symmetric. Due to the completeness of a weak order relation, the weak order
relation %j on C expressed by a voter and the corresponding ranking with ties j are used
interchangeably1.
The set of all rankings with ties on C is denoted by L∗(C ). As a ranking is a particular
case of a ranking with ties, it obviously holds that L(C ) ⊆ L∗(C ). The list of r rankings
with ties given by the voters is called a profile of rankings with ties and is denoted by
R∗ = (j)rj=1. Obviously, it holds that R∗ ∈ L∗(C )r.
In the following, we will see how the representations of votes analysed in the previous
chapters are affected by ties.
8.2 The weak-scorix
In case a ranking with ties is provided, the position of a candidate is no longer determined
by a number, but rather by an interval, where the left endpoint equals the best position
of the candidate in any linear extension of the ranking with ties and the right endpoint
equals the worst position of the candidate in any linear extension of the ranking with ties.
Definition 8.1 Let C be a set of k candidates. For a weak order relation % on C , the
position P(ai) of candidate ai is defined as the interval [`1, `2], where
`1 = #{j ∈ {1, . . . , k} | aj  ai}+ 1 ,
`2 = k −#{j ∈ {1, . . . , k} | ai  aj} .
All intervals of this form are called interval positions.
1When a strict weak order relation is understood as a ranking with ties, the incomparable elements in
the ranking with ties correspond to indifferent elements in the weak order relation.
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Interval positions are based on the generalization of the Borda count to rankings with ties.
Several extensions of the Borda count have been proposed (see, for instance [50]). Here,
we have considered a similar methodology to the two-valued approach discussed in [15].
Example 8.2 Let C = {a, b, c, d} be a set of candidates and a  b ∼ c  d be a weak order
relation on C . Note that there are two linear extensions of a  b ∼ c  d: a  b  c  d
and a  c  b  d. As it is always ranked at the first position, the position of candidate
a in % is the (degenerated) interval [1, 1]. Analogously, as it is always ranked at the last
position, the position of candidate d in % is the (degenerated) interval [4, 4]. As they are
ranked, in the best case scenario, at the second position and, in the worst case scenario,
at the third position, the interval position of both candidates b and c in % is the interval
[2, 3].
Remark 8.3 The set Pk of all interval positions for a set of k candidates is denoted by
Pk, and it can be characterized in the following way2:
Pk ={[`1, `2] ∈ I(N) | `1 ≤ `2 ≤ k} = I({1, . . . , k}) .
An intuitive order relation on Pk is defined according to how good a candidate is ranked
in a given ranking with ties.
Proposition 8.4 Let Pk be the set of all interval positions for a set of k candidates. The
relation ≤Pk defined as
≤Pk=
{(
[`1, `2], [`
′
1, `
′
2]
) ∈ P2k | `1 ≥ `′1 ∧ `2 ≥ `′2} ,
is an order relation on Pk.
Proof: The proof of this proposition is immediate as ≤Pk coincides with the converse of
the partial order on intervals induced by the usual product order on N2. 
In Figure 8.1, the Hasse diagram of the order relation ≤Pk is shown for a set of four
candidates.
2Throughout this chapter, I(X) refers to the set of intervals in a totally ordered set X and N refers to
the set of natural numbers, not including zero.
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[1, 1]
[1, 2]
[2, 2][1, 3]
[1, 4] [2, 3]
[2, 4] [3, 3]
[3, 4]
[4, 4]
Figure 8.1: Hasse diagram of the order relation ≤Pk .
Remark 8.5 When restricting to the case where ties are not allowed, it holds that, for any
candidate, its interval position [`1, `2] reduces to a single value, i.e., `1 = `2. Furthermore,
as the position ` in a ranking is the interval position [`, `] when a ranking is interpreted
as a ranking with ties, it holds that [`, `] ≤Pk [`′, `′] if and only if ` ≥ `′. Hence, the order
relation ≤Pk is a total order relation when restricting to rankings without ties.
The scorix can no longer be defined in the form of a matrix for the case of rankings with
ties. Instead, we define the weak-scorix.
Definition 8.6 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A function
S∗ : C×Pk → {0, 1, . . . , r} is called a weak-scorix (plural weak-scorices) on C if there exists
a profile R∗ of r rankings with ties on C such that, for any ai ∈ C and any [`1, `2] ∈ Pk,
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it holds that
S∗(ai, [`1, `2]) = #{j ∈ {1, . . . , r} | Pj(ai) = [`1, `2]} .
The set of all weak-scorices on C induced by any profile of r rankings with ties on C is
denoted by S∗r (C ).
Similarly to monotonicity of a scorix, we define monotonicity of a weak-scorix.
Definition 8.7 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A weak-
scorix S∗ ∈ S∗r (C ) is said to be monotone w.r.t. a ranking  on C if, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C
such that ai1  ai2 and any [`1, `2] ∈ Pk, it holds that∑
[`′1,`
′
2]∈Pk
[`′1,`
′
2]≤Pk [`1,`2]
S∗
(
ai1 , [`
′
1, `
′
2]
) ≤ ∑
[`′1,`
′
2]∈Pk
[`′1,`
′
2]≤Pk [`1,`2]
S∗
(
ai2 , [`
′
1, `
′
2]
)
,
∑
[`′1,`
′
2]∈Pk
[`1,`2]≤Pk [`′1,`′2]
S∗
(
ai1 , [`
′
1, `
′
2]
) ≥ ∑
[`′1,`
′
2]∈Pk
[`1,`2]≤Pk [`′1,`′2]
S∗
(
ai2 , [`
′
1, `
′
2]
)
.
Again, the weak-scorix induced by most profiles of rankings with ties is not monotone w.r.t.
any ranking. The set of all profiles of rankings with ties with a monotone weak-scorix can
also be understood as a consensus state for the rationalisation of ranking rules.
8.3 The weak-votrix
Among the three main representations of votes discussed in this dissertation (scorix, votrix
and votex), the votrix is the least affected by ties in the sense that the definition of the given
representation of votes remains almost the same when rankings with ties are considered.
Definition 8.8 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A matrix
V ∗ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r}k×k is called a weak-votrix (plural votrices) on C if there exists a profile
R∗ of r rankings with ties on C such that, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C , it holds that
V ∗i1i2 = #{j ∈ {1, . . . , r} | ai1 j ai2} .
The set of all weak-votrices on C induced by any profile of r rankings with ties on C is
denoted by V∗r (C ).
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The notion of monotonicity of a votrix is easily extended to weak-votrices.
Definition 8.9 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A weak-
votrix V ∗ is said to be monotone w.r.t. a ranking  on C (with corresponding A) if, for
any (ai1 , aj1), (ai2 , aj2) ∈ C 26= such that (ai1 , aj1) A (ai2 , aj2), it holds that
V ∗i1j1 ≥ V ∗i2j2 ,
V ∗j1i1 ≤ V ∗j2i2 .
Again, the weak-votrix induced by most profiles of rankings with ties is not monotone w.r.t.
any ranking. The set of all profiles of rankings with ties with a monotone weak-votrix can
also be understood as a consensus state for the rationalisation of ranking rules.
8.4 The weak-votex
In order to define the ‘relative position’ of a candidate ai1 w.r.t. another candidate ai2 in a
ranking with ties , the sizes of the equivalence classes in % of both candidates ai1 and ai2
need to be taken into account. For any candidate a ∈ C , we denote by [a]% the equivalence
class of candidate a in the weak order relation %, i.e., [a]% = {a′ ∈ C | a ∼ a′}.
The relative position of ai1 w.r.t. ai2 depends on three values: the size of the largest
equivalence class among [ai1 ]% and [ai2 ]%, the size of the smallest equivalence class among
[ai1 ]% and [ai2 ]%, and the relative position of both equivalence classes defined as
P%([ai1 ]%, [ai2 ]%) =

#{i ∈ {1, . . . , k} | ai1  ai  ai2}+ 1 , if ai1  ai2 ,
0 , if ai1 ∼ ai2 ,
−#{i ∈ {1, . . . , k} | ai2  ai  ai1} − 1 , if ai2  ai1 .
Definition 8.10 Let C be a set of k candidates. For a weak order relation % on C , the
relative position of candidate ai1 w.r.t. candidate ai2 is defined as the triplet:
(s1, s2, p) =
(
max(#[ai1 ]%,#[ai2 ]%),min(#[ai1 ]%,#[ai2 ]%), P%([ai1 ]%, [ai2 ]%)
)
,
in case P%([ai1 ]%, [ai2 ]%) 6= 0, or, otherwise, as the triplet (s1, s2, p) = (0, 0, 0). All triplets
of this form are called positional triplets. The set of all positional triplets for a set of k
candidates is denoted by Bk.
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Remark 8.11 Note that Bk can be characterized in the following way:
Bk = {(s1, s2, p) ∈ N2 × Z | (s1 ≥ s2) ∧ (s1 + s2 + |p| ≤ k + 1) ∧ (p 6= 0)} ∪ {(0, 0, 0)} .
In the following example we illustrate the notion of a positional triplet.
Example 8.12 Let C = {a, b, c, d} be a set of candidates and a  b ∼ c  d be a weak
order relation on C . For candidates a and d, the size of both equivalence classes equals one
(#[a]% = #[d]% = 1) and the relative position of both equivalence classes equals three due
to the fact that there are two candidates strictly in between a and d (P%([a]%, [d]%) = 3).
Therefore, the relative position of a w.r.t. d is (1, 1, 3). Analogously, the relative position
of d w.r.t. a is (1, 1,−3). For candidates a and b, the size of the equivalence class of a
equals one (#[a]% = 1), the size of the equivalence class of b equals two (#[b]% = 2) and
the relative position of both equivalence classes equals one due to the fact that there are no
candidates strictly in between a and b (P%([a]%, [b]%) = 1). Therefore, the relative position
of a w.r.t. b is (2, 1, 1). Analogously, the relative position of b w.r.t. a is (2, 1,−1). As
candidates b and c belong to the same equivalence class, the relative position of b w.r.t. c
is (0, 0, 0). Analogously, the relative position of c w.r.t. b also is (0, 0, 0).
The set of all positional triplets (s1, s2, p) ∈ Bk such that p ≥ 1 is denoted by B+k , the
(singleton) set of all positional triplets (s1, s2, p) ∈ Bk such that p = 0 is denoted by B0k
and the set of all positional triplets (s1, s2, p) ∈ Bk such that p ≤ −1 is denoted by B−k . It
obviously holds that B+k , B0k and B−k are disjoint sets and
Bk = B+k ∪ B0k ∪ B−k .
An intuitive order relation on Bk is defined according to how far apart two candidates are
in a given ranking with ties. In order to do so, we will first define three order relations on
B+k , B0k and B−k separately. The order relation on B+k follows from the intuition that the
addition (resp. removal) of a candidate strictly in between a and b or in the equivalence
class of either a or b should make the relative position of a w.r.t. b to increase (resp.
decrease). The order relation on B0k is trivially determined due to the fact that B0k is a
singleton. The order relation on B−k should be analogous to B+k due to the fact that the
relative position of a w.r.t. b and the relative position of b w.r.t. a play opposite roles. In
that way, the order relation on Bk should be defined as the linear sum of the order relations
on B−k , B0k and B+k .
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Proposition 8.13 Let Bk be the set of all positional triplets for a set of k candidates.
(i) The relation ≤+Bk , defined as
≤+Bk=

(
(s1, s2, p), (s
′
1, s
′
2, p
′)
) ∈ (B+k )2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(p ≤ p′)
∧(p+ s1 ≤ p′ + s′1)
∧(p+ s2 ≤ p′ + s′2)
∧(p+ s1 + s2 ≤ p′ + s′1 + s′2)
 ,
is an order relation on B+k .
(ii) The relation ≤0Bk , defined as ≤0Bk= (B0k)2, is an order relation on B0k.
(iii) The relation ≤−Bk , defined as
≤−Bk=
{(
(s1, s2, p), (s
′
1, s
′
2, p
′)
) ∈ (B−k )2 ∣∣((s′1, s′2,−p′), (s1, s2,−p)) ∈≤+Bk } ,
is an order relation on B−k .
(iv) The relation ≤Bk , defined as
≤Bk=≤+Bk ∪ ≤0Bk ∪ ≤−Bk ∪
(B−k × B0k) ∪ (B−k × B+k ) ∪ (B0k × B+k ) ,
is an order relation on Bk.
Proof: If the three relations ≤+Bk , ≤0Bk and ≤−Bk are order relations on, respectively, B+k ,
B0k and B−k , then, as we are considering the linear sum (see [41]) of three disjoint partially
ordered sets, ≤Bk is an order relation on Bk. Trivially, ≤0Bk is an order relation on B0k. Let
us prove that ≤+Bk and ≤−Bk are reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relations.
Reflexivity: evident.
Antisymmetry: for any (s1, s2, p), (s
′
1, s
′
2, p
′) ∈ B+k such that (s1, s2, p) ≤+Bk (s′1, s′2, p′) and
(s′1, s
′
2, p
′) ≤+Bk (s1, s2, p), it holds that
(p ≤ p′) ∧ (p′ ≤ p) which implies p = p′ ,
(p+ s1 ≤ p′ + s′1) ∧ (p′ + s′1 ≤ p+ s1) ∧ (p = p′) which implies s1 = s′1 ,
(p+ s2 ≤ p′ + s′2) ∧ (p′ + s′2 ≤ p+ s2) ∧ (p = p′) which implies s2 = s′2 .
Therefore, we conclude that (s1, s2, p) = (s
′
1, s
′
2, p
′).
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For any (s1, s2, p), (s
′
1, s
′
2, p
′) ∈ B−k such that (s1, s2, p) ≤−Bk (s′1, s′2, p′) and (s′1, s′2, p′) ≤−Bk
(s1, s2, p), it holds that (s
′
1, s
′
2,−p′) ≤+Bk (s1, s2,−p) and (s1, s2,−p) ≤+Bk (s′1, s′2,−p′). As
≤+Bk is antisymmetric, it holds that (s1, s2,−p) = (s′1, s′2,−p′) and, therefore, we conclude
that (s1, s2, p) = (s
′
1, s
′
2, p
′).
Transitivity: for any (s1, s2, p), (s
′
1, s
′
2, p
′), (s′′1, s
′′
2, p
′′) ∈ B+k such that (s1, s2, p) ≤+Bk (s′1, s′2, p′)
and (s′1, s
′
2, p
′) ≤+Bk (s′′1, s′′2, p′′), it holds that
(p ≤ p′) ∧ (p′ ≤ p′′) which implies p ≤ p′′ ,
(p+ s1 ≤ p′ + s′1) ∧ (p′ + s′1 ≤ p′′ + s′′1) which implies p+ s1 ≤ p′′ + s′′1 ,
(p+ s2 ≤ p′ + s′2) ∧ (p′ + s′2 ≤ p′′ + s′′2) which implies p+ s2 ≤ p′′ + s′′2 ,
(p+ s1 + s2 ≤ p′ + s′1 + s′2) ∧ (p′ + s′1 + s′2 ≤ p′′ + s′′1 + s′′2)
which implies p′ + s1 + s2 ≤ p′′ + s′′1 + s′′2 .
Therefore, we conclude that (s1, s2, p) ≤+Bk (s′′1, s′′2, p′′).
For any (s1, s2, p), (s
′
1, s
′
2, p
′), (s′′1, s
′′
2, p
′′) ∈ B−k such that (s1, s2, p) ≤−Bk (s′1, s′2, p′) and
(s′1, s
′
2, p
′) ≤−Bk (s′′1, s′′2, p′′), it holds that (s′1, s′2,−p′) ≤+Bk (s1, s2,−p) and (s′′1, s′′2,−p′′) ≤+Bk
(s′1, s
′
2,−p′). As ≤+Bk is transitive, it holds that (s′′1, s′′2,−p′′) ≤+Bk (s1, s2,−p). Therefore, we
conclude that (s1, s2, p) ≤−Bk (s′′1, s′′2, p′′). 
In Figure 8.2, the Hasse diagrams of the order relations ≤+Bk , ≤0Bk and ≤−Bk are shown for a
set of four candidates. The considered order relation on Bk is the one given by the linear
sum of the three disjoint partially ordered sets (B−k ,≤−Bk), (B0k,≤0Bk) and (B+k ,≤+Bk). The
Hasse diagram of the order relation ≤Bk is shown in Figure 8.3. Note that the relative
position of two candidates is smaller than or equal to the relative position of two other
candidates if the first two candidates are closer in the given weak order relation than the
second couple of candidates.
Remark 8.14 When restricting to the case where ties are not allowed, it holds that max(#[ai1 ]%,#[ai2 ]%) =
min(#[ai1 ]%,#[ai2 ]%) = 1 and P%([ai1 ]%, [ai2 ]%) 6= 0 (for any two different candidates
ai1 , ai2 ∈ C ).
In addition, it holds that p ≤ p′ if and only if (1, 1, p) ≤Bk (1, 1, p′). As the relative position
p in the sense of [124] is the relative position (1, 1, p) in the sense of this section, the usual
order relation on relative positions defined in [124] is preserved. The order relation ≤Bk is
a total order relation when restricting to rankings without ties (s1 = s2 = 1).
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(1, 1, 3)
(2, 1, 2)
(2, 2, 1)
(1, 1, 1)
(2, 1, 1)
(1, 1, 2) (3, 1, 1)(0, 0, 0)
(1, 1,−1)
(2, 1,−1)
(2, 2,−1)
(1, 1,−3)
(2, 1,−2)
(1, 1,−2) (3, 1,−1)
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 8.2: Hasse diagrams of the order relations ≤−Bk (a), ≤0Bk (b) and ≤+Bk
(c).
Gathering the information given by all the voters, we denote by n(s1,s2,p)(ai1 , ai2) the (ab-
solute) frequency of the relative position (s1, s2, p) ∈ Bk for the couple (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=, i.e.,
the number of voters considering that the relative position of candidate ai1 w.r.t. candi-
date ai2 equals (s1, s2, p). The vector (n(s1,s2,p)(ai1 , ai2))(s1,s2,p)∈Bk is called the frequency
distribution of the couple (ai1 , ai2).
As ≤Bk does not define a total order relation on Bk but a partial order relation, two cumu-
lative frequency distributions (instead of one) are associated with a frequency distribution:
a top-down and a bottom-up one. For any (s1, s2, p) ∈ Bk, the top-down cumulative
frequency distribution of the couple (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26= is given by
n(s1,s2,p)(ai1 , ai2) =
∑
(s′1,s
′
2,p
′)∈Bk
(s1,s2,p)≤Bk (s′1,s′2,p′)
n(s′1,s′2,p′)(ai1 , ai2) .
Analogously, for any (s1, s2, p) ∈ Bk, the bottom-up cumulative frequency distribution of
the couple (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26= is given by
n(s1,s2,p)(ai1 , ai2) =
∑
(s′1,s
′
2,p
′)∈Bk
(s′1,s
′
2,p
′)≤Bk (s1,s2,p)
n(s′1,s′2,p′)(ai1 , ai2) .
In order to illustrate how the frequency distribution given by a profile of rankings with ties
and the corresponding top-down and bottom-up cumulative frequency distributions can be
obtained, we consider the following example.
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(1, 1, 3)
(2, 1, 2)
(2, 2, 1)
(1, 1, 1)
(2, 1, 1)
(1, 1, 2) (3, 1, 1)
(0, 0, 0)
(1, 1,−1)
(2, 1,−1)
(2, 2,−1)
(1, 1,−3)
(2, 1,−2)
(1, 1,−2) (3, 1,−1)
Figure 8.3: Hasse diagram of the order relation ≤Bk .
Example 8.15 Let C = {a, b, c, d} be a set of candidates and R∗ = {1,2,3} be a
profile of three rankings with ties with %1: a  b ∼ c  d, %2: d  a ∼ c  b and
%3: a ∼ b ∼ d  c.
As the equivalence classes of both a and d have size one in %1 and the relative position of
the first equivalence class w.r.t. the second one is three, it holds that n(1,1,3)(a, d) = 1. As
the equivalence class of a has size two and the one of d has size one in %2 and the relative
position of the first equivalence class w.r.t. the second one is (minus) one, it holds that
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1
0
0
0
0
0 01
0
1
0
0
0
0 0
Figure 8.4: Frequency distribution of the couple (a, d).
n(2,1,−1)(a, d) = 1. Finally, as the equivalence classes of a and d coincide in %3, it holds
that n(0,0,0)(a, d) = 1. Of course, n(s1,s2,p)(a, d) = 0 for any other (s1, s2, p) ∈ Bk. Thus,
the frequency distribution3 of relative positions of the couple (a, d) is shown in Figure 8.4.
1
1
1
1
1
1 12
2
3
3
3
3
3 3
Figure 8.5: Top-down cumulative frequency distribution of the couple (a, d).
The top-down and bottom-up cumulative frequency distributions of the couple (a, d) are
shown in Figures 8.5 and 8.6, respectively.
3Due to the lack of available space, in Figures 8.4–8.6, the frequency distribution is shown over the
Hasse diagrams of Figure 8.2 and not over the Hasse diagram of Figure 8.3. Two arrows have been added
for indicating that (1, 1,−1) ≤Bk (0, 0, 0) and that (0, 0, 0) ≤Bk (1, 1, 1).
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3
2
2
2
2
2 22
1
1
0
0
0
0 0
Figure 8.6: Bottom-up cumulative frequency distribution of the couple (a, d).
Finally, the frequency distributions of all couples of candidates are given in Tables 8.1
and 8.2.
(s1, s2, p) (1, 1,−3) (2, 1,−2) (2, 2,−1) (1, 1,−2) (3, 1,−1) (2, 1,−1) (1, 1,−1)
n(s1,s2,p)(a, b) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n(s1,s2,p)(a, c) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n(s1,s2,p)(a, d) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
n(s1,s2,p)(b, a) 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
n(s1,s2,p)(b, c) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
n(s1,s2,p)(b, d) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
n(s1,s2,p)(c, a) 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
n(s1,s2,p)(c, b) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
n(s1,s2,p)(c, d) 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
n(s1,s2,p)(d, a) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
n(s1,s2,p)(d, b) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
n(s1,s2,p)(d, c) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Table 8.1: Frequency distribution of all couples in C 26= (first part).
As can be seen in Example 8.15, any profile of rankings with ties R∗ defines a function
of the form W ∗ : C 26= → {0, 1, . . . , r}#Bk . This function will be henceforth called the
weak-votex (plural weak-votices) induced by the profile of rankings with ties R∗.
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(s1, s2, p) (0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1) (2, 1, 1) (2, 2, 1) (1, 1, 2) (3, 1, 1) (2, 1, 2) (1, 1, 3)
n(s1,s2,p)(a, b) 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
n(s1,s2,p)(a, c) 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
n(s1,s2,p)(a, d) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
n(s1,s2,p)(b, a) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n(s1,s2,p)(b, c) 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
n(s1,s2,p)(b, d) 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
n(s1,s2,p)(c, a) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
n(s1,s2,p)(c, b) 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
n(s1,s2,p)(c, d) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
n(s1,s2,p)(d, a) 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
n(s1,s2,p)(d, b) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
n(s1,s2,p)(d, c) 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Table 8.2: Frequency distribution of all couples in C 26= (second part).
Definition 8.16 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A function
W ∗ : C 26= → {0, 1, . . . , r}#Bk is called a weak-votex (plural weak-votices) on C if there
exists a profile R∗ of r rankings with ties on C such that, for any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26= and any
(s1, s2, p) ∈ Bk, it holds that
W ∗(ai1 , ai2) =
(
n(s1,s2,p)(ai1 , ai2)
)
(s1,s2,p)∈Bk .
The set of all weak-votices on C induced by any profile of r rankings with ties on C is
denoted by W∗r (C ).
Similarly to the dominance relation defined on votices, we define a dominance relation on
weak-votices.
The strict partial order relation A between couples of candidates associated to a given
ranking  on C is used to define monotonicity of the weak-votex w.r.t. this ranking.
Definition 8.17 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A weak-
votex W ∗ ∈ W∗r (C ) is said to be monotone w.r.t. a ranking  on C (with corresponding A)
if, for any (ai1 , aj1), (ai2 , aj2) ∈ C 26= such that (ai1 , aj1) A (ai2 , aj2) and any (s1, s2, p) ∈ Bk,
it holds that the following two conditions are satisfied:
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(i) Dominance w.r.t. the top-down cumulative frequency distribution:
n(s1,s2,p)(ai1 , aj1) ≥ n(s1,s2,p)(ai2 , aj2) .
(ii) Dominance w.r.t. the bottom-up cumulative frequency distribution:
n(s1,s2,p)(ai1 , aj1) ≤ n(s1,s2,p)(ai2 , aj2) ,
Remark 8.18 In case a total order relation on Bk would be considered, dominance w.r.t.
the top-down cumulative frequency distribution and dominance w.r.t. the bottom-up cumu-
lative frequency distribution would coincide. However, as ≤Bk is a partial order relation,
dominance w.r.t. the top-down cumulative frequency distribution and dominance w.r.t. the
bottom-up cumulative frequency distribution might not coincide.
Again, the weak-votex induced by most profiles of rankings with ties is not monotone w.r.t.
any ranking. The set of all profiles of rankings with ties with a monotone weak-votex can
also be understood as a consensus state for the rationalisation of ranking rules.
8.5 The profile of rankings with ties
In case voters express rankings with ties instead of rankings, monotonicity of the profile of
rankings with ties does not follow immediately from the definition of monotonicity of the
profile of rankings. The relation w≥ needs to be extended to L∗(C ). In order to do so, we
note that, for a ranking with ties i, the conditions ai1 i ai2 and ai2 6i ai1 are no longer
equivalent. Therefore, the former unique condition for rankings (without ties) now needs
to be divided in two parts.
Proposition 8.19 Let C be a set of k candidates and  be a ranking on C . The relation
w≥ defined as
w≥ =
(i,j) ∈ L∗(C )2 | (∀(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 2)(ai1  ai2)
 (ai1 j ai2)⇒ (ai1 i ai2)∧
(ai2 i ai1)⇒ (ai2 j ai1)


is an order relation on L∗(C ).
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Proof: We prove that w≥ satisfies reflexivity, antisymmetry and transitivity.
Reflexivity: holds trivially.
Antisymmetry: for any i,j∈ L∗(C ), if i w≥ j and j w≥ i, then it holds that:
(∀(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 2)(ai1  ai2)
(
(ai1 j ai2)⇒ (ai1 i ai2)
(ai2 i ai1)⇒ (ai2 j ai1)
)
,
and (∀(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 2)(ai1  ai2)
(
(ai1 i ai2)⇒ (ai1 j ai2)
(ai2 j ai1)⇒ (ai2 i ai1)
)
.
Therefore, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1  ai2 , it holds that(
(ai1 i ai2)⇔ (ai1 j ai2)
) ∧ ((ai2 i ai1)⇔ (ai2 j ai1)) . (8.1)
As  is complete, if ai1 6 ai2 , then it holds that ai1 = ai2 or ai2  ai1 . The case ai2  ai1
is equivalent to the case ai2  ai1 as both ai1 and ai2 play a symmetric role in Eq. (8.1).
The case ai1 = ai2 is immediate due to the fact that both i and j are irreflexive by
definition of ranking. Hence, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C , it holds that
(ai1 i ai2)⇔ (ai1 j ai2) ,
i.e., it holds that i=j.
Transitivity: for any i,j,`∈ L∗(C ), if i w≥ j and j w≥ `, then it holds that
(∀(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 2)(ai1  ai2)
 (ai1 j ai2)⇒ (ai1 i ai2)∧
(ai2 i ai1)⇒ (ai2 j ai1)
 ,
(∀(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 2)(ai1  ai2)
 (ai1 ` ai2)⇒ (ai1 j ai2)∧
(ai2 j ai1)⇒ (ai2 ` ai1)
 .
Hence, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1  ai2 , it holds that
(ai1 ` ai2)⇒ (ai1 j ai2)⇒ (ai1 i ai2)
(ai2 i ai1)⇒ (ai2 j ai1)⇒ (ai2 ` ai1)
,
i.e., it holds that i w≥ `.
Thus, w≥ is an order relation on L∗(C ). 
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Remark 8.20 For any ranking  on C , the restriction of the relation w≥ on L∗(C ) to
L(C ) coincides with the relation w≥ on L(C ). Therefore, the use of the same notation is
justified.
Figure 8.7 displays the Hasse diagram of the order relation w≥ on L∗(C ) for the set of
candidates C = {a, b, c} and the ranking a  b  c. Note that this Hasse diagram
coincides with that used by Kemeny [80] for defining a distance function on L∗(C ).
a  b  c
a  b ∼ c a ∼ b  c
a  c  b b  a  c
a ∼ c  b a ∼ b ∼ c b  a ∼ c
c  a  b b  c  a
c  a ∼ b b ∼ c  a
c  b  a
Figure 8.7: Hasse diagram of the order relation w≥ on L∗(C ) for the ranking
a  b  c.
Unfortunately, this diagram may be inappropriate for modelling real-world problems. For
any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=, voters might show inclination towards either ai1  ai2 and ai2  ai1 or
ai1 ∼ ai2 . In order to model this inclination, we introduce here the notions of signature
and ordered signature.
Definition 8.21 Let C be a set of k candidates. The signature S of a ranking with ties
 on C , denoted by S (), is a vector where the i-th component equals the size of the i-th
equivalence class in . The set of all the signatures on C is denoted by S(C ).
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Definition 8.22 Let C be a set of k candidates. The ordered signature O of a ranking
with ties  on C , denoted by O(), is a vector where the i-th component equals the size
of the i-th largest equivalence class in . The set of all the ordered signatures on C is
denoted by O(C ).
Remark 8.23 Each signature S ∈ S(C ) leads to a unique ordered signature O ∈ O(C ).
Note that the lengths of S and O coincide. The fact that the signature S leads to the
ordered signature O is denoted by S  O.
The notions of signature and ordered signature are illustrated in the following example.
Example 8.24 Consider the set of candidates C = {a, b, c}. The signature of the ranking
with ties a  b  c is the vector (1, 1, 1) and its ordered signature is (1, 1, 1). Therefore, it
holds that
S (a  b  c) = O(a  b  c) = (1, 1, 1) .
Analogously, the signature of the ranking with ties a  b ∼ c is the vector (1, 2) and its
ordered signature is (2, 1). Therefore, it holds that
S (a  b ∼ c) = (1, 2) and O(a  b ∼ c) = (2, 1) .
In general, the set of all signatures on C is given by:
S(C ) = {(1, 1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (3)} .
Analogously, the set of all ordered signatures on C is given by:
O(C ) = {(1, 1, 1), (2, 1), (3)} .
We prove the following lemma, which will be useful in the upcoming proofs.
Lemma 8.25 Let E be an equivalence relation and R be an order relation on a set X.
The relation E ∩R is an order relation on X.
Proof: Reflexivity follows immediately from the reflexivity of both E and R.
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Antisymmetry. Suppose that E ∩ R is not antisymmetric. Therefore, there exist two
different elements x, y ∈ X such that x(E ∩ R)y and y(E ∩ R)x. It follows that xRy and
yRx, a contradiction with the fact that R is antisymmetric.
Transitivity. Suppose that E ∩ R is not transitive. Therefore, there exist three elements
x, y, z ∈ X such that x(E ∩ R)y and y(E ∩ R)z but such that x(E ∩ R)cz. On the one
hand, it holds that xEy and yEz and, therefore, that xEz, due to the transitivity of
an equivalence relation. On the other hand, it holds that xRy and yRz and, therefore,
that xRz, due to the transitivity of an order relation. We conclude that x(E ∩ R)z, a
contradiction. 
These (ordered) signatures can be used for defining two natural order relations L∗(C ). In
the first order relation, only couples of rankings with ties belonging to w≥ and that have the
same signature are considered comparable elements, while, in the second order relation,
only couples of rankings with ties belonging to w≥ and that have the same ordered signature
are considered comparable elements.
Proposition 8.26 Let C be a set of k candidates and  be a ranking on C . The relation
w≥S defined as
w≥S = w≥ ∩ {(i,j) ∈ L∗(C )2 | S (i) = S (j)} ,
is an order relation on L∗(C ).
Proof:
The proof follows immediately from Lemma 8.25. 
Figure 8.8 displays the Hasse diagram of the order relation w≥S on L∗(C ) for the set of
candidates C = {a, b, c} and the ranking a  b  c. Note that we use dashed lines for
separating sets of incomparable rankings with ties.
Proposition 8.27 Let C be a set of k candidates and  be a ranking on C . The relation
w≥O defined as
w≥O = w≥ ∩ {(i,j) ∈ L∗(C )2 | O(i) = O(j)} ,
is an order relation on L∗(C ).
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a  b  c a  b ∼ c a ∼ b  c
a  c  b b  a  c
a ∼ c  b
a ∼ b ∼ c
b  a ∼ c
c  a  b b  c  a
c  a ∼ b b ∼ c  a
c  b  a
Figure 8.8: Hasse diagram of the order relation w≥S on L∗(C ) for the ranking
a  b  c.
Proof:
The proof follows immediately from Lemma 8.25. 
Figure 8.9 displays the Hasse diagram of the order relation w≥O on L∗(C ) for the set of
candidates C = {a, b, c} and the ranking a  b  c. Note that, as in Figure 8.8, we use
dashed lines for separating sets of incomparable rankings with ties.
a  b  c a  b ∼ c a ∼ b  c
a  c  b b  a  c
a ∼ c  b a ∼ b ∼ cb  a ∼ c
c  a  b b  c  a
c  a ∼ b b ∼ c  ac  b  a
Figure 8.9: Hasse diagram of the order relation w≥O on L∗(C ) for the ranking
a  b  c.
Of course, there is an immediate relation between the three relations w≥, w≥S and w≥O.
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Proposition 8.28 Let C be a set of k candidates and  be a ranking on C . The following
statement holds:
w≥S ⊆ w≥O ⊆ w≥ .
Proof: The fact that w≥O ⊆ w≥ is straightforward by definition of w≥O. The fact that
w≥S ⊆ w≥O follows from the fact that, if two rankings with ties have the same signature,
then they have the same ordered signature. 
Consider the relation S on S(C ), where ‘S1 S S2’ represents that the length of the
signature S1 equals the length of the signature S2 plus one and, at the same time, the
signature S2 is obtained by merging two consecutive components of S1. For instance, the
signature (1, 2) is obtained by merging the last two components of the signature (1, 1, 1),
therefore (1, 1, 1) S (1, 2). This relation is used for defining a natural order relation on
S(C ).
Proposition 8.29 Let C be a set of k candidates. The relation ≥S, defined as the pre-
order closure4 of S, is an order relation on S(C ).
Proof: By definition of pre-order closure, ≥S obviously is reflexive and transitive. We
need to prove that ≥S satisfies antisymmetry.
By definition, all couples in S satisfy that the length of the first signature in the couple
is greater than the length of the second signature in the couple. Note that this property is
preserved by the smallest transitive relation containing S. Therefore, when considering
the pre-order closure of S, it only holds that S ≥S S and S ≥S S in case S = S. We
conclude that ≥S satisfies the antisymmetry property. 
Figure 8.10 displays the Hasse diagram of the order relation ≥S on S(C ) for a set C of
three and of four candidates.
Analogously, a natural order relation can be defined for ordered signatures. Consider
the relation O on O(C ), where ‘O1 O O2’ represents that there exist two signatures
S1,S2 ∈ S(C ) such that S1  O1, S2  O2 and S1 S S2. For instance, for the
ordered signature (2, 1) and (1, 1, 1), it holds that (1, 2)  (2, 1), (1, 1, 1)  (1, 1, 1) and
4The pre-order closure of a relation R is the smallest reflexive and transitive relation containing R.
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(2, 1)
(1, 1, 1)
(3)
(1, 2)
(3, 1)
(2, 1, 1)
(4)
(2, 2)
(1, 2, 1)
(1, 1, 1, 1)
(1, 1, 2)
(1, 3)
Figure 8.10: Hasse diagram of the order relation ≥S on S(C ) for a set C of
three (left) and of four (right) candidates.
(1, 1, 1) S (1, 2). Therefore, it holds that (1, 1, 1) O (2, 1). This relation is used for
defining a natural order relation on O(C ).
Proposition 8.30 Let C be a set of k candidates. The relation ≥O, defined as the pre-
order closure of O, is an order relation on O(C ).
Proof: By definition of pre-order closure, ≥O obviously is reflexive and transitive. We
need to prove that ≥O satisfies antisymmetry.
By definition, all couples inO satisfy that the length of the first ordered signature in the
couple is greater than the length of the second ordered signature in the couple. Therefore,
as ≥S is only defined for couples where the length of the first signature in the couple is
greater than the length of the second signature in the couple (or for couples where both
signatures coincide), there exists no couple (O1,O2) ∈ O(C )2 such that O1 ≥O O2 and
O2 ≥O O1. 
Figure 8.11 displays the Hasse diagram of the order relation ≥O on O(C ) for a set C of
three and of four candidates.
The following result follows immediately.
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(2, 1)
(1, 1, 1)
(3)
(3, 1)
(2, 1, 1)
(4)
(2, 2)
(1, 1, 1, 1)
Figure 8.11: Hasse diagram of the order relation ≥O on O(C ) for a set C of
three (left) and of four (right) candidates.
Corollary 8.31 Let C be a set of k candidates. For any S1,S2 ∈ S(C ) and O1,O2 ∈
O(C ) such that S1  O1 and S2  O2, it holds that
S1 ≥S S2 ⇒ O1 ≥O O2 .
We prove the following lemma, which will be useful in the upcoming proofs.
Lemma 8.32 Let R and S be two order relations on a set X. The relation R ∩ S is an
order relation on X.
Proof: Reflexivity follows immediately from the reflexivity of both R and S.
Antisymmetry. Suppose that R ∩ S is not antisymmetric. Therefore, there exist two
different elements x, y ∈ X such that x(R ∩ S)y and y(R ∩ S)x. It follows that xRy and
yRx, a contradiction with the fact that R is antisymmetric.
Transitivity. Suppose that R ∩ S is not transitive. Therefore, there exist three elements
x, y, x ∈ X such that x(R∩S)y and y(R∩S)z but such that x(R∩S)cz. On the one hand,
it holds that xRy and yRz and, therefore, that xRz, due to the transitivity of an order
relation. On the other hand, it holds that xSy and ySz and, therefore, that xSz, due to
the transitivity of an order relation. We conclude that x(R ∩ S)z, a contradiction. 
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These order relations on the set of (ordered) signatures can be used for defining four natural
order relations L∗(C ), where only couples of rankings with ties belonging to sqsupseteqbis
and satisfying these additional requirements are considered comparable elements.
Proposition 8.33 Let C be a set of k candidates and  be a ranking on C . The relations
defined as
w≥S↓ = w≥ ∩ {(i,j) ∈ L∗(C )2 | S (i) ≥S S (j)} ,
w≥S↑ = w≥ ∩ {(i,j) ∈ L∗(C )2 | S (j) ≥S S (i)} ,
w≥O↓ = w≥ ∩ {(i,j) ∈ L∗(C )2 | O(i) ≥O O(j)} ,
w≥O↑ = w≥ ∩ {(i,j) ∈ L∗(C )2 | O(j) ≥O O(i)} ,
are four order relations on L∗(C ).
Proof:
The proof follows immediately from Lemma 8.32. 
Figure 8.12 displays the Hasse diagram of the order relation w≥O↓ on L∗(C ) for the set of
candidates C = {a, b, c} and the ranking a  b  c.
Figure 8.13 displays the relation between the different order relations on L∗(C ) introduced
in this section.
From now on, we denote by nR∗ the vector of absolute frequencies of the profile of rankings
with ties R∗, where nR∗(i) is the absolute frequency of the i-th ranking with ties in L∗(C ),
i.e., the number of voters that expressed the i-th ranking with ties in L∗(C ) in the profile
of rankings with ties R∗.
Under the assumption that there exists a true ranking  on C , it seems natural that the
vector of absolute frequencies of the given profile of rankings with ties should be decreasing
on the Hasse diagram of the order relation w≥ (note that now seven different diagrams are
considered). A profile of rankings with ties satisfying this property is said to be monotone
w.r.t. the ranking .
Definition 8.34 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters and  be a
ranking on C .
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a  b  c
a  b ∼ c a ∼ b  c
a  c  b b  a  c
a ∼ c  b
a ∼ b ∼ c
b  a ∼ c
c  a  b b  c  a
c  a ∼ b b ∼ c  a
c  b  a
Figure 8.12: Hasse diagram of the order relationw≥O↓ on L∗(C ) for the ranking
a  b  c.
w≥
w≥O↑ w≥O↓
w≥S↑ w≥O w≥S↓
w≥S
Figure 8.13: Relation between different order relations on L∗(C ).
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(i) A profile R∗ of rankings with ties on C is said to be monotone w.r.t.  if, for any
i,j∈ L∗(C ), it holds that( i w≥ j )⇒ (nR∗(i) ≥ nR∗(j)) .
(ii) A profile R∗ of rankings with ties on C is said to be O↓-monotone w.r.t.  if, for
any i,j∈ L∗(C ), it holds that( i w≥O↓ j )⇒ (nR∗(i) ≥ nR∗(j)) .
(iii) A profile R∗ of rankings with ties on C is said to be O↑-monotone w.r.t.  if, for
any i,j∈ L∗(C ), it holds that( i w≥O↑ j )⇒ (nR∗(i) ≥ nR∗(j)) .
(iv) A profile R∗ of rankings with ties on C is said to be O-monotone w.r.t.  if, for any
i,j∈ L∗(C ), it holds that( i w≥O j )⇒ (nR∗(i) ≥ nR∗(j)) .
(v) A profile R∗ of rankings with ties on C is said to be S↓-monotone w.r.t.  if, for any
i,j∈ L∗(C ), it holds that( i w≥S↓ j )⇒ (nR∗(i) ≥ nR∗(j)) .
(vi) A profile R∗ of rankings with ties on C is said to be S↑-monotone w.r.t.  if, for any
i,j∈ L∗(C ), it holds that( i w≥S↑ j )⇒ (nR∗(i) ≥ nR∗(j)) .
(vii) A profile R∗ of rankings with ties on C is said to be S-monotone w.r.t.  if, for any
i,j∈ L∗(C ), it holds that( i w≥S j )⇒ (nR∗(i) ≥ nR∗(j)) .
In general, in case the considered order relation on L∗(C ) is not specified, we talk about
∗-monotonicity w.r.t. a ranking on the set of candidates.
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8.6 Search for monotonicity of representations of votes affected by
ties
When the chosen representation of votes is not monotone w.r.t. any ranking, the goal is
to look for a new profile of rankings with ties with a monotone representation of votes
w.r.t. at least one ranking. Obviously, among all the profiles of rankings with ties with
a monotone representation of votes, we want to find the closest to the given one. This
closeness can be measured by means of a monometric.
The notion of betweenness to be considered between profiles of rankings with ties is based
on the Kemeny distance function [80] on rankings with ties5, which is an extension of the
Kendall distance function [82] on rankings.
Definition 8.35 Let C be a set of k candidates. For any two weak order relations %1 and
%2 on C , the Kemeny distance between %1 and %2 is defined as
K(%1,%2) = #{(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26= | ai1 1 ai2 , ai2 2 ai1}
+
1
2
#{(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26= | ai1 1 ai2 , ai1 ∼2 ai2}
+
1
2
#{(ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26= | ai1 ∼1 ai2 , ai1 2 ai2} .
Remark 8.36 For any two rankings with ties 1 and 2 on C , we interchangeably write
K(%1,%2) or K(1,2).
Considering the Kemeny distance function on L∗(C ), the following betweenness relation
on L∗(C ) can be defined.
Definition 8.37 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters.
(i) The betweenness relation S on L∗(C ) is defined as
S =
{
(1,2,3) ∈ L∗(C )3 | K(1,3) = K(1,2) +K(2,3)
}
.
5The original Kemeny distance function proposed in [80] is the double of the distance function used
in this dissertation. However, in order to maintain a consistency with the Kendall distance function [82]
when restricted to rankings, this rescaled distance function will be considered.
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(ii) The betweenness relation R on L∗(C )r is defined as
R =
{(
R∗1 ,R
∗
2 ,R
∗
3
) ∈ (L∗(C )r)3 | (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , r})((1i ,2i ,3i ) ∈ S)} ,
where, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , r} and any j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, ji represents the i-th ranking
with ties in R∗j .
In order to ease notations, for any R∗1 ,R
∗
2 ,R
∗
3 ∈ L∗(C )r,
(
R∗1 ,R
∗
2 ,R
∗
3
) ∈ R is denoted by
[R∗1 ,R
∗
2 ,R
∗
3 ]. As a ranking with ties is a particular case of a profile of rankings with ties,
for any 1,2,3∈ L∗(C ), (1,2,3) ∈ S is also denoted by [1,2,3].
Definition 8.38 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A func-
tion M : L∗(C )r × L∗(C )r → R is called a monometric if it satisfies the following three
properties:
(i) Non-negativity: for any R∗,R∗′ ∈ L∗(C )r, it holds that M(R∗,R∗′) ≥ 0.
(ii) Coincidence: for any R∗,R∗′ ∈ L∗(C )r, it holds that M(R∗,R∗′) = 0 ⇔ R∗ =
R∗′.
(iii) Compatibility: for any R∗,R∗′,R∗′′ ∈ L∗(C )r such that [R∗,R∗′,R∗′′], it holds
that M(R∗,R∗′) ≤M(R∗,R∗′′).
Several monometrics can be considered w.r.t. the betweenness relation based on the Ke-
meny distance function between rankings with ties. In the following, three intuitive exam-
ples are provided:
(i) M1(R∗1 ,R
∗
2) =
∑r
i=1 K(1i ,2i ).
(ii) M2(R∗1 ,R
∗
2) =
∑r
i=1 1 − δ(1i ,2i ), where δ(,′) equals one if =′ and zero
otherwise. M2 counts the number of rankings with ties that differ from a profile of
rankings with ties to another one.
(iii) M3(R∗1 ,R
∗
2) =
M1(R∗1 ,R∗2) , if 1i⊆2i for any i ,rk(k−1)
2
, otherwise ,
M3 counts the number of ties that are broken in the profile in case that R∗2 can be
reached from R∗1 by only breaking ties. Otherwise, it is equal to an upper bound of
M1.
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A procedure for hierarchically combining monometrics was analysed in [126].
After fixing a monometric, the search for a profile of rankings with ties with a monotone
representation of votes w.r.t.  that is closest to the profile of rankings with ties given
by the voters can be addressed. However, under some circumstances, all ties may need
to be avoided. In that case, the search for a closest profile of rankings with a monotone
representation of votes should be addressed.
Definition 8.39 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. Let M : L(C )r × L(C )r → R be a monometric and consider a fixed
representation of votes.
(i) A closest profile of rankings with ties with a monotone representation of votes is a
profile of rankings with ties R ′∗ such that there exists a ranking  w.r.t. which the
representation of votes induced by R ′∗ is monotone and for which it holds that there
exists no profile of rankings with ties R ′′∗ such that there exists a ranking  w.r.t.
which the representation of votes induced by R ′′∗ is monotone, while M(R∗,R ′′∗) <
M(R∗,R ′∗).
(ii) A closest profile of rankings with a monotone representation of votes is a profile of
rankings R ′ such that there exists a ranking  w.r.t. which the representation of
votes induced by R ′ is monotone and for which it holds that there exists no profile
of rankings R ′′ such that there exists a ranking  w.r.t. which the representation of
votes induced by R ′′ is monotone, while M(R,R ′′) < M(R,R ′).
As L∗(C )r and L(C )r are finite, the existence of both a closest profile of rankings with ties
with a monotone representation of votes and a closest profile of rankings with a monotone
representation of votes is assured. Unfortunately, the uniqueness cannot be assured.
As a profile of rankings (without ties) is a particular case of a profile of rankings with ties,
the following result is straightforward.
Proposition 8.40 Let C be a set of k candidates and R∗ ∈ L∗(C )r be the profile of r
rankings with ties given by the voters. Let M : L∗(C )r × L∗(C )r → R be a monometric
and consider a fixed representation of votes. For any closest profile of rankings with ties
R∗′ with a monotone representation of votes and any closest profile of rankings R ′ with a
monotone representation of votes, it holds that M(R∗,R∗′) ≤M(R∗,R ′).
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Now, two kinds of optimal rankings can be defined: a weak-optimal ranking and a total-
optimal ranking. On the one hand, a weak-optimal ranking is one whose corresponding
closest profile of rankings with ties with a monotone representation of votes is closest to the
profile of rankings with ties given by the voters. On the other hand, a total-optimal ranking
is one whose corresponding closest profile of rankings with a monotone representation of
votes is closest to the profile of rankings with ties given by the voters.
Definition 8.41 Let C be a set of k candidates and R∗ be the profile of r rankings with
ties on C given by the voters. Let M : L∗(C )r × L∗(C )r → R be a monometric.
(i) A weak-optimal ranking  is a ranking imposing monotonicity on at least one closest
profile of rankings with ties with a monotone representation of votes.
(ii) A total-optimal ranking  is a ranking imposing monotonicity on at least one closest
profile of rankings with a monotone representation of votes.
Obviously, the existence of both a weak-optimal ranking and a total-optimal ranking is
assured. Unfortunately, the uniqueness cannot be assured.
The extension of the method of Kemeny to rankings with ties (and to tournaments and
to binary relations) is a common problem in social choice [8, 21, 30, 31], usually referred
to as the search for ‘median orders’ or ‘median relations’. These extensions are obtained
by allowing the relations in the profile to be rankings with ties (or tournaments, or binary
relations) or by allowing the winning relations to be rankings with ties (or tournaments,
or binary relations). This approach differs from the one followed in this dissertation (it
suffices to see that the method of Kemeny does not need to coincide with the search for
monotonicity of a representation of votes).
8.7 Relation with the antisymmetric case
A profile of rankings is a special case of a profile of rankings with ties. The methods
recalled in Chapter 6 based on the search for monotonicity of a representation of votes
should then coincide with the methods introduced in this chapter when restricted to the
case where voters are not allowed to express ties in their preferences.
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Any scorix has a weak-scorix representation when the corresponding profile of rankings is
considered as a profile of rankings with ties.
Proposition 8.42 Let C be a set of k candidates and R ∈ L(C )r be the profile of r
rankings on C given by the voters. Let us denote by SR ∈ Sr(C ) the scorix of R and by
S∗R ∈ S∗r (C ) the weak-scorix of R. For any ai ∈ C , it holds that
(i) for any [`1, `2] ∈ Pk such that `1 = `2,
S∗R
(
ai, [`1, `2]
)
= (SR)i`1 ,
(ii) for any [`1, `2] ∈ Pk such that `1 6= `2,
S∗R
(
ai, [`1, `2]
)
= 0 .
Any votrix has a weak-votrix representation when the corresponding profile of rankings is
considered as a profile of rankings with ties.
Proposition 8.43 Let C be a set of k candidates and R ∈ L(C )r be the profile of r
rankings on C given by the voters. Let us denote by VR ∈ Vr(C ) the votrix of R and by
V ∗R ∈ V∗r (C ) the weak-votrix of R. For any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=, it holds that
(V ∗R)i1i2 = (VR)i1i2 .
Any votex has a weak-votex representation when the corresponding profile of rankings is
considered as a profile of rankings with ties.
Proposition 8.44 Let C be a set of k candidates and R ∈ L(C )r be the profile of r
rankings on C given by the voters. Let us denote by WR ∈ Wr(C ) the votex of R and by
W ∗R ∈ W∗r (C ) the weak-votex of R. For any (ai1 , ai2) ∈ C 26=, it holds that
(i) for any (s1, s2, p) ∈ Bk such that s1 = s2 = 1 and p 6= 0,
W ∗R(ai1 , ai2)(1, 1, p) = WR(ai1 , ai2)(p) ,
(ii) for any (s1, s2, p) ∈ Bk such that s1 6= 1 or p = 0,
W ∗R(ai1 , ai2)(s1, s2, p) = 0 .
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It follows from the previous propositions that the scorix/votrix/votex of a profileR of rank-
ings on C is monotone w.r.t. a ranking  on C if and only if the weak-scorix/votrix/votex
of R is monotone w.r.t. .
Proposition 8.45 Let C be a set of k candidates and R ∈ L(C )r be the profile of r
rankings on C given by the voters. Let us denote by SR ∈ Sr(C ) the scorix of R, by
S∗R ∈ S∗r (C ) the weak-scorix of R, by VR ∈ Vr(C ) the votrix of R, by V ∗R ∈ V∗r (C ) the
weak-votrix of R, by WR ∈ Wr(C ) the votex of R and by W ∗R ∈ W∗r (C ) the weak-votex
of R. For any ranking  on C , the following three equivalences hold:
(i) SR is monotone w.r.t.  if and only if S∗R is monotone w.r.t. .
(ii) VR is monotone w.r.t.  if and only if V ∗R is monotone w.r.t. .
(iii) WR is monotone w.r.t.  if and only if W ∗R is monotone w.r.t. .
(iv) R is monotone w.r.t.  if and only if R∗ is S-monotone (or O-monotone) w.r.t. .
Proof: (i) As ≤ is a total order relation on {1, . . . , k} and it holds that [`, `] ≤Pk [`′, `′]
if and only if ` ≥ `′, the equivalence follows from Proposition 8.42.
(ii) Follows immediately from Proposition 8.43.
(iii) As ≤ is a total order relation on K and it holds that (1, 1, p) ≤Bk (1, 1, p′) if and only
if p ≤ p′, the equivalence follows from Proposition 8.44.
(iv) Follows immediately from the definition of w≥S and w≥O 
The chosen monometric on L∗(C )r needs to coincide with the monometric on L(C )r when
restricted to profiles of rankings.
Definition 8.46 Let C be a set of k candidates and r be the number of voters. A
monometric M : L(C )r × L(C )r → R is called the restriction of a monometric M∗ :
L∗(C )r×L∗(C )r → R to L(C )r if, for any two profiles of rankings R and R ′, it holds that
M(R,R ′) = M∗(R,R ′).
Remark 8.47 The restriction of a monometric M∗ : L∗(C )r × L∗(C )r → R to L(C )r is
unique.
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In case a monometric on L∗(C )r and its restriction to L(C )r are considered, it is straightfor-
ward to see that the search for a closest profile of rankings with a monotone representation
of votes in the set of profiles of rankings is equivalent to the search for a closest profile of
rankings with a monotone representation of votes in the set of profiles of rankings with
ties.
Proposition 8.48 Let C be a set of k candidates, r be the number of voters,  be a ranking
on C , R ∈ L(C )r be a profile of rankings and M : L(C )r × L(C )r → R be the restriction
of a monometric M∗ : L∗(C )r ×L∗(C )r → R to L(C )r. A profile of rankings R ′ ∈ L(C )r
is a closest profile of rankings with a monotone representation of votes w.r.t.  considering
M∗ if and only if it is a closest profile of rankings with a monotone representation of votes
w.r.t.  considering M .
We conclude that the methods introduced in the previous chapters coincide with the one
introduced in this chapter when restricted to the search for total-optimal rankings.
Corollary 8.49 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters and M : L(C )r × L(C )r → R be the restriction of a monometric
M∗ : L∗(C )r × L∗(C )r → R to L(C )r. A ranking  on C is an optimal ranking if and
only if it is a total-optimal ranking.
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CHAPTER 9
Winning candidates
In this chapter, we do not discuss the problem of the aggregation of rankings, but, instead,
we address the problem of identifying the best candidate on the set of candidates. There
are some situations in which the selection of a winning candidate is easy, for instance, when
every voter agrees on the candidate that needs to be selected as the winner. Such can-
didate is called the unanimous winner [6]. Unfortunately, the unanimous winner usually
does not exist. In case more than half of the voters agree on the candidate that should be
selected as the winner, one talks about the majority1 winner [107]. Obviously, the major-
ity winner might not exist either. Based only on the head-to-head comparisons between
candidates, Condorcet [35] advocated a weaker condition than that of the unanimous or
the majority winner: if a candidate is preferred by more than half of the voters to each of
the other candidates, then it should be selected as the winner; said candidate is referred
to as the Condorcet winner. The existence of the Condorcet winner is neither assured due
to the more than famous ‘voting paradox’ where, although all the voters provide transitive
preferences on the set of candidates, the collective preference might be cyclic.
Although the existence of the unanimous winner entails the existence of an undoubtedly
clear winner, we find several examples where selecting the majority winner or the Condorcet
winner is more than questionable. This is due to the fact that both the majority winner
and the Condorcet winner disregard an important part of the preferences of the voters;
quoting a well-known phrase by Sen [150], “... the method of majority decision takes no
1The concept of a majority winner is not related with that of the (simple) majority rule [54, 64, 76, 95,
149] whenever more than two candidates are considered.
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account of intensities of preference, and it is certainly arguable that what matters is not
merely the number who prefer x to y and the number who prefer y to x, but also by how
much each prefers one alternative to the other”. Although Sen’s statement tries to call
attention to the need of requiring voters to express intensities in their preferences, there
is also some unconsidered intensity of preference when voters express rankings on the set
of candidates. After all, when a voter is providing a ranking x  y  z, he is actually
declaring that he supports x over z stronger than both x over y and y over z. Pe´rez-
Ferna´ndez et al. [124] proposed a new representation of votes capturing this information:
the votex. Another way of exploiting all the information provided by the voters is to focus
not only on the “the number who prefer x to y”, but also on the number who prefer x and
y to any other candidate z. We will explore this direction throughout this section resulting
in a new type of winner: the pairwise winner [120]. The quasipositional winner, which
is the winner given by the positional rule [52, 98], and a stronger version - the positional
winner [118] - will also be analysed.
9.1 On being better than another candidate
In this section, we discuss three motivations for assuring that a candidate is better than
another candidate considering either positional or pairwise information.
9.1.1 On being quasipositionally better than another candidate
In case the vector of positions of a candidate (strictly) dominates the vector of positions
of another candidate, the first candidate will always be ranked at a better position than
the other candidate by any ranking rule. The first candidate is then considered to be
quasipositionally as good as the second candidate.
Definition 9.1 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C given
by the voters and S be the scorix induced by R. For any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C , ai1 is said to be
quasipositionally as good as ai2, denoted by
2 ai1 m∼B ai2, if Si1 D1 Si2.
2The subindex ‘B’ stands from Borda, the forefather of the exploitation of quasipositional information
in the field of social choice theory.
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If ai1 m∼B ai2 and Si1 B1 Si2, then ai1 is said to be quasipositionally better than ai2, denoted
by ai1 mB ai2. The reflexive closure3 of the relation mB is denoted by mB.
Of course, being quasipositionally better than or equal to another candidate implies being
quasipositionally as good as this candidate.
Proposition 9.2 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. For any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C , it holds that ai1 mB ai2 implies that ai1 m∼B ai2.
Note that the fact that a candidate is quasipositionally better than another candidate
trivially implies that the Borda score4 of the first candidate is greater than the Borda score
of the second candidate.
Proposition 9.3 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. For any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1mB ai2, it holds that B(ai1) > B(ai2).
From now on, we focus on the relation mB as it leads to an order relation on the set of
candidates instead of a preorder relation.
Proposition 9.4 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. The relation mB is an order relation on C .
Proof: By definition of D1, the relation mB obviously is transitive. As we consider the
reflexive closure of an irreflexive relation, the reflexivity and the antisymmetry are also
satisfied. 
The previous definitions are illustrated in the following example.
Example 9.5 Consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile of rankings
R = (i)14i=1 provided by fourteen voters shown in Table 9.1.
3The reflexive closure of a relation R is the smallest reflexive relation containing R.
4The Borda score B(ai) of candidate ai is defined as the number of times that a candidate is ranked at
a worse position than candidate ai in the profile of rankings given by the voters, i.e., B(ai) =
∑
a`∈C\{ai}
Vi`.
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# i Rankings on C
6 c  b  a  d
5 a  d  b  c
3 b  a  d  c
Table 9.1: Frequency of the rankings on C expressed by 14 voters.
The scorix induced by R is given by:
SR =

5 3 6 0
3 6 5 0
6 0 0 8
0 5 3 6
 .
Note that, for instance, considering candidates a and d, it holds that:
5 = S11 > S41 = 0 ,
8 = S11 + S12 > S41 + S42 = 5 ,
14 = S11 + S12 + S13 > S41 + S42 + S43 = 8 .
Thus, it holds that amB d. In general, mB is given by:
mB = {(a, d), (b, d)} .
Obviously, mB is given by:
mB = {(a, a), (a, d), (b, b), (b, d), (c, c), (d, d)} .
This leads to the partially ordered set with the Hasse diagram in Figure 9.1.
•a
•d
• c
• b
Figure 9.1: Hasse diagram of the order relation mB.
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9.1.2 On being positionally better than another candidate
Based on the notion of sub-scorix, we define the notion of being quasipositionally better
than another candidate.
Definition 9.6 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C given
by the voters and S be the scorix induced by R. For any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C , ai1 is said to be
positionally as good as ai2, denoted by
5 ai1 m∼R ai2, if, for any C ′ ⊆ C such that ai1 , ai2 ∈ C ′
and the corresponding sub-scorix of S on C ′, it holds that S ′i1 D1 S ′i2.
If, for any C ′ ⊆ C such that ai1 , ai2 ∈ C ′ and the corresponding sub-scorix of S on C ′, it
holds that S ′i1B1S ′i2, then ai1 is said to be positionally better than ai2, denoted by ai1mR ai2.
The reflexive closure of the relation mR is denoted by mR.
Of course, being positionally better than or equal to another candidate implies being
positionally as good as this candidate.
Proposition 9.7 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. For any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C , it holds that ai1 mR ai2 implies that ai1 m∼R ai2.
Note that the fact that a candidate is positionally better than another candidate trivially
implies that the candidate is quasipositionally better than another candidate. The same
result holds for the relations ‘being positionally as good’ as and ‘being quasipositionally as
good as’.
Proposition 9.8 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. For any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1 m∼R ai2, it holds that ai1 m∼B ai2.
Moreover, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1 mR ai2, it holds that ai1 mB ai2.
From now on, we focus on the relation mR as it leads to an order relation on the set of
candidates instead of a preorder relation.
5The subindex ‘R’ stands from ‘recursive’ monotonicity of the scorix.
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Proposition 9.9 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. The relation mR is an order relation on C .
Proof: By definition of D1, the relation mR obviously is transitive. As we consider the
reflexive closure of an irreflexive relation, the reflexivity and the antisymmetry are also
satisfied. 
The previous definitions are illustrated in the following example.
Example 9.10 Consider the set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile of
rankings R = (i)14i=1 provided in Example 9.5. As a result of Proposition 9.8, it holds that
mR ⊆ mB = {(a, d), (b, d)}.
We check whether (a, d) belongs to mR. First, the scorix induced by the restriction of R to
Cabd = {a, b, d} is given by:
Sabd =
5 9 09 0 5
0 5 9
 .
Note that, for candidates a and d, it holds that:
5 = S11 > S31 = 0 ,
14 = S11 + S12 > S31 + S32 = 5 .
Second, the scorix induced by the restriction of R to Cacd = {a, c, d} is given by:
Sacd =
8 6 06 0 8
0 8 6
 .
Note that, for candidates a and d, it holds that:
8 = S11 > S31 = 0 ,
14 = S11 + S12 > S31 + S32 = 8 .
Third, the scorix induced by the restriction of R to Cad = {a, d} is given by:
Sad =
(
14 0
0 14
)
.
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Note that, for candidates a and d, it holds that:
14 = S11 > S21 = 0 .
Thus, (a, d) ∈ mR.
However, it holds that (b, d) /∈ mR in case Cbcd = {b, c, d} is considered. The scorix induced
by the restriction of R to Cbcd is given by:
Sbcd =
3 11 06 0 8
5 3 6
 .
Note that, for candidates b and d, it holds that:
3 = S11 6> S31 = 5 .
Thus, it holds that mR is given by:
mR = {(a, d)} .
Obviously, mR is given by:
mR = {(a, a), (a, d), (b, b), (c, c), (d, d)} .
This leads to the partially ordered set with the Hasse diagram in Figure 9.2.
•a
•d
• c• b
Figure 9.2: Hasse diagram of the order relation mR.
9.1.3 On being pairwisely better than another candidate
In social choice theory, researchers have focused too strongly on the notion of a candidate
that beats another one (the strength of support of the first candidate over the second
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one is greater than the strength of support of the second candidate over the first one)
following the ideas of Condorcet [35]. Nevertheless, this notion disregards the comparisons
with all the other candidates leading sometimes to the well-known voting paradox (also
known as Condorcet’s paradox) where a first candidate beats a second candidate, this
second candidate beats a third candidate but this third candidate beats the first candidate.
Several ways of avoiding the voting paradox have been analysed; obtaining choice sets [22]
such as the Smith Set [70, 152] or the Schwarz set [148] and the use of beatpaths [147] being
the most prominent ones. With the intention of avoiding such paradox, we propose here
to also consider the relations with all the other candidates when comparing a candidate
with another one.
Definition 9.11 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. For any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C , ai1 is said to be pairwisely as good as ai2, denoted
by6 ai1 m∼C ai2, if the following conditions hold:
(i) Vi1i2 ≥ Vi2i1,
(ii) Vi1` ≥ Vi2`, for any a` ∈ C \{ai1 , ai2},
(iii) V`i1 ≤ V`i2, for any a` ∈ C \{ai1 , ai2}.
If ai1 m∼C ai2 and Vi1i2 > Vi2i1, then ai1 is said to be pairwisely better than ai2, denoted by
ai1 mC ai2. The reflexive closure of the relation mC is denoted by mC.
Remark 9.12 In case we restrict our attention to the case where voters express rankings
(without ties) on the set of candidates, conditions (ii) and (iii) are equivalent.
Remark 9.13 Dutta and Laslier [47] generalized the covering relation, which is an old
acquaintance for scholars of social choice [59, 103, 129] in the context of (weak) tourna-
ments, by introducing comparison functions. In this generalized case, the relation ‘being
pairwisely better than’ and the covering relation turn out to be equivalent in case the fol-
lowing two conditions hold: (a) each voter expresses a ranking (without ties) on the set
of candidates (forcing conditions (ii) and (iii) to be equivalent) and (b) the considered
comparison function g is defined as g(ai1 , ai2) = Vi1i2 − Vi2i1.
6The subindex ‘C’ stands from Condorcet, the forefather of the exploitation of pairwise information in
the field of social choice theory.
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Of course, being pairwisely better than or equal to another candidate implies being pair-
wisely as good as this candidate. The converse is also true for an odd number of voters.
Proposition 9.14 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on
C given by the voters. For any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C , the following two statements hold:
(i) ai1 mC ai2 implies that ai1 m∼C ai2.
(ii) If r is an odd number, then it holds that ai1 mC ai2 if and only if ai1 m∼C ai2.
Proof: Statement (i) is evident by definition. Statement (ii) follows from the fact that
both Vi1i2 and Vi2i1 are natural numbers and, at the same time, Vi1i2 +Vi2i1 = r. Therefore,
it holds that Vi1i2 ≥ Vi2i1 if and only if Vi1i2 > Vi2i1 . 
Note that the fact that a candidate is pairwisely better than another candidate implies
that the Borda score of the first candidate is greater than the Borda score of the second
candidate.
Proposition 9.15 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. For any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1mC ai2, it holds that B(ai1) > B(ai2).
Proof: As ai1 mC ai2 , it follows that,
B(ai1) =
∑
a`∈C \{ai1}
Vi1`
= Vi1i2 +
∑
a`∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
Vi1`
> Vi2i1 +
∑
a`∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
Vi2`
=
∑
a`∈C \{ai2}
Vi2`
= B(ai2) .
We conclude that B(ai1) > B(ai2). 
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From now on, we focus on the relation mC as it leads to an order relation on the set of
candidates, while the relation m∼C leads to a pre-order relation only. Note that, although
Condorcet’s proposal might not be transitive, the relation mC is transitive and it avoids
the voting paradox.
Proposition 9.16 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on
C given by the voters. The relation mC is an order relation on C .
Proof: We prove that mC is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive.
(a) Reflexivity: as mC is defined as the reflexive closure of mC , it trivially holds that mC
is reflexive.
(b) Antisymmetry: as mC obviously is asymmetric, mC is antisymmetric.
(c) Transitivity: for any ai1 , ai2 , ai3 ∈ C such that ai1 mC ai2 and that ai2 mC ai3 , we need
to prove that ai1 mC ai3 . If ai1 = ai2 or ai1 = ai3 or ai2 = ai3 , then it is trivial.
Consider the case where ai1 6= ai2 6= ai3 6= ai1 (only necessary if k ≥ 3). First, as
ai1 mC ai2 and as ai3 ∈ C \{ai1 , ai2}, it holds that Vi1i3 ≥ Vi2i3 and, therefore, that
Vi3i1 ≤ Vi3i2 . Furthermore, as ai2 mC ai3 , it holds that Vi2i3 > Vi3i2 . Thus, it holds
that:
Vi1i3 ≥ Vi2i3 > Vi3i2 ≥ Vi3i1 .
Second, for any a` ∈ C \{ai1 , ai3}, we need to prove that
Vi1` ≥ Vi3` .
We distinguish two cases: ` = i2 and ` 6= i2.
(i) If ` = i2, then it follows from ai1 mC ai2 and ai2 mC ai3 that
Vi1i2 ≥
r
2
≥ Vi3i2 .
(ii) If ` 6= i2 (only necessary if k ≥ 4), then it follows from ai1 mC ai2 and ai2 mC ai3
that
Vi1` ≥ Vi2` ≥ Vi3` .
Thus, it holds that ai1 mC ai3 and, therefore, mC is transitive.
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We conclude that mC is an order relation on C . 
As a consequence of this proposition, we conclude that the voting paradox results from the
fact that the relation of the candidates with respect to all the other ones is disregarded in
Condorcet’s proposal.
Example 9.17 Consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile of rank-
ings R = (i)14i=1 provided by fourteen voters shown in Table 9.2.
# i Rankings on C
6 c  b  a  d
5 a  d  b  c
3 b  a  d  c
Table 9.2: Frequency of the rankings on C expressed by 14 voters.
The votrix induced by R is given by:
VR =

0 5 8 14
9 0 8 9
6 6 0 6
0 5 8 0
 .
Note that, for instance, considering candidates a and d, it holds that:
14 = V (a, d) > V (d, a) = 0 ,
5 = V (a, b) ≥ V (d, b) = 5 ,
8 = V (a, c) ≥ V (d, c) = 8 .
Thus, it holds that amC d. In general, mC is given by:
mC = {(a, d), (b, c), (b, d)} .
Obviously, mC is given by:
mC = {(a, a), (a, d), (b, b), (b, c), (b, d), (c, c), (d, d)} .
This leads to the partially ordered set with the Hasse diagram in Figure 9.3.
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•a
•d • c
• b
Figure 9.3: Hasse diagram of the order relation mC .
9.2 On being the best candidate
In this section, we discuss several existing notions of winning candidate. We also propose
two new types of winner, positioning them with respect to the rest of existing notions.
9.2.1 Some existing notions of best candidate
The choice of the winner of an election is an easy problem when all the voters agree on
which candidate is the best. In that case, one talks about a unanimous winner [6].
Definition 9.18 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on
C given by the voters. A candidate ai1 is called the unanimous winner if, for any other
candidate ai2 ∈ C \{ai1}, it holds that Vi1i2 = r.
However, the existence of a unanimous winner does not hold in almost any election. Instead,
a weaker version is often considered requiring that more than half of the voters agree on
the candidate that should be selected as the winner [107].
Definition 9.19 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. A candidate ai1 is called the majority winner if it holds that
#{j ∈ {1, . . . , r} | (∀ai2 ∈ C \{ai1})(ai1 j ai2)} >
r
2
.
Nevertheless, the existence of such a majority winner usually does not hold when more
than two candidates are considered.
CHAPTER 9 WINNING CANDIDATES 203
In 1781, Borda [18] proposed to exploit the positions at which every candidate is ranked
in order to determine a new type of winner: the Borda winner.
Definition 9.20 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. A candidate ai1 is called the Borda winner if, for any other candidate
ai2 ∈ C \{ai1}, it holds that B(ai1) > B(ai2).
Remark 9.21 Some authors consider that a Borda winner is one that maximizes the
Borda score, without requiring this maximum to be unique. Here, we require the Borda
winner to be unique and, therefore, it is not assured to exist.
In 1785, Condorcet [35] gave another condition that at first sight seems to be sufficient for
selecting a candidate as the winner. He advocated that, if a candidate is preferred to each
of the other candidates by more than half of the voters, then it should be selected as the
winner.
Definition 9.22 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on
C given by the voters. A candidate ai1 is called the Condorcet winner if, for any other
candidate ai2 ∈ C \{ai1}, it holds that Vi1i2 > r2 .
Remark 9.23 Some authors consider that a Condorcet winner ai1 is one that satisfies
that, for any other candidate ai2 ∈ C \{ai1}, it holds that Vi1i2 > Vi2i1. Note that both
definitions are equivalent in the main setting considered in this dissertation where each
voter expresses his/her preferences in the form of a ranking on the set of candidates.
However, as it disregards a big part of the information provided by the voters, this concept
has withstood a big criticism from part of the scientific community [18, 142]. In the
following example, we provide a case where the suitability of the Condorcet winner may
be questioned.
Example 9.24 Consider a set of four candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile of rank-
ings R = (i)101i=1 provided by 101 voters shown in Table 9.3.
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# i Rankings on C
51 a  b  c  d
50 b  c  d  a
Table 9.3: Frequency of the rankings on C expressed by 101 voters.
The votrix induced by R is given by:
VR =

0 51 51 51
50 0 101 101
50 0 0 101
50 0 0 0
 .
Note that although candidate b - which is the Borda winner - seems to be the most reasonable
choice, candidate a is the Condorcet winner (and the majority winner). However, it clearly
is a questionable choice for this particular example. This counter-intuitive result derives
from the fact that candidate b is pairwisely better than candidates c and d and just a small
change of one of the rankings a  b  c  d into b  a  c  d will also make b pairwisely
better than a. Many more changes are needed for turning candidate a pairwisely better than
candidates b and c.
9.2.2 On being the quasipositionally best candidate
The quasipositional winner is a candidate that is quasipositionally better than each can-
didate in the set of candidates.
Definition 9.25 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. A candidate ai1 is called the quasipositional winner if, for any other
candidate ai2 ∈ C \{ai1}, it holds that ai1 mB ai2.
It is known that the unanimous winner, the majority winner, the Borda winner and the
Condorcet winner are not assured to exist but, if they do exist, they are unique. Note that
this is also the case for the quasipositional winner.
Proposition 9.26 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on
C given by the voters.
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(i) A quasipositional winner might not exist.
(ii) If a quasipositional winner exists, then it is unique.
Proof:
Statement (i). It suffices to consider the profile of rankings given in Example 9.5 and the
Hasse diagram represented in Figure 9.1.
Statement (ii). Suppose that ai1 and ai2 are two different quasipositional winners. It then
holds that ai1 mB ai2 and ai2 mB ai1 . By definition of mB, it holds that Si1` = Si2`, for any
` ∈ {1, . . . , k} and, at the same time, there exist `1, `2 ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that Si1`1 > Si2`1
and Si1`2 < Si2`2 , a contradiction.
Therefore, if a quasipositional winner exists, it is unique. 
Evidently, the notion of quasipositional winner is a stronger notion than that of Borda
winner and a weaker notion than that of unanimous winner.
Theorem 9.27 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters.
(i) If the unanimous winner exists, then the quasipositional exists and it coincides with
the unanimous winner.
(ii) If the quasipositional winner exists, then the unanimous winner might not exist.
Proof:
Statement (i). If a candidate ai1 is the unanimous winner, then it is ranked at the first
position by every voter. For any other candidate ai2 ∈ C \{ai1}, it trivially holds that
r = Si11 > Si21 = 0. Furthermore, for any ` ∈ {2, . . . , k}, it holds that r =
∑`
j=1 Si1` ≥∑`
j=1 Si2`. Thus, for any other candidate ai2 ∈ C \{ai1}, it holds that ai1mB ai2 . Therefore,
if the unanimous winner ai1 exists, then the quasipositional winner exists and it coincides
with ai1 .
Statement (ii). Consider the set of candidates C = {a, b, c} and the profile of rankings
shown in Table 9.4.
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# i Rankings on C
9 a  b  c
1 c  a  b
Table 9.4: Frequency of the rankings on C = {a, b, c} expressed by 10 voters.
Clearly, candidate a is the quasipositional winner, but there does not exist a unanimous
winner. 
Theorem 9.28 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters.
(i) If the quasipositional winner exists, then the Borda winner exists and it coincides
with the pairwise winner.
(ii) If the Borda winner exists, then the quasipositional winner might not exist.
Proof:
Statement (i). Note that the Borda score of any candidate ai ∈ C can be expressed in the
following way as a linear combination of the components of the vector of positions of ai:
B(ai) =
k∑
`=1
(k − `)Si` .
We conclude that, as the vector of positions of candidate ai dominates the vector of posi-
tions of any other candidate (due to the fact that it is the quasipositional winner), then
the Borda score of candidate ai is greater than the Borda score of any other candidate.
Statement (ii) immediately follows from Example 9.24. 
In Theorems 9.27 and 9.28, we described the relation between the notions of unanimous
winner, quasipositional winner and Borda winner. We will now prove that there is no
immediate relation between the existence of the quasipositional winner and the existence
of the Condorcet winner nor the majority winner. Note that, in case both the majority
winner and the quasipositional winner exist, then they need to coincide. However, this is
not the case for the quasipositional winner and the Condorcet winner.
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Theorem 9.29 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters.
(i) If the quasipositional winner exists, then the majority winner might not exist.
(ii) If the majority winner exists, then the quasipositional winner might not exist.
(iii) If both the majority winner and the quasipositional winner exist, then they coincide.
Proof:
Statement (i). Consider the set of candidates C = {a, b, c} and the profile of rankings
shown in Table 9.5.
# i Rankings on C
4 a  b  c
3 b  a  c
3 c  a  b
Table 9.5: Frequency of the rankings on C = {a, b, c} expressed by 10 voters.
Clearly, candidate a is the quasipositional winner, but there does not exist a majority
winner.
Statement (ii) immediately follows from Example 9.24.
Statement (iii). Note that if the majority winner exists, then the first component of the
vector of positions of this candidate needs to be greater than half of the number of voters.
Therefore, this vector of positions cannot be dominated by any other vector of positions.
We conclude that, if the quasipositional winner also exists, then the majority candidate
and the quasipositional winner coincide. 
Theorem 9.30 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters.
(i) If the quasipositional winner exists, then the Condorcet winner might not exist.
(ii) If the Condorcet winner exists, then the quasipositional winner might not exist.
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(iii) If both the Condorcet winner and the quasipositional winner exist, then they might
not coincide.
Proof:
Statement (i). Consider the set of candidates C = {a, b, c} and the profile of rankings
shown in Table 9.6.
# i Rankings on C
4 a  c  b
3 b  a  c
3 c  b  a
Table 9.6: Frequency of the rankings on C = {a, b, c} expressed by 10 voters.
Clearly, candidate a is the quasipositional winner, but there does not exist a Condorcet
winner.
Statement (ii) immediately follows from Example 9.24.
Statement (iii). Consider the set of candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the profile of rankings
shown in Table 9.7.
# i Rankings on C
4 a  c  b  d
3 b  a  c  d
3 d  b  a  c
Table 9.7: Frequency of the rankings on C = {a, b, c} expressed by 10 voters.
Note that candidate a is the quasipositional winner and candidate b is the Condorcet
winner. 
9.2.3 On being the positionally best candidate
The positional winner is a candidate that is positionally better than each candidate in the
set of candidates.
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Definition 9.31 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on
C given by the voters. A candidate ai1 is called the positional winner if, for any other
candidate ai2 ∈ C \{ai1}, it holds that ai1 mR ai2.
The positional winner is not assured to exist but, if it does exist, it is unique.
Proposition 9.32 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on
C given by the voters.
(i) A positional winner might not exist.
(ii) If a positional winner exists, then it is unique.
Proof:
Statement (i). It suffices to consider the profile of rankings given in Example 9.10 and the
Hasse diagram represented in Figure 9.2.
Statement (ii). Suppose that ai1 and ai2 are two different positional winners. It then holds
that ai1mRai2 and ai2mRai1 . Therefore, as a result of Proposition 9.8, it holds that ai1mBai2
and ai2 mB ai1 . By definition of mB, it holds that Si1` = Si2`, for any ` ∈ {1, . . . , k} and,
at the same time, there exist `1, `2 ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that Si1`1 > Si2`1 and Si1`2 < Si2`2 , a
contradiction.
Therefore, if a positional winner exists, it is unique. 
Evidently, the notion of positional winner is a stronger notion than that of quasiposi-
tional winner (and therefore than that of Borda winner) and a weaker notion than that of
unanimous winner.
Theorem 9.33 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters.
(i) If the unanimous winner exists, then the positional exists and it coincides with the
unanimous winner.
(ii) If the positional winner exists, then the unanimous winner might not exist.
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Proof:
Statement (i). If a candidate ai1 is the unanimous winner, then it is ranked at the first
position by every voter. For any other candidate ai2 ∈ C \{ai1}, it trivially holds that
r = Si11 > Si21 = 0. Furthermore, for any ` ∈ {2, . . . , k}, it holds that r =
∑`
j=1 Si1` ≥∑`
j=1 Si2`. The previous result trivially holds for any sub-scorix of S on any subset of the
set of candidates containing ai1 and ai2 . Thus, for any other candidate ai2 ∈ C \{ai1}, it
holds that ai1 mR ai2 . Therefore, if the unanimous winner ai1 exists, then the positional
winner exists and it coincides with ai1 .
Statement (ii). Consider the set of candidates C = {a, b, c} and the profile of rankings
shown in Table 9.8.
# i Rankings on C
9 a  b  c
1 c  a  b
Table 9.8: Frequency of the rankings on C = {a, b, c} expressed by 10 voters.
Clearly, candidate a is the positional winner, but there does not exist a unanimous win-
ner. 
Theorem 9.34 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters.
(i) If the positional winner exists, then the quasipositional winner exists and it coincides
with the positional winner.
(ii) If the quasipositional winner exists, then the quasipositional winner might not exist.
Proof:
Statement (i) trivially follows from Proposition 9.8.
Statement (ii). Consider the set of candidates C = {a, b, c} and the profile of rankings
shown in Table 9.9.
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# i Rankings on C
4 a  b  c
3 b  c  a
3 c  a  b
Table 9.9: Frequency of the rankings on C = {a, b, c} expressed by 10 voters.
Clearly, candidate a is the quasipositional winner, but there does not exist a positional
winner (it suffices to consider the sub-scorix on C ′ = {a, c} to see that a is not positionally
better than c). 
In Theorems 9.33 and 9.34, we described the relation between the notions of unanimous
winner, positional winner and quasipositional winner. The positional winner is understood
as a natural link between the Borda winner and the Condorcet winner, leading to the same
social outcome.
Theorem 9.35 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters.
(i) If the positional winner exists, then the Condorcet winner exists and it coincides with
the positional winner.
(ii) If the Condorcet winner exists, then the positional winner might not exist.
Proof:
Statement (i). Note that a consequence of the relation mR is that, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C
with ai1 mR ai2 and any C ′ ⊆ C such that ai1 , ai2 ∈ C ′, it holds that S ′i1 B1 S ′i2 , where S ′
is the corresponding sub-scorix of S on C ′. The result immediately follows by considering
C ′ = {ai1 , ai2}. Therefore, if the positional winner exists, then the Condorcet winner exists
and it coincides with ai1 .
Statement (ii). Immediately follows from Example 9.24. 
As a result of Theorem 9.35, we conclude that every Condorcet method will select the
positional winner (in case it exists) as the winner of the election.
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Corollary 9.36 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. If a candidate ai ∈ C is the positional winner, then ai will be the
winner for any Condorcet method.
Therefore, the most well-known Condorcet methods, such as the ones due to Kemeny [80],
Copeland [40], Tideman [157], Dodgson [46] or Schulze [147], will select the positional
winner (in case it exists) as the winner.
We will now prove that there is no immediate relation between the existence of the po-
sitional winner and the existence of the majority winner. Note that, in case both the
majority winner and the positional winner exist, then they need to coincide.
Theorem 9.37 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters.
(i) If the positional winner exists, then the majority winner might not exist.
(ii) If the majority winner exists, then the positional winner might not exist.
(iii) If both the majority winner and the quasipositional winner exist, then they coincide.
Proof:
Statement (i). Consider the set of candidates C = {a, b, c} and the profile of rankings
shown in Table 9.10.
# i Rankings on C
4 a  b  c
4 a  c  b
3 b  a  c
3 b  c  a
3 c  a  b
3 c  b  a
Table 9.10: Frequency of the rankings on C = {a, b, c} expressed by 20 voters.
Candidate a is the positional winner, but there does not exist a majority winner.
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Statement (ii) immediately follows from Example 9.24.
Statement (iii). Note that if the majority winner exists, then it coincides with the Con-
dorcet winner. As a result of Theorem 9.35, if the positional winner exists, then it coincides
with the Condorcer winner. We conclude that, if both the majority winner and the quasi-
positional winner exist, then they coincide. 
9.2.4 On being the pairwisely best candidate
From Example 9.24 we conclude that, although the Condorcet winner may seem a natural
choice when it exists, it may also be subject of controversy. We propose here a stronger
version of the Condorcet winner, the pairwise winner, which is a candidate that is pairwisely
better than each candidate in the set of candidates.
Definition 9.38 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. A candidate ai1 is called the pairwise winner if, for any other candidate
ai2 ∈ C \{ai1}, it holds that ai1 mC ai2.
The pairwise winner is not assured to exist but, if it does exist, it is unique.
Proposition 9.39 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on
C given by the voters.
(i) A pairwise winner might not exist.
(ii) If a pairwise winner exists, then it is unique.
Proof:
Statement (i). It suffices to consider the profile of rankings given in Example 9.17 and the
Hasse diagram represented in Figure 9.3.
Statement (ii). Suppose that ai1 and ai2 are two different pairwise winners. It then holds
that ai1 mC ai2 and ai2 mC ai1 . By definition of mC , it holds that Vi1i2 > Vi2i1 and that
Vi2i1 > Vi1i2 , a contradiction.
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Therefore, if a pairwise winner exists, it is unique. 
Evidently, the notion of pairwise winner is a stronger notion than that of Condorcet winner
and a weaker notion than that of unanimous winner.
Theorem 9.40 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters.
(i) If the unanimous winner exists, then the pairwise winner exists and it coincides with
the unanimous winner.
(ii) If the pairwise winner exists, then the unanimous winner might not exist.
Proof:
Statement (i). If a candidate ai1 is the unanimous winner, then it is ranked at the first
position by every voter. For any other candidate ai2 ∈ C \{ai1}, it trivially holds that
r = Vi1i2 > Vi2i1 = 0. Furthermore, for any a` ∈ C \{ai1 , ai2}, it holds that r = Vi1` ≥ Vi2`.
Thus, for any other candidate ai2 ∈ C \{ai1}, it holds that ai1 mC ai2 . Therefore, if the
unanimous winner ai1 exists, then the pairwise winner exists and it coincides with ai1 .
Statement (ii). Consider the set of candidates C = {a, b, c} and the profile of rankings
shown in Table 9.11.
# i Rankings on C
4 a  b  c
3 b  a  c
3 c  a  b
Table 9.11: Frequency of the rankings on C = {a, b, c} expressed by 10 voters.
Clearly, candidate a is the pairwise winner, but there does not exist a unanimous winner. 
Theorem 9.41 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters.
CHAPTER 9 WINNING CANDIDATES 215
(i) If the pairwise winner exists, then the Condorcet winner exists and it coincides with
the pairwise winner.
(ii) If the Condorcet winner exists, then the pairwise winner might not exist.
Proof:
Statement (i). Note that the first condition of the relation mC is that ai1 mC ai2 implies
that Vi1i2 >
r
2
> Vi2i1 . Therefore, if the pairwise winner exists, then the Condorcet winner
exists and it coincides with ai1 .
Statement (ii). Immediately follows from Example 9.24. 
As a result of Theorem 9.41, we conclude that every Condorcet method will select the
pairwise winner (in case it exists) as the winner of the election.
Corollary 9.42 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. If a candidate ai ∈ C is the pairwise winner, then ai will be the winner
for any Condorcet method.
Therefore, the most well-known Condorcet methods, such as the ones due to Kemeny [80],
Copeland [40], Tideman [157], Dodgson [46] or Schulze [147], will select the pairwise winner
(in case it exists) as the winner.
In Theorems 9.40 and 9.41, we described the relation between the notions of unanimous
winner, pairwise winner and Condorcet winner. It is clear that the majority winner also
lies between the unanimous winner and the Condorcet winner. We will now prove that,
although they need to coincide if both exist, there is no immediate relation between the
existence of the pairwise winner and the existence of the majority winner.
Theorem 9.43 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters.
(i) If the pairwise winner exists, then the majority winner might not exist.
(ii) If the majority winner exists, then the pairwise winner might not exist.
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(iii) If both the majority winner and the pairwise winner exist, then they coincide.
Proof:
Statement (i). Consider the set of candidates C = {a, b, c} and the profile of rankings
shown in Table 9.11. Clearly, candidate a is the pairwise winner, but there does not exist
a majority winner.
Statement (ii) immediately follows from Example 9.24.
Statement (iii). Note that if the majority winner aM exists, then the Condorcet winner
also exists and it coincides with aM . As a result of Theorem 9.41, we know that, if the
pairwise winner aP exists, then the Condorcet winner also exists and it coincides with aP .
Due to the uniqueness of the Condorcet winner, both the majority winner and the pairwise
winner coincide when they exist. 
An even more surprising observation is that the pairwise winner also turns out to be a
stronger winner than the Borda winner. This implies that the pairwise winner is a type
of winner that finally unites the works of Borda and Condorcet, assuring that both the
Borda winner and the Condorcet winner lead to the same social outcome.
Theorem 9.44 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters.
(i) If the pairwise winner exists, then the Borda winner exists and it coincides with the
pairwise winner.
(ii) If the Borda winner exists, then the pairwise winner might not exist.
Proof:
Statement (i). Let aP be the pairwise winner. By definition, for any other candidate
ai ∈ C \{aP}, it holds that aP mC ai. As a result of Proposition 9.15, it follows that
B(aP ) > B(ai). We conclude that aP is the Borda winner.
Statement (ii) immediately follows from Example 9.24. 
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Although it obeys a stronger condition than that of the Borda and Condorcet winners, the
pairwise winner is the actual cornerstone of social choice theory; it is under the absence of
the pairwise winner when the need of making a decision arises.
9.2.5 Relation between the (quasi)positional and the pairwise winners
We conclude this section by comparing the (quasi)positional winner and the pairwise win-
ner.
Theorem 9.45 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters.
(i) If the pairwise winner exists, then the quasipositional winner might not exist.
(ii) If the quasipositional winner exists, then the pairwise winner might not exist.
(iii) If both the quasipositional winner and the pairwise winner exist, then they coincide.
Proof:
Statement (i). Consider the set of candidates C = {a, b, c} and the profile of rankings
shown in Table 9.12.
# i Rankings on C
4 b  a  c
3 a  c  b
3 c  a  b
Table 9.12: Frequency of the rankings on C = {a, b, c} expressed by 10 voters.
Clearly, candidate a is the pairwise winner, but there does not exist a quasipositional
winner.
Statement (ii). Consider the set of candidates C = {a, b, c} and the profile of rankings
shown in Table 9.13.
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# i Rankings on C
5 a  b  c
2 b  c  a
2 c  a  b
1 b  a  c
Table 9.13: Frequency of the rankings on C = {a, b, c} expressed by 10 voters.
Clearly, candidate a is the quasipositional winner, but there does not exist a pairwise
winner.
Statement (iii). As a result of Theorem 9.28, we know that, if the quasipositional winner
exists, then the Borda winner exists and it coincides with the quasipositional winner. As
a result of Theorem 9.44, we know that, if the pairwise winner exists, then the Borda
winner exists and it coincides with the pairwise winner. We conclude that, if both the
quasipositional winner and the pairwise winner exist, then the Borda winner exists and all
three need to coincide. 
Theorem 9.46 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters.
(i) If the pairwise winner exists, then the positional winner might not exist.
(ii) If the positional winner exists, then the pairwise winner might not exist.
(iii) If both the positional winner and the pairwise winner exist, then they coincide.
Proof:
Statement (i). Consider the set of candidates C = {a, b, c} and the profile of rankings
shown in Table 9.12. Clearly, candidate a is the pairwise winner, but there does not exist
a positional winner.
Statement (ii). Consider the set of candidates C = {a, b, c} and the profile of rankings
shown in Table 9.13. Clearly, candidate a is the positional winner, but there does not exist
a pairwise winner.
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Statement (iii). As a result of Theorems 9.28 and 9.34, we know that, if the positional
winner exists, then the Borda winner exists and it coincides with the positional winner.
As a result of Theorem 9.44, we know that, if the pairwise winner exists, then the Borda
winner exists and it coincides with the pairwise winner. We conclude that, if both the
positional winner and the pairwise winner exist, then the Borda winner exists and all three
need to coincide. 
Figure 9.4 displays the relation between the different types of winners analysed in this
chapter. In this figure, an arrow indicates that, if the winner from which the arrow starts
exists, then the winner to which the arrow points also exists and it coincides with the
former.
Unanimous winner
Pairwise winner
Condorcet winner
Majority winnerPositional winner
Quasipositional winner
Borda winner
Figure 9.4: Relation between the different types of winners.
9.3 On being a potential best candidate
In this section, we discuss what candidates could be considered potential winning can-
didates considering either quasipositional or pairwise information. In order to do so, we
define the undominated sets for the relations mB, mR and mC .
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9.3.1 The quasipositionally undominated set
In case the quasipositional winner does not exist, a natural solution we propose to consider
the quasipositionally undominated set, i.e., the set of all elements for which there exists
no quasipositionally better element.
Definition 9.47 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. The quasipositionally undominated set is the subset UB of C defined
as
UB = {ai1 ∈ C | (6 ∃ai2 ∈ C )(ai2 mB ai1)} .
Note that there always exists at least one candidate that belongs to the quasipositionally
undominated set.
Proposition 9.48 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on
C given by the voters. It holds that UB 6= ∅.
Proof: The result is straightforward due to the fact that mB defines an order relation on
C , that C is a finite set and that the quasipositionally undominated set coincides with the
set of maximal elements of mB. 
The existence of the quasipositional winner is equivalent to the fact that the quasiposi-
tionally undominated set is a singleton.
Proposition 9.49 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. A candidate aP is the quasipositional winner if and only if UB = {aP}.
Proof: Let aP be the quasipositional winner. By definition of the quasipositional winner,
for any other candidate ai ∈ C \{aP}, it holds that aP mB ai. It obviously follows that the
unique element that can belong to the quasipositionally undominated set is aP . As a result
of Proposition 9.48, we know that UB 6= ∅. Therefore, we conclude that UB = {aP}.
Let UB = {aP}. Suppose that aP is not the quasipositional winner. Therefore, there exists
ai1 ∈ C \{aP} such that it does not hold that aP mB ai1 . As ai1 6∈ UB and mB is an order
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relation on a finite set, there exists a maximal element ai2 ∈ C \{aP , ai1} of mB such that
ai2mBai1 . Note that ai2 is a maximal element of mB not belonging to UB, a contradiction.
9.3.2 The positionally undominated set
As discussed in the previous sections, the positional winner seems to be an intuitive winner
in case it exists. In case it does not exist, a natural solution is to consider the positionally
undominated set, i.e., the set of all elements for which there exists no positionally better
element. This set is always not empty and, as we will show next, in case the positional
winner does not exist, contains at least two elements. As it likely is a proper subset of the
set of candidates itself, the choice of the best candidate can be restricted to that subset.
Definition 9.50 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. The positionally undominated set is the subset UR of C defined as
UR = {ai1 ∈ C | (6 ∃ai2 ∈ C )(ai2 mR ai1)} .
Remark 9.51 As a result of Proposition 9.8, we know that mR ⊆ mB. Therefore, it
trivially holds that
UB ⊆ UR .
Note that there always exists at least one candidate that belongs to the positionally un-
dominated set.
Proposition 9.52 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on
C given by the voters. It holds that UR 6= ∅.
Proof: The result is straightforward due to the fact that mR defines an order relation on
C , that C is a finite set and that the positionally undominated set coincides with the set
of maximal elements of mR. 
The existence of the positional winner is equivalent to the fact that the positionally un-
dominated set is a singleton.
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Proposition 9.53 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on
C given by the voters. A candidate aP is the positional winner if and only if UR = {aP}.
Proof: Let aP be the positional winner. By definition of the positional winner, for
any other candidate ai ∈ C \{aP}, it holds that aP mR ai. It obviously follows that the
unique element that can belong to the positionally undominated set is aP . As a result of
Proposition 9.52, we know that UR 6= ∅. Therefore, we conclude that UR = {aP}.
Let UR = {aP}. Suppose that aP is not the positional winner. Therefore, there exists
ai1 ∈ C \{aP} such that it does not hold that aP mR ai1 . As ai1 6∈ UR and mR is an order
relation on a finite set, there exists a maximal element ai2 ∈ C \{aP , ai1} of mR such that
ai2mRai1 . Note that ai2 is a maximal element of mR not belonging to UR, a contradiction.
9.3.3 The pairwisely undominated set
Similarly, the pairwise winner also seems to be an intuitive winner in case it exists. In
case it does not exist, a natural solution is to consider the pairwisely undominated set,
i.e., the set of all elements for which there exists no pairwisely better element. Like the
(quasi)positionally undominated set, the pairwisely undominated set is always not empty
and, in case the pairwise winner does not exist, contains at least two elements.
Definition 9.54 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. The pairwisely undominated set is the subset UC of C defined as
UC = {ai1 ∈ C | ( 6 ∃ai2 ∈ C )(ai2 mC ai1)} .
Note that there always exists at least one candidate that belongs to the pairwisely undom-
inated set.
Proposition 9.55 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on
C given by the voters. It holds that UC 6= ∅.
Proof: The result is straightforward due to the fact that mC defines an order relation on
C , that C is a finite set and that the pairwisely undominated set coincides with the set of
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maximal elements of mC . 
The existence of the pairwise winner is equivalent to the fact that the pairwisely undomi-
nated set is a singleton.
Proposition 9.56 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on
C given by the voters. A candidate aP is the pairwise winner if and only if UC = {aP}.
Proof: Let aP be the pairwise winner. By definition of the pairwise winner, for any other
candidate ai ∈ C \{aP}, it holds that aPmC ai. It obviously follows that the unique element
that can belong to the pairwisely undominated set is aP . As a result of Proposition 9.55,
we know that UC 6= ∅. Therefore, we conclude that UC = {aP}.
Let UC = {aP}. Suppose that aP is not the pairwise winner. Therefore, there exists
ai1 ∈ C \{aP} such that it does not hold that aP mC ai1 . As ai1 6∈ UC and mC is an order
relation on a finite set, there exists a maximal element ai2 ∈ C \{aP , ai1} of mC such that
ai2mCai1 . Note that ai2 is a maximal element of mC not belonging to UC , a contradiction.
9.4 On being the best ranking
In this section, we discuss the case where the partial order relations “being quasipositionally
as good as” and “being pairwisely as good as” turn out to be total order relations on the
set of candidates.
9.4.1 On being the quasipositionally best ranking
The fact that the scorix is monotone w.r.t. a ranking  on the set of candidates turns
out to be equivalent to the fact that every two candidates ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1  ai2
satisfy that ai1 is quasipositionally as good as ai2 .
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Proposition 9.57 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters, S be the scorix induced by R and  be a ranking on C . The following
two statements are equivalent:
(i) S is monotone w.r.t. .
(ii) For any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1  ai2, it holds that ai1 m∼B ai2.
Proof: The proof is straightforward by definition of monotonicity of the scorix and of
the relation ‘being quasipositionally as good as’. 
Unfortunately, monotonicity of the scorix might hold w.r.t. different rankings on the set
of candidates. Instead of the relation ‘being quasipositionally as good as’, we propose
to consider the relation ‘being quasipositionally better than’ in the characterization of
monotonicity of the scorix given in Proposition 9.57, leading to a strict version of the
property of monotonicity of the scorix. This strictness leads to the uniqueness of the
ranking w.r.t. which monotonicity of the scorix holds, something that was not assured
before.
Definition 9.58 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. The scorix S induced by R is said to be strictly monotone w.r.t. a
ranking  on C if, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1  ai2, it holds that ai1 mB ai2.
Strict monotonicity of the scorix can be understood as the requirement for the relation
mB to be a strict total order relation on the set of candidates. This property results in an
intuitive condition for the Borda ranking to exist.
Theorem 9.59 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C given
by the voters and S be the scorix induced by R. If S is strictly monotone w.r.t. a ranking
 on C , then  is the Borda ranking.
Proof: It follows from the fact that, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C , ai1 mB ai2 implies that
B(ai1) > B(ai2). 
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The search for the ranking that is the closest to imposing strict monotonicity on the scorix
will lead to the definition of different ranking rules depending on the chosen notion of
closeness.
9.4.2 On being the positionally best ranking
The fact that the scorix is recursively monotone w.r.t. a ranking  on the set of candidates
turns out to be equivalent to the fact that every two candidates ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that
ai1  ai2 satisfy that ai1 is positionally as good as ai2 .
Proposition 9.60 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters, S be the scorix induced by R and  be a ranking on C . The following
two statements are equivalent:
(i) S is recursively monotone w.r.t. .
(ii) For any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1  ai2, it holds that ai1 m∼R ai2.
Proof: The proof is straightforward by definition of recursive monotonicity of the scorix
and of the relation ‘being positionally as good as’. 
Analogously, the fact that the scorix is strictly recursively monotone w.r.t. a ranking 
on the set of candidates turns out to be equivalent to the fact that every two candidates
ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1  ai2 satisfy that ai1 is positionally better than ai2 .
Proposition 9.61 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters, S be the scorix induced by R and  be a ranking on C . The following
two statements are equivalent:
(i) S is strictly recursively monotone w.r.t. .
(ii) For any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1  ai2, it holds that ai1 mR ai2.
Proof: The proof is straightforward by definition of strict recursive monotonicity of the
scorix and of the relation ‘being positionally better than’. 
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Strict monotonicity of the scorix can be understood as the requirement for the relation
mR to be a strict total order relation on the set of candidates. This property results in an
intuitive condition for the Borda ranking and the Condorcet ranking to finally agree.
Theorem 9.62 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C given
by the voters and S be the scorix induced by R. If S is strictly recursively monotone w.r.t.
a ranking  on C , then  is both the Borda ranking and the Condorcet ranking.
Proof: It follows from the fact that, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C , ai1 mR ai2 implies that
B(ai1) > B(ai2) and Vi1i2 > Vi2i1 . 
The search for the ranking that is the closest to imposing strict recursive monotonicity
on the scorix will lead to the definition of different ranking rules depending on the chosen
notion of closeness.
9.4.3 On being the pairwisely best ranking
The fact that the votrix is monotone w.r.t. a ranking  on the set of candidates turns
out to be equivalent to the fact that every two candidates ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1  ai2
satisfy that ai1 is pairwisely as good as ai2 .
Proposition 9.63 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters, V be the votrix induced by R and  be a ranking on C . The following
two statements are equivalent:
(i) V is monotone w.r.t. .
(ii) For any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1  ai2, it holds that ai1 m∼C ai2.
Proof: The implication (i)⇒(ii). Firstly, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1  ai2 , it holds
that (ai1 , ai2) A (ai2 , ai1). Therefore, as V is monotone w.r.t. , it holds that Vi1i2 ≥ Vi2i1 .
Secondly, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1  ai2 and any ai3 ∈ C \{ai1 , ai2}, it holds that
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(ai1 , ai3) A (ai2 , ai3). Therefore, as V is monotone w.r.t. , it holds that Vi1i3 ≥ Vi2i3 .
Thus, we conclude that, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1  ai2 , it holds that ai1 m∼C ai2 .
The implication (ii)⇒(i). Let us assume that, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1  ai2 ,
it holds that ai1 m∼C ai2 . By definition of A, for any (ai1 , aj1), (ai2 , aj2) ∈ C 26= such that
(ai1 , aj1) A (ai2 , aj2), it holds that
(ai1  ai2) ∧ (aj2  aj1) ∧ (ai1  ai2 ∨ aj2  aj1) .
We distinguish three cases: if ai1  ai2 and aj2  aj1 , then it holds that ai1 m∼C ai2 and
aj2 m∼C aj1 , therefore it holds that Vi1j1 ≥ Vi2j1 ≥ Vi2j2 ; if ai1  ai2 and aj2 = aj1 , then it
holds that ai1 m∼C ai2 , therefore it holds that Vi1j1 ≥ Vi2j1 = Vi2j2 ; if ai1 = ai2 and aj2  aj1 ,
then it holds that aj2 m∼C aj1 , therefore it holds that Vi1j1 = Vi2j1 ≥ Vi2j2 . We conclude
that Vi1j1 ≥ Vi2j2 and, therefore, V is monotone w.r.t. . 
Unfortunately, monotonicity of the votrix might hold w.r.t. different rankings on the set of
candidates. Instead of the relation ‘being pairwisely as good as’, we propose to consider the
relation ‘being pairwisely better than’ in the characterization of monotonicity of the votrix
given in Proposition 9.63, leading to a strict version of the property of monotonicity of the
votrix. This strictness leads to the uniqueness of the ranking w.r.t. which monotonicity of
the votrix holds, something that was not assured before.
Definition 9.64 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. The votrix V induced by R is said to be strictly monotone w.r.t. a
ranking  on C if, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C such that ai1  ai2, it holds that ai1 mC ai2.
Strict monotonicity of the votrix can be understood as the requirement for the relation
m to be a strict total order relation on the set of candidates. This property results in an
intuitive condition for the Borda ranking and the Condorcet ranking to finally agree.
Theorem 9.65 Let C be a set of k candidates, R be the profile of r rankings on C given
by the voters and V be the votrix induced by R. If V is strictly monotone w.r.t. a ranking
 on C , then  is both the Borda ranking and the Condorcet ranking.
Proof: From Proposition 9.15, it follows that, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C , ai1 m ai2 implies
that B(ai1) > B(ai2). In addition, by definition of m, it follows that, for any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C ,
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ai1 m ai2 implies that Vi1i2 > Vi2i1 . We conclude that  is both the Borda ranking and the
Condorcet ranking. 
The search for the ranking that is the closest to imposing strict monotonicity on the votrix
will lead to the definition of different ranking rules depending on the chosen notion of
closeness.
9.5 A new social choice function
As discussed in this chapter, the pairwise winner is a natural type of winner finally uniting
the Borda winner and the Condorcet winner. In this section, we recall part of the work
in [120], where we introduced a social choice function that selects the candidate(s) that is
the closest to becoming the pairwise winner. Of course, this closeness can be measured in
many different ways. For instance, the search for the Condorcet winner is addressed by
means of a distance function at the votrix level and of a distance function at the profile
level by two prominent methods: Condorcet’s least-reversal method [99] and the method
of Dodgson [46].
Here, we consider to assign a score to each candidate ai according to how close it is to
becoming the pairwise winner. In order to fulfill the conditions of Definition 9.11, we need
to increase Vi` until the following three conditions hold: (a) Vi` is greater than V`i (i.e., it
is greater than or equal to r
2
+ 1, in case r is even, or r+1
2
, in case r is odd), for any other
candidate a`; (b) Vi` is greater than or equal to Vt`, for any other candidates a` and at;
(c) V`i is smaller than or equal to V`t, for any other candidates a` and at. Analogously,
we need to decrease the counterpart V`i until the following three conditions hold: (a) V`i
is smaller than Vi`; (b) V`i is smaller than or equal to V`t, for any other candidates a` and
at; (c) Vi` is greater than or equal to Vt`, for any other candidates a` and at. The score for
each candidate ai is then given by
7
s(ai) =
1
2
∑
a`∈C \{ai}
∣∣∣∣Vi` −max(r2 + 1, maxat∈C \{ai,a`}Vt`
)∣∣∣∣
−
+
1
2
∑
a`∈C \{ai}
∣∣∣∣min(r2 − 1, minat∈C \{ai,a`}Vt`
)
− V`i
∣∣∣∣
−
,
7We denote the negative part of x by |x|− = −min(x, 0).
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in case r is an even number, and
s(ai) =
1
2
∑
a`∈C \{ai}
∣∣∣∣Vi` −max(r + 12 , maxat∈C \{ai,a`}Vt`
)∣∣∣∣
−
+
1
2
∑
a`∈C \{ai}
∣∣∣∣min(r − 12 , minat∈C \{ai,a`}Vt`
)
− V`i
∣∣∣∣
−
,
in case r is an odd number.
In the setting where each voter provides a ranking (without ties) on the set of candidates,
the terms corresponding to the same index are identical in both sums in each of the above
expressions due to the fact that Vi` = r−V`i, for any two candidates ai, a` ∈ C . Moreover,
the reader can easily check that both maxat∈C \{ai,a`} Vt` and maxat∈C Vt` lead to the same
result. We sketch the proof for the case where r is an even number (the case where r is an
odd number is analogous). It suffices to distinguish three cases:
(a)
r
2
+ 1 ≥ Vi` > maxat∈C \{ai,a`} Vt`, where it holds that∣∣∣∣Vi` −max(r2 + 1, maxat∈C \{ai,a`}Vt`
)∣∣∣∣
−
=
∣∣∣Vi` − r
2
− 1
∣∣∣
−
=
∣∣∣∣Vi` −max(r2 + 1,maxat∈C Vt`
)∣∣∣∣
−
;
(b) Vi` ≥ r
2
+ 1 ≥ maxat∈C \{ai,a`} Vt` (with Vi` > maxat∈C \{ai,a`} Vt`), where it holds that∣∣∣∣Vi` −max(r2 + 1, maxat∈C \{ai,a`}Vt`
)∣∣∣∣
−
= 0 =
∣∣∣∣Vi` −max(r2 + 1,maxat∈C Vt`
)∣∣∣∣
−
;
(c) Vi` > maxat∈C \{ai,a`} Vt` ≥
r
2
+ 1, where it holds that∣∣∣∣Vi` −max(r2 + 1, maxat∈C \{ai,a`}Vt`
)∣∣∣∣
−
= 0 =
∣∣∣∣Vi` −max(r2 + 1,maxat∈C Vt`
)∣∣∣∣
−
.
Therefore, the above expressions can be simplified to
s(ai) =
∑
a`∈C \{ai}
K` − Vi` , (9.1)
whereK` = max
(
r
2
+ 1,max
at∈C
Vt`
)
in case r is an even number, andK` = max
(
r + 1
2
,max
at∈C
Vt`
)
in case r is an odd number.
Obviously, in case the pairwise winner aP exists, its score s(aP ) equals zero. In the following
example, we illustrate how the score of a candidate can be easily obtained by just analysing
the corresponding votrix.
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Example 9.66 The votrix induced by the profile of rankings listed in Example 9.17 is given
by:
VR =

0 5 8 14
9 0 8 9
6 6 0 6
0 5 8 0
 .
The score of the i-th candidate equals the sum (for all columns j 6= i) of the costs of making
the element at the i-th row and j-th column the maximum of the column and, at the same
time, greater than half of the number of voters. We illustrate how to obtain the score of
candidate a. For the second column we need to increase five until it becomes the maximum
of the column (six) and, at the same time, it becomes greater than half of the number of
voters, i.e., it becomes at least eight. Therefore, for the second column, we need to increase
five until it becomes eight, leading to a cost of three. Note that, for the third column, eight
is already the maximum of the column and at the same time greater than half of the number
of voters and, for the fourth column, fourteen is already the maximum of the column and at
the same time greater than half of the number of voters. Therefore, the score of candidate
a equals
s(a) = 3 + 0 + 0 = 3 .
Analogously, the scores of the other candidates are s(b) = 5, s(c) = 13 and s(d) = 12.
We suggest that a candidate should be elected a winner if it minimizes the score given by
Eq. (9.1), i.e., a candidate ai is a winning candidate if it belongs to
A = arg min
ai∈C
s(ai) . (9.2)
Remark 9.67 As s(ai) = −B(ai)−Ki+
∑
a`∈C K`, the proposed method can be understood
as a modified version of the Borda method, where, for any candidate ai, the term Ki is
added to the Borda score:
A = arg max
ai∈C
B(ai) +Ki .
Remark 9.68 The search for a pairwise winner in the same fashion as the method of
Dodgson searches for a Condorcet winner (i.e., by minimizing the number of consecutive
candidates that need to be switched in the profile of rankings) has also been implemented.
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This has resulted in the same scores in most of the analysed profiles. Nevertheless, this was
not always the case, for instance, in case we consider the set of candidates C = {a, b, c, d}
and the profile of rankings listed in Table 9.14.
# i Rankings on C
26 c  d  a  b
25 a  b  d  c
25 b  a  d  c
25 c  b  a  d
Table 9.14: Frequency of the rankings on C = {a, b, c, d} expressed by 101
voters.
The unique minimizer of Eq. (9.2) is candidate a, while the set of minimizers for the search
for a pairwise winner by minimizing the number of consecutive candidates that are switched
in the profile of rankings is {a, b}.
In case a candidate ai1 is pairwisely better than another candidate ai2 , the score of ai1 is
smaller than the score of ai2 .
Proposition 9.69 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on
C given by the voters. For any ai1 , ai2 ∈ C , ai1 mC ai2 implies that s(ai1) < s(ai2).
Proof: Let ai1 , ai2 ∈ C be such that ai1 mC ai2 . As ai1 mC ai2 , it follows that, for any
a` ∈ C \{ai1 , ai2},
K` − Vi1` ≤ K` − Vi2` . (9.3)
It immediately follows that∑
a`∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
K` − Vi1` ≤
∑
a`∈C \{ai1 ,ai2}
K` − Vi2` .
As s(ai) =
∑
a`∈C \{ai}K` − Vi`, in order for s(ai1) < s(ai2) to hold, it would suffice that
Ki1 − Vi2i1 < Ki2 − Vi1i2 .
Unfortunately, this may not be the case. However, it is also sufficient to prove that
Ki1 − Vi2i1 +K` − Vi1` < Ki2 − Vi1i2 +K` − Vi2` ,
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for some appropriate index `, or
Ki1 − Vi2i1 +K`1 − Vi1`1 +K`2 − Vi1`2 < Ki2 − Vi1i2 +K`1 − Vi2`1 +K`2 − Vi2`2 ,
for some appropriate indices `1 and `2.
Let T1 be an index t maximizing Vti1 and T2 be an index t maximizing Vti2 (we assume
here k > 2, otherwise this proof is unnecessary). We distinguish five cases:8 (a) T1 = i2
and T2 = i1; (b) T1 = i2 and T2 6∈ {i1, i2}; (c) T1 6∈ {i1, i2} and T2 = i1; (d) T1, T2 6∈ {i1, i2}
and T1 = T2; (e) T1, T2 6∈ {i1, i2} and T1 6= T2 (only needed in case k > 3).
The cases (a) and (c) trivially lead to s(ai1) < s(ai2).
The case (b). It holds that Ki1 =
r
2
+ 1 (in case r is even) or Ki1 =
r + 1
2
(in case r is
odd) and, due to the fact that Vi1i2 >
r
2
, it follows that Ki2 = VT2i2 = r − Vi2T2 . We will
prove that the strict inequality
Ki2 − Vi1i2 +KT2 − Vi1T2 < Ki1 − Vi2i1 +KT2 − Vi2T2 (9.4)
holds, or, equivalently, in case r is even (the case r is odd is analogous),
Vi2i1 − Vi1i2 +
r
2
− 1− Vi1T2 < 0 .
This indeed holds due to the fact that Vi2i1 − Vi1i2 < 0 and VT2i1 ≤ VT1i1 ≤
r
2
+ 1. We
conclude that the strict inequality in Eq. (9.4) holds and, combining Eqs. (9.3) and (9.4),
it follows that s(ai1) < s(ai2).
The case (d). Let T = T1 = T2. We will prove that the strict inequality
Ki2 − Vi1i2 +KT − Vi1T < Ki1 − Vi2i1 +KT − Vi2T (9.5)
holds, or, equivalently,
Ki2 −Ki1 + Vi2i1 − Vi1i2 + Vi2T − Vi1T < 0 . (9.6)
Note that Ki1 = VT i1 or Ki1 =
r
2
+ 1 (in case r is even) or Ki1 =
r + 1
2
(in case r is
odd) and, due to the fact that Vi1i2 >
r
2
, it follows that Ki2 = VT i2 = r − Vi2T . In case
Ki1 = VT i1 = r − Vi1T , Eq. (9.6) leads to:
Vi2i1 − Vi1i2 + Vi2T − Vi1T < 0 .
8Note that the case where T1 = i1 and T2 = i2 does not need to be considered because Vii = 0.
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This indeed holds due to the fact that Vi2i1−Vi1i2 < 0 and VT i1 ≤ VT i2 . In case Ki1 =
r
2
+1
(the case Ki1 =
r + 1
2
is analogous), Eq. (9.6) leads to:
Vi2i1 − Vi1i2 +
r
2
− 1− Vi1T < 0 .
This indeed holds due to the fact that Vi2i1 − Vi1i2 < 0 and VT1i1 ≤
r
2
+ 1. We conclude
that the strict inequality in Eq. (9.5) holds and, combining Eqs. (9.3) and (9.5), it follows
that s(ai1) < s(ai2).
The case (e). We will prove that the strict inequality
Ki2 − Vi1i2 +KT1 − Vi1T1 +KT2 − Vi1T2 < Ki1 − Vi2i1 +KT1 − Vi2T1 +KT2 − Vi2T2 (9.7)
holds, or, equivalently,
Ki2 −Ki1 + Vi2i1 − Vi1i2 + Vi2T1 − Vi1T1 + Vi2T2 − Vi1T2 < 0 . (9.8)
Note that Ki1 = VT1i1 or Ki1 =
r
2
+ 1 (in case r is even) or Ki1 =
r + 1
2
(in case r is
odd) and, due to the fact that Vi1i2 >
r
2
, it follows that Ki2 = VT2i2 = r − Vi2T2 . In case
Ki1 = VT1i1 = r − Vi1T1 , Eq. (9.8) leads to:
Vi2i1 − Vi1i2 + Vi2T1 − Vi1T2 < 0 .
This indeed holds due to the fact that Vi2i1 − Vi1i2 < 0 and VT2i1 ≤ VT1i1 ≤ VT1i2 . In case
Ki1 =
r
2
+ 1 (the case Ki1 =
r + 1
2
is analogous), Eq. (9.8) leads to:
Vi2i1 − Vi1i2 + Vi2T1 − Vi1T2 +
r
2
− 1− Vi1T1 < 0 .
This indeed holds due to the fact that Vi2i1 − Vi1i2 < 0, VT2i1 ≤ VT1i1 ≤ VT1i2 and VT1i1 ≤
r
2
+ 1.
We conclude that the strict inequality in Eq. (9.7) holds and, combining Eqs. (9.3) and (9.7),
it follows that s(ai1) < s(ai2). 
The preceding proposition implies that the winner(s) needs to belong to the pairwisely
undominated set.
Corollary 9.70 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. It holds that A ⊆ UC.
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Corollary 9.71 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on C
given by the voters. If the pairwise winner aP exists, then it holds that s(aP ) = 0 < s(ai),
for any ai ∈ C \{aP}, and A = UC = {aP}.
Example 9.72 For the profile of rankings listed in Example 9.17, the scores associated
with each candidate are the following:
s(a) = 3 ,
s(b) = 5 ,
s(c) = 13 ,
s(d) = 12 .
Therefore, candidate a, which belongs to the pairwisely undominated set UC = {a, b},
should be considered the winner in Example 9.17.
For the profile of rankings listed in Example 9.24, the scores associated with each candidate
are the following:
s(a) = 100 ,
s(b) = 1 ,
s(c) = 52 ,
s(d) = 153 .
Therefore, candidate b, which belongs to the pairwisely undominated set UC = {a, b}, should
be considered the winner in Example 9.24.
In the following, we analyse some intuitive properties of the proposed method.
Proposition 9.73 Let C be a set of k candidates and R be the profile of r rankings on
C given by the voters. The search for the candidate(s) that minimizes Eq. (9.2)
(i) satisfies the non-dictatorship criterion, i.e., there is no voter whose winning
candidate is always elected winner;
(ii) satisfies the non-imposition criterion, i.e., every candidate can be elected win-
ner if unanimously desired by the group;
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(iii) satisfies the anonymity criterion, i.e., reassigning the rankings over the voters
does not change the outcome;
(iv) satisfies the neutrality criterion, i.e., if some permutation of the candidates is
applied to each voter’s ranking, the winner should be the result of this same permu-
tation;
(v) is not a Condorcet method (is not Condorcet consistent), i.e., the Condorcet
winner is not always elected the winner in case of existence;
(vi) is not Borda consistent, i.e., the Borda winner is not always elected the winner
in case of existence;
(vii) does not satisfy the majority criterion, i.e., the majority winner is not always
elected the winner in case of existence;
(viii) is not independent of clones, i.e., the winner could change due to the addition
of a non-winning candidate who is a clone of a candidate already present;
(ix) satisfies the monotonicity criterion, i.e., a winner remains a winner in case it
is raised in the rankings of some of the voters;
(x) does not satisfy the homogeneity criterion, i.e., the set of winning candidates
may not remain the same in case the rankings of the voters are repeated a finite
number of times.
Proof: Statements (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) are straightforward.
Statements (v) and (vii) follow from Example 9.24. As discussed in Example 9.72, the
winner for the profile of rankings given in Example 9.24 is candidate b, while candidate a
is the majority winner, and thus the Condorcet winner.
Statement (vi) follows from the following example. Consider the set of candidates C =
{a, b, c, d} and the profile of rankings shown in Table 9.15. The Borda winner is candidate
d, while the candidate minimizing Eq. (9.2) is candidate a.
Statement (viii) follows from the following example. Consider the set of candidates C =
{a, b, c} and the profile of rankings shown in Table 9.16 (left). Candidate a is the pairwise
winner, therefore it is the unique candidate minimizing Eq. (9.2). Nevertheless, if we add
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# i Rankings on C
8 a  b  c  d
5 a  c  b  d
5 b  d  c  a
5 c  d  b  a
5 d  b  a  c
5 d  c  a  b
1 d  a  b  c
Table 9.15: Frequency of the rankings on C = {a, b, c, d} expressed by 34
voters (statement (vi)).
a candidate d that is a clone of candidate b, the resulting profile will be the one shown in
Table 9.16 (right). The candidate minimizing Eq. (9.2) is now candidate b.
# i Rankings on C # i Rankings on C
2 a  b  c 2 a  b  d  c
1 a  c  b 1 a  c  b  d
1 b  a  c 1 b  d  a  c
1 b  c  a 1 b  d  c  a
1 c  a  b 1 c  a  b  d
1 c  b  a 1 c  b  d  a
Table 9.16: Frequency of the rankings on C = {a, b, c} (left) and on C =
{a, b, c, d} (right) expressed by 7 voters (statement (viii)).
Statement (ix). We prove that, after improving a winning candidate ai1 exactly one position
in one of the rankings, this candidate remains being a winner. The monotonicity criterion
would then be satisfied. Let us denote by S, V and K the terms related to the original
profile and by S ′, V ′ and K ′ the terms related to the profile obtained by raising candidate
ai1 exactly one position in one of the rankings. Suppose that there exists another candidate
ai2 satisfying that s(ai2) ≥ s(ai1), while S ′(ai2) < S ′(ai1). Note that it holds that∑
a`∈C \{ai1}
−Vi1` = −1 +
∑
a`∈C \{ai1}
−V ′i1` ,
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while ∑
a`∈C \{ai2}
−Vi2` ≥
∑
a`∈C \{ai2}
−V ′i2` .
This implies that, for S ′(ai2) < S
′(ai1) to hold, it should hold that
K ′i2 < Ki2 − 1 ,
which is a contradiction as the maximum of the i2-th column has increased at most one
unit.
Statement (x) follows from the following example. Consider the set of candidates C =
{a, b, c, d} and the profile of rankings shown in Table 9.17. The set of candidates minimizing
Eq. (9.2) is {a, b}. Nevertheless, in case we repeat the profile twice, the unique candidate
minimizing Eq. (9.2) is a. 
# i Rankings on C
4 b  a  d  c
2 c  a  b  d
1 a  c  d  b
1 b  c  a  d
1 c  a  d  b
1 d  c  b  a
Table 9.17: Frequency of the rankings on C = {a, b, c, d} expressed by 10
voters (statement (x)).
In this chapter, we have identified seven different types of winning candidates. A study
of the relations between all these types of winner has also been addressed. We concluded
this section by proposing a social choice rule based on the search for the pairwise winner,
resulting in a Borda-like method where a correction term is added to the Borda count.
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PART III
THE APPLICATION

CHAPTER 10
Case studies
The aggregation of rankings has been addressed in many scientific disciplines, including
medicine [91], consumer preference analysis [162], computer science [48], management sci-
ence [173] and social choice theory [6, 14]. Nevertheless, due to the natural interpretation
of the aggregation of rankings as a voting procedure, social choice theory is considered (one
of) the most prominent field of application. All these scientific disciplines represent some
of the possible large-scale applications of the contents of this dissertation. Indeed, the
theoretical development in this dissertation should be understood as a necessary tool for
proposing a solution for ranking all available alternatives/rankings, which is the ultimate
goal of this research.
Throughout this chapter, we analyse three different real-life problems: an ecosystem man-
agement problem where the goal is to rank four plans according to their perceived suit-
ability for the Lar rangeland in Iran; an environmental decision making problem where the
goal is to identify the best estimation method for the production of orange trees in the
Argentinian province of Corrientes; and a consumer preference analysis problem where the
goal is to check whether or not consumers are able to distinguish between different degrees
of spoilage of some cod fish samples at the Laboratory of Food Microbiology and Food
Preservation at Ghent University, Belgium. In each of the three cases, we search for all dif-
ferent consensus states and analyse the obtained results. Due to its natural interpretation,
the Kendall distance function is always considered in this chapter.
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10.1 Lar rangeland in Iran
The methodologies discussed in this dissertation are applied here to a dataset coming
from a decision making problem concerning the management of the Lar rangeland in Iran,
an area of great local economic, ecological and social importance. When drawing up
new management plans, the Iranian government asked r = 31 representatives of different
stakeholder groups to rank four plans according to their perceived suitability on different
criteria. For more details, we refer to [173].
10.1.1 The wildlife diversity criterion
In Table 10.1, we list the rankings given by the voters in the Lar rangeland decision
problem corresponding to the wildlife diversity criterion. We see that a majority of voters
has expressed the ranking a  b  c  d. However, an optimal ranking could differ from
the most frequent ranking.
# i Rankings on C
18 a  b  c  d
3 c  d  b  a
3 d  c  b  a
2 b  a  c  d
1 b  c  a  d
1 b  c  d  a
1 b  d  c  a
1 c  b  d  a
1 d  b  c  a
Table 10.1: Expressed rankings and their frequency for the Wildlife Diversity
Criterion in the Lar rangeland decision problem.
The scorix induced by the profile of rankings given by the voters is:
S =

18 2 1 10
5 20 6 0
4 5 22 0
4 4 2 21
 .
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We see that S is not (recursively) monotone w.r.t. any ranking on the set of candidates
due to the fact that the vector of positions of candidate a does not dominate the vector of
positions of candidate b (18 + 2 < 5 + 20) and, at the same time, the vector of positions of
candidate b does not dominate the vector of positions of candidate a (18 > 5).
The relation mB is given by:
mB = {(a, d), (b, c), (b, d), (c, d)} .
Evidently, mB is given by:
mB = {(a, a), (a, d), (b, b), (b, c), (b, d), (c, c), (c, d), (d, d)} .
Figure 10.1 displays the Hasse diagram of the order relation mB. Note that the quasiposi-
tionally undominated set is here given by UB = {a, b}.
•a
•d
• c
• b
Figure 10.1: Hasse diagram of the order relation mB.
Similarly, the relation mR is given by:
mR = {(a, d), (c, d)} .
Evidently, mR is given by:
mR = {(a, a), (a, d), (b, b), (c, c), (c, d), (d, d)} .
Figure 10.2 displays the Hasse diagram of the order relation mR. Note that the positionally
undominated set is here given by UB = {a, b, c}.
In Table 10.2, the costs of imposing monotonicity and recursive monotonicity on the scorix
w.r.t. each possible ranking are listed. We conclude that a  b  c  d is the ranking
w.r.t. which the closest profile of rankings with a monotone scorix and the closest profile of
rankings with a recursively monotone scorix lead to the lowest cost (11 and 14). Of course,
the ranking a  b  c  d linearly extends the strict partial order relation given by mB.
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•a
•d
• c
• b
Figure 10.2: Hasse diagram of the order relation mR.
Ranking Cost S Cost RS Ranking Cost S Cost RS
a  b  c  d 11 14 c  a  b  d 21 25
a  b  d  c 20 21 c  a  d  b 33 35
a  c  b  d 17 21 c  b  a  d 18 23
a  c  d  b 28 32 c  b  d  a 34 39
a  d  b  c 28 31 c  d  a  b 39 42
a  d  c  b 28 34 c  d  b  a 40 45
b  a  c  d 15 15 d  a  b  c 38 40
b  a  d  c 19 19 d  a  c  b 39 42
b  c  a  d 17 21 d  b  a  c 39 42
b  c  d  a 30 31 d  b  c  a 41 45
b  d  a  c 29 29 d  c  a  b 41 46
b  d  c  a 33 35 d  c  b  a 41 48
Table 10.2: Cost of a closest profile of rankings with a monotone scorix (Cost
S) and with a recursively monotone scorix (Cost RS) w.r.t. each possible
ranking on C .
As expected due to Theorem 5.13, the cost of imposing monotonicity on the scorix is
always lower than or equal to the cost of imposing recursive monotonicity on the scorix.
Nevertheless, the fact that the cost of imposing monotonicity on the scorix w.r.t. a ranking
 is lower than the cost of imposing recursive monotonicity on the scorix w.r.t. another
ranking ′ does not imply that the cost of imposing recursive monotonicity on the scorix
w.r.t.  is lower than the cost of imposing monotonicity w.r.t. ′. For instance, the cost
of imposing monotonicity on the scorix w.r.t. the ranking c  b  a  d (18) is lower than
the cost of imposing monotonicity on the scorix w.r.t. the ranking a  b  d  c (20);
nevertheless, the cost of imposing recursive monotonicity on the scorix w.r.t. the ranking
c  b  a  d (23) is greater than the cost of imposing recursive monotonicity on the
scorix w.r.t. the ranking a  b  d  c (21).
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In Table 10.3, a closest profile of rankings with a monotone scorix (left) w.r.t. the ranking
a  b  c  d and a closest profile of rankings with a recursively monotone scorix (right)
w.r.t. the ranking a  b  c  d are shown.
# i Rankings on C # i Rankings on C
18 a  b  c  d 16 a  b  c  d
2 b  a  c  d 3 b  a  c  d
2 b  d  a  c 2 a  b  d  c
2 c  d  b  a 2 c  a  d  b
2 d  c  a  b 1 b  c  d  a
1 b  c  a  d 1 b  d  c  a
1 c  a  b  d 1 c  b  d  a
1 c  a  d  b 1 c  d  a  b
1 d  a  b  c 1 d  a  b  c
1 d  c  b  a 1 d  a  c  b
1 d  b  a  c
1 d  c  b  a
Table 10.3: Closest profile of rankings with a monotone scorix (left) and with
a recursively monotone scorix (right) w.r.t. the ranking a  b  c  d.
The scorix induced by the closest profile of rankings with a recursively monotone scorix
listed in Table 10.3 is the following:
S ′ =

18 7 2 4
5 20 2 4
4 2 21 4
4 2 6 19
 .
We easily see that S ′ is monotone w.r.t. the ranking a  b  c  d. The four sub-scorices
associated with the restriction of the profile of rankings to a subset of the set of candidates
of cardinality three are the following:
Sabc =
20 7 46 21 4
5 3 23
 ,
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which is monotone w.r.t. a  b  c;
Sabd =
20 6 56 20 5
5 5 21
 ,
which is monotone w.r.t. a  b  d;
Sacd =
21 5 55 21 5
5 5 21
 ,
which is monotone w.r.t. a  c  d; and
Sbcd =
23 3 54 22 5
4 6 21
 ,
which is monotone w.r.t. b  c  d.
In order to prove the monotonicity of the six sub-scorices associated with the restriction
of the profile of rankings to a subset of the set of candidates of cardinality two, it suffices
to see that a  b  c  d is a weak Condorcet ranking (Lemma 5.11). The votrix induced
by the closest profile of rankings with a recursively monotone scorix listed in Table 10.3 is
the following:
V ′ =

0 23 24 23
8 0 25 24
7 6 0 24
8 7 7 0
 .
As a  b  c  d is a ranking such that every candidate is preferred by not less than half of
the voters to all the candidates ranked at a worse position, we conclude that a  b  c  d
is a weak Condorcet ranking. Therefore, the six sub-scorices associated with the restriction
of the profile of rankings to a subset of the set of candidates of cardinality two are monotone.
We conclude that S ′ is recursively monotone1 w.r.t. a  b  c  d.
The votrix induced by the profile of rankings given by the voters is:
V =

0 18 20 21
13 0 24 24
11 7 0 26
10 7 5 0
 .
1S′ actually is strictly recursively monotone w.r.t. a  b  c  d.
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We see that V is not monotone w.r.t. any ranking on the set of candidates due to the fact
that a  b  c  d is the Condorcet ranking but, at the same time, Vad = 21 < 24 = Vbd.
The relation mC is given by:
mC = {(a, d), (b, d), (c, d)} .
Evidently, mC is given by:
mC = {(a, a), (a, d), (b, b), (b, d), (c, c), (c, d), (d, d)} .
Figure 10.3 displays the Hasse diagram of the order relation mC .
•a
•d
• c• b
Figure 10.3: Hasse diagram of the order relation mC .
Note that the pairwisely undominated set is here given by UC = {a, b, c}. Applying the
Borda-like social choice function introduced at the end of Chapter 9, the scores associated
with each candidate are the following:
s(a) = 9 ,
s(b) = 5 ,
s(c) = 16 ,
s(d) = 36 .
Therefore, candidate b is the winning candidate according to the search for a pairwise
winner.
The votex induced by the profile of rankings given by the voters is:
W : C 26= −→ {0, . . . , 31}6 W : C 26= −→ {0, . . . , 31}6
W (a, b) = (2, 3, 8, 18, 0, 0) W (b, c) = (0, 3, 4, 21, 3, 0)
W (a, c) = (4, 4, 3, 2, 18, 0) W (b, d) = (0, 3, 4, 2, 19, 3)
W (a, d) = (4, 4, 2, 1, 2, 18) W (c, d) = (0, 1, 4, 24, 2, 0)
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As the votrix is not monotone w.r.t. any ranking on the set of candidates, we conclude
that the votex induced by the profile of rankings given by the voters is not monotone w.r.t.
any ranking either (see Theorem 5.23).
In Table 10.4, the costs of imposing monotonicity on the votrix and on the votex w.r.t.
each possible ranking are listed. We conclude that b  a  c  d is the ranking w.r.t.
which the closest profile of rankings with a monotone votrix leads to the lowest cost (8),
while a  b  c  d is the ranking w.r.t. which the closest profile of rankings with a
monotone votex leads to the lowest cost (16). As expected due to Theorem 5.23, the cost
of imposing monotonicity on the votrix is always lower than or equal to the cost of imposing
monotonicity on the votex. Nevertheless, the ranking leading to the lowest cost does not
need to coincide for both the search for monotonicity of the votrix and of the votex, as can
be seen in this example. Note that both a  b  c  d and b  a  c  d linearly extend
the strict partial order relation given by mC .
Ranking Cost V Cost W Ranking Cost V Cost W
a  b  c  d 9 16 c  a  b  d 19 33
a  b  d  c 18 26 c  a  d  b 36 41
a  c  b  d 16 25 c  b  a  d 17 29
a  c  d  b 31 36 c  b  d  a 41 41
a  d  b  c 31 39 c  d  a  b 41 46
a  d  c  b 32 40 c  d  b  a 42 47
b  a  c  d 8 21 d  a  b  c 36 45
b  a  d  c 15 30 d  a  c  b 41 46
b  c  a  d 18 29 d  b  a  c 37 46
b  c  d  a 32 37 d  b  c  a 42 48
b  d  a  c 32 39 d  c  a  b 42 48
b  d  c  a 33 41 d  c  b  a 43 48
Table 10.4: Cost of a closest profile of rankings with a monotone votrix (Cost
V) and with a monotone votex (Cost W) w.r.t. each possible ranking on C .
In Table 10.5, a closest profile of rankings with a monotone votrix (left) w.r.t. the ranking
b  a  c  d and a closest profile of rankings with a monotone votex (right) w.r.t. the
ranking a  b  c  d are shown.
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# i Rankings on C # i Rankings on C
11 a  b  c  d 17 a  b  c  d
5 b  a  c  d 2 b  a  c  d
4 a  b  d  c 1 a  b  d  c
3 c  d  b  a 1 a  c  b  d
3 d  c  b  a 1 a  d  c  b
2 b  d  c  a 1 b  c  a  d
1 b  c  a  d 1 b  c  d  a
1 c  b  d  a 1 b  d  a  c
1 d  b  c  a 1 c  a  b  d
1 c  a  d  b
1 c  d  b  a
1 d  a  c  b
1 d  b  a  c
1 d  c  b  a
Table 10.5: Closest profile of rankings with a monotone votrix (left) w.r.t. the
ranking b  a  c  d and with a monotone votex (right) w.r.t. the ranking
a  b  c  d.
The votrix associated with the closest profile of rankings with a monotone votrix listed in
Table 10.5 is the following:
V ′ =

0 15 20 21
16 0 24 24
11 7 0 21
10 7 10 0
 .
We easily see that V ′ is monotone w.r.t. the ranking b  a  c  d.
Analogously, the votex associated with the closest profile of rankings with a monotone
votex listed in Table 10.5 is the following:
W ′ : C 26= −→ {0, . . . , 31}6 W ′ : C 26= −→ {0, . . . , 31}6
W (a, b) = (1, 2, 5, 19, 3, 1) W (b, c) = (1, 2, 4, 19, 4, 1)
W (a, c) = (1, 2, 3, 6, 18, 1) W (b, d) = (1, 2, 3, 4, 18, 3)
W (a, d) = (1, 2, 3, 3, 4, 18) W (c, d) = (1, 2, 3, 21, 3, 1)
We easily see that W ′ is monotone w.r.t. the ranking a  b  c  d.
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Figure 10.4 displays the given profile of rankings represented on the diagram of w≥ (where
 represents the ranking a  b  c  d). Note that the profile of rankings is not monotone
w.r.t. the ranking a  b  c  d. As a  b  c  d is the most frequent ranking, the
profile of rankings cannot be monotone w.r.t. any other ranking on the set of candidates.
Nevertheless, although there are some violations of monotonicity, the cost of imposing
monotonicity w.r.t. the ranking a  b  c  d should be ‘low’.
18× abcd
2× bacd 0× acbd 0× abdc
1× bcad 0× cabd 0× badc 0× acdb 0× adbc
0× cbad 1× bcda 0× bdac 0× cadb 0× adcb 0× dabc
1× cbda 1× bdca 0× cdab 0× dbac 0× dacb
3× cdba 1× dbca 0× dcab
3× dcba
Figure 10.4: Frequencies of Table 10.1 represented on the Hasse diagram of
the order relation w≥ for the ranking a  b  c  d.
In Table 10.6, the costs of imposing monotonicity on the profile w.r.t. each possible ranking
are listed. We conclude that a  b  c  d is the ranking w.r.t. which the closest monotone
profile of rankings leads to the lowest cost (19).
Figure 10.5 displays the closest monotone profile of rankings w.r.t. the ranking a  b 
c  d represented on the diagram of w≥ (where  represents the ranking a  b  c  d).
As it is decreasing on the diagram, we clearly see that this profile of rankings is monotone
w.r.t. the ranking a  b  c  d.
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Ranking Cost Ranking Cost Ranking Cost Ranking Cost
a  b  c  d 19 b  a  c  d 20 c  a  b  d 26 d  a  b  c 38
a  b  d  c 29 b  a  d  c 28 c  a  d  b 35 d  a  c  b 45
a  c  b  d 25 b  c  a  d 24 c  b  a  d 30 d  b  a  c 42
a  c  d  b 32 b  c  d  a 30 c  b  d  a 35 d  b  c  a 44
a  d  b  c 36 b  d  a  c 33 c  d  a  b 40 d  c  a  b 49
a  d  c  b 41 b  d  c  a 37 c  d  b  a 43 d  c  b  a 52
Table 10.6: Cost of a closest monotone profile of rankings w.r.t. each possible
ranking on C .
16× abcd
1× bacd 1× acbd 1× abdc
1× bcad 1× cabd 1× badc 1× acdb 0× adbc
1× cbad 1× bcda 1× bdac 1× cadb 0× adcb 0× dabc
1× cbda 1× bdca 1× cdab 0× dbac 0× dacb
1× cdba 0× dbca 0× dcab
0× dcba
Figure 10.5: Frequencies of the closest monotone profile of rankings w.r.t. a 
b  c  d represented on the Hasse diagram of the order relation w≥.
The last analysis for the Lar rangeland problem is linked to the search for a Condorcet
ranking, acclamation and unanimity. As previously discussed, the ranking a  b  c  d
is the Condorcet ranking for the profile of rankings given by the voters. Obviously, the
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ranking that leads to the lowest cost (zero) when searching for a Condorcet ranking is the
ranking a  b  c  d. Under the existence of a Condorcet ranking, the ranking that leads
to the lowest cost (53) when searching for unanimity (which is the winner according to the
method of Kemeny) always coincides with this Condorcet ranking. It remains to identify
the ranking that leads to the lowest cost when searching for acclamation.
In Table 10.7, the costs associated with the search for a Condorcet ranking, acclamation
and unanimity w.r.t. each possible ranking are listed. We conclude that a  b  c  d is
the ranking that leads to the lowest cost in all three cases.
Ranking Cost C Cost A Cost U Ranking Cost C Cost A Cost U
a  b  c  d 0 22 53 c  a  b  d 14 34 79
a  b  d  c 11 31 74 c  a  d  b 23 41 96
a  c  b  d 9 28 70 c  b  a  d 17 32 84
a  c  d  b 18 40 87 c  b  d  a 23 44 95
a  d  b  c 20 41 91 c  d  a  b 29 49 107
a  d  c  b 29 43 108 c  d  b  a 32 50 112
b  a  c  d 3 25 58 d  a  b  c 26 48 102
b  a  d  c 14 32 79 d  a  c  b 35 49 119
b  c  a  d 8 31 67 d  b  a  c 29 49 107
b  c  d  a 14 40 78 d  b  c  a 34 53 116
b  d  a  c 20 42 90 d  c  a  b 40 52 128
b  d  c  a 25 44 99 d  c  b  a 43 54 133
Table 10.7: Cost of a closest profile with a Condorcet ranking (Cost C), a
closest acclaimed profile (Cost A) and a closest unanimous profile (Cost U)
w.r.t. each possible ranking on C .
As expected due to Theorem 5.32, the cost associated with the search for a Condorcet rank-
ing is always lower than or equal to the cost associated with the search for acclamation.
As also expected due to Theorem 5.32, the cost associated with the search for acclamation
is always lower than or equal to the cost associated with the search for unanimity. Never-
theless, as discussed in Chapter 7, the ranking leading to the lowest cost does not need to
coincide for the three searches, although this is the case in this example.
We conclude this section by analysing the optimal ranking w.r.t. the search for each of
the considered consensus states. Note that, as listed in Table 10.8, the optimal ranking
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according to the search for all consensus states - but monotonicity of the votrix - is the
ranking a  b  c  d. Note that the optimal ranking according to the search for
monotonicity of the votrix is the ranking b  a  c  d.
Search for Optimal ranking Search for Optimal ranking
Monotone scorix a  b  c  d Rec. monotone scorix a  b  c  d
Monotone votrix b  a  c  d Monotone votex a  b  c  d
Monotone profile a  b  c  d Condorcet ranking a  b  c  d
Acclamation a  b  c  d Unanimity a  b  c  d
Table 10.8: Optimal ranking w.r.t. the search for all the considered consensus
states.
From the results of this case study it follows that the ranking a  b  c  d seems to be
the most natural ranking of the four plans proposed for the Lar rangeland. After all, it is
the optimal ranking according to the search for seven out of eight consensus states and it
is only one unit of cost away from being optimal according to the other one.
For this case study, there does not exist a unanimous winner. A quasipositional winner, a
positional winner or a pairwise winner does not exist either. However, the majority winner,
the Condorcet winner and the Borda winner exist. Candidate a is both the majority winner
and the Condorcet winner, while candidate b is the Borda winner.
10.1.2 Allowing for ties
For the four available plans in the Lar rangeland problem, some representatives of the
stakeholder groups considered that, sometimes, two or more plans were almost equally
suitable for the management of the rangeland. In order to prevent them from taking an
arbitrary decision when ranking the plans, the representatives of the stakeholder groups
were also asked to provide rankings with ties whenever they considered one candidate was
as equally suitable as another candidate. This profile of rankings with ties is listed in
Table 10.9.
At this point, the goal is to look for the set of (weak/total)-optimal rankings. In Ta-
ble 10.10, the cost associated to a closest profile of rankings and to a closest profile of
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# %i Ranking with ties # %i Ranking with ties
7 a  b  c  d 6 a ∼ b ∼ c ∼ d
3 a  b  c ∼ d 3 a  b ∼ c ∼ d
3 a ∼ b  c  d 2 c ∼ d  a ∼ b
1 a ∼ b  c ∼ d 1 c  a ∼ b ∼ d
1 c  d  a ∼ b 1 b  a  c  d
1 d  c  b  a 1 d  a ∼ b ∼ c
1 b  c  a ∼ d
Table 10.9: Expressed rankings with ties and their frequency for the Wildlife
Diversity Criterion in the Lar rangeland decision problem.
rankings with ties with a monotone representation of votes w.r.t. each possible ranking
and its associated cost are listed.
As expected due to Proposition 8.40, the cost associated to a closest profile of rankings
with ties with a monotone weak-scorix/votrix/votex is always lower than or equal to the
cost of a closest profile of rankings with a monotone scorix/votrix/votex. Furthermore, as
monotonicity of the votex implies monotonicity of the votrix [124], the cost associated to
the (weak-)votrix is always lower than or equal to the cost associated to the (weak-)votex.
We conclude that the ranking a  b  c  d clearly is the weak-optimal ranking considering
either the monotonicity of the scorix, votrix or votex. Nevertheless, we see that, although it
still is the total-optimal ranking considering either the monotonicity of the scorix, votrix or
votex, there are also other total-optimal rankings. This is due to the fact that the minimum
cost of changing the given profile of rankings with ties into an arbitrary profile of rankings
(without ties) equals 32.5. In that way, we impose, with a minimum cost, monotonicity on
the scorix w.r.t. the rankings a  b  c  d, a  b  d  c and a  c  b  d and on the
votrix w.r.t. the rankings a  b  c  d, a  b  d  c, b  a  c  d and b  a  d  c.
This is caused due to the six appearances of the ranking with ties a ∼ b ∼ c ∼ d in the
profile of rankings with ties given by the experts.
In Table 10.11, the cost associated to a closest ∗-monotone2 profile of rankings with ties
w.r.t. each possible ranking and its associated cost are listed. We note that the compar-
2The notation ∗-monotone is a shorthand for referring to any of w≥-monotone, w≥O↑-monotone, w≥O↓-
monotone, w≥O-monotone, w≥S↑-monotone, w≥S↓-monotone or w≥S-monotone.
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Ranking Cost WS Cost TS Cost WV Cost TV Cost WW Cost TW
a  b  c  d 1.5 32.5 3.5 32.5 9 32.5
a  b  d  c 7 32.5 7.5 32.5 14 34.5
a  c  b  d 7.5 32.5 10.5 33.5 17.5 36.5
a  c  d  b 16.5 34.5 19.5 34.5 23.5 41.5
a  d  b  c 17 35.5 21 33.5 25 41.5
a  d  c  b 17 36.5 20 34.5 25 43.5
b  a  c  d 8 33.5 8.5 32.5 14 34.5
b  a  d  c 13.5 33.5 13.5 32.5 19.5 35.5
b  c  a  d 16.5 37.5 20 35.5 24.5 41.5
b  c  d  a 27 41.5 29 38.5 32.5 48.5
b  d  a  c 25.5 39.5 29 36.5 32 45.5
b  d  c  a 27.5 43.5 29 38.5 33 48.5
c  a  b  d 16 35.5 18.5 36.5 23 41.5
c  a  d  b 24.5 39.5 25.5 39.5 29 46.5
c  b  a  d 16.5 37.5 18.5 36.5 24 43.5
c  b  d  a 29 42.5 34.5 39.5 34.5 50.5
c  d  a  b 29.5 43.5 34.5 40.5 35.5 51.5
c  d  b  a 29.5 44.5 34.5 40.5 35.5 52.5
d  a  b  c 27 40.5 29.5 37.5 33 47.5
d  a  c  b 29 43.5 34.5 39.5 34.5 50.5
d  b  a  c 27.5 42.5 29.5 37.5 34 48.5
d  b  c  a 29.5 46.5 34.5 39.5 37 53.5
d  c  a  b 29.5 45.5 34.5 40.5 35.5 52.5
d  c  b  a 29.5 46.5 34.5 40.5 36.5 53.5
Table 10.10: Cost of a closest profile of rankings (with ties) with a monotone
weak-scorix (Cost WS), with a monotone scorix (Cost TS), with a monotone
weak-votrix (Cost WV), with a monotone votrix (Cost V), with a monotone
weak-votex (Cost WW) and with a monotone votex (Cost TW) w.r.t. each
possible ranking on C .
ison of costs in different columns respects the relations between different order relations
illustrated in Figure 8.13.
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Ranking Cost w≥ Cost w≥O↑ Cost w≥O↓ Cost w≥O Cost w≥S↑ Cost w≥S↓ Cost w≥S
a  b  c  d 25.5 8.5 22.5 8.5 5.5 21.5 5.5
a  b  d  c 32.5 14 29.5 14 11.5 29 11
a  c  b  d 29 10.5 27.5 10.5 9.5 25.5 9.5
a  c  d  b 29.5 13.5 29.5 13.5 7 26 7
a  d  b  c 36 19 32.5 19 11.5 31.5 11
a  d  c  b 34.5 16 33 16 12.5 32 12.5
b  a  c  d 30.5 11.5 28 11.5 10.5 26.5 10.5
b  a  d  c 36.5 17 32.5 17 13 32 13
b  c  a  d 34 17.5 31.5 17.5 11 29.5 11
b  c  d  a 37.5 16.5 36.5 16.5 9.5 32 9.5
b  d  a  c 37.5 21 35 21 16.5 34 16.5
b  d  c  a 42.5 17.5 41.5 17.5 14.5 37.5 14.5
c  a  b  d 32 13 30.5 13 7.5 29 7.5
c  a  d  b 36.5 22 34 22 13.5 33 13.5
c  b  a  d 35 15 33.5 15 11.5 32 11.5
c  b  d  a 41.5 25.5 40 25.5 23.5 36.5 23.5
c  d  a  b 39.5 27 38 27 19.5 37.5 19
c  d  b  a 49.5 30 46 30 23.5 41 23.5
d  a  b  c 40 16 37 16 8 34.5 8
d  a  c  b 42.5 25 40 25 23.5 38.5 23.5
d  b  a  c 41.5 17.5 40 17.5 12 38 12
d  b  c  a 50 35.5 48 35 34 44 33
d  c  a  b 50 30 47 30 23.5 43 23.5
d  c  b  a 61 36.5 51 36.5 34.5 49 34.5
Table 10.11: Cost of a closest ∗-monotone profile of rankings with ties w.r.t.
each possible ranking on C .
We conclude that the ranking a  b  c  d is the ranking that is the closest to imposing
all types of ∗-monotonicity.
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10.2 Orange harvest in Argentina
In this section, the proposed methodology is illustrated on a decision making problem
concerning the orange harvest in the Argentinian province of Corrientes. The farmers
of this province have four different methods (from now on referred to as candidates and
denoted by a, b, c and d) to estimate the production of an orange tree based on, among
other factors, the amount of fallen pieces of fruit and the volume of its crown. Although
the original number of orange trees in the considered orchards equals 2462, as part of a
preliminary process of data cleaning, trees with a missing value for at least one of the
methods were disregarded, yielding estimates for 1565 trees for further analysis.
In order to reduce the cost associated with the estimation, all these factors are measured
inaccurately, leading to estimates with a varying degree of error. A quick glance at the
data shows that the average production of each tree equals 586.51, while the average
estimation error embarrassingly equals 378.79. The number of outliers is overwhelming.
Rather than being the exception, they may be considered the standard. This issue hinders
the ranking of the methods by means of techniques based on the analysis of the estimation
errors. Therefore, the farmers tend to disregard the value of the estimates and exclusively
consider the ordinal part of the data.
After the harvest, farmers ranked the four considered methods according to how accurate
they were estimating the production of each tree. The final goal is to rank the four methods
according to their accuracy for estimating the production of the local orange trees in order
to decide what method should be used during the next harvest season. In that way, we do
not consider here a voting problem where each voter expresses his/her personal preferences
on the set of candidates, but an identification problem where the goal is to recognize the
unknown true ranking on the set of candidates. For more details, we refer to [45].
In Table 10.12, the expressed r = 1565 rankings and their frequency are provided. Note
that the profile of rankings is not monotone w.r.t. any ranking on the set of candidates.
It should be remarked that the most frequent ranking in the profile is the ranking c  d 
b  a. However, as the profile of rankings is not monotone w.r.t. any ranking on the set
of candidates, the optimal ranking could differ from the most frequent ranking. It should
also be remarked that, as we observe from the low values of the first column and the two
first rows of Table 10.12, method a clearly is less accurate than the other three methods.
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Ranking Freq. Ranking Freq. Ranking Freq. Ranking Freq.
a  b  c  d 3 b  a  c  d 8 c  a  b  d 10 d  a  b  c 6
a  b  d  c 2 b  a  d  c 11 c  a  d  b 17 d  a  c  b 12
a  c  b  d 1 b  c  a  d 76 c  b  a  d 98 d  b  a  c 71
a  c  d  b 0 b  c  d  a 135 c  b  d  a 165 d  b  c  a 148
a  d  b  c 1 b  d  a  c 60 c  d  a  b 113 d  c  a  b 111
a  d  c  b 0 b  d  c  a 134 c  d  b  a 204 d  c  b  a 179
Table 10.12: Expressed rankings and their frequency for the orange harvest
problem in the Argentinian province of Corrientes.
The scorix induced by the profile of rankings given by the voters is:
S =

7 64 529 965
424 487 401 253
607 502 305 151
527 512 330 196
 .
We easily see that S is monotone w.r.t. the ranking c  d  b  a. Actually, S is
recursively monotone w.r.t. c  d  b  a.
The relation mB is given by:
mB = {(b, a), (c, a), (c, b), (c, d), (d, a), (d, b)} .
Actually, mB is the ranking c  d  b  a. This result follows from the fact that the
scorix is monotone w.r.t. the ranking c  d  b  a. We conclude that candidate c is the
quasipositional winner.
Evidently, mB is given by:
mB = {(a, a), (b, a), (b, b), (c, a), (c, b), (c, c), (c, d), (d, a), (d, b), (d, d)} .
Figure 10.6 displays the Hasse diagram of the order relation mB. Note that the quasiposi-
tionally undominated set is here given by UB = {c}.
Similarly, the relation mR is given by:
mR = {(b, a), (c, a), (c, b), (c, d), (d, a), (d, b)} .
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•a
•d
•c
•b
Figure 10.6: Hasse diagram of the order relation mB.
Actually, mR is the ranking c  d  b  a. This result follows from the fact that the scorix
is recursively monotone w.r.t. the ranking c  d  b  a. We conclude that candidate c is
the positional winner.
Evidently, mR is given by:
mR = {(a, a), (b, a), (b, b), (c, a), (c, b), (c, c), (c, d), (d, a), (d, b), (d, d)} .
Figure 10.7 displays the Hasse diagram of the order relation mR. Note that the positionally
undominated set is here given by UR = {c}.
•a
•d
•c
•b
Figure 10.7: Hasse diagram of the order relation mR.
In Table 10.13, the costs of imposing monotonicity and recursive monotonicity on the scorix
w.r.t. each possible ranking are listed. Obviously, as the scorix is already monotone w.r.t.
this ranking, we conclude that c  d  b  a is the ranking w.r.t. which the closest profile
of rankings with a (recursively) monotone scorix leads to the lowest cost (zero).
Note that, as expected due to Theorem 5.13, the cost of imposing monotonicity on the
scorix is always lower than or equal to the cost of imposing recursive monotonicity on the
scorix. We also note that all rankings where candidate a is not ranked at the last position
lead to a really big cost.
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Ranking Cost S Cost RS Ranking Cost S Cost RS
a  b  c  d 1671 1925 c  a  b  d 1457 1702
a  b  d  c 1671 1928 c  a  d  b 1457 1582
a  c  b  d 1671 1878 c  b  a  d 1375 1399
a  c  d  b 1671 1777 c  b  d  a 151 151
a  d  b  c 1671 1926 c  d  a  b 1185 1185
a  d  c  b 1671 1845 c  d  b  a 0 0
b  a  c  d 1605 1889 d  a  b  c 1525 1845
b  a  d  c 1605 1925 d  a  c  b 1525 1690
b  c  a  d 1410 1523 d  b  a  c 1492 1531
b  c  d  a 283 313 d  b  c  a 262 288
b  d  a  c 1508 1605 d  c  a  b 1195 1239
b  d  c  a 283 356 d  c  b  a 104 105
Table 10.13: Cost of a closest profile of rankings with a monotone scorix
(Cost S) and with a recursively monotone scorix (Cost RS) w.r.t. each possible
ranking on C .
The votrix induced by the profile of rankings given by the voters is:
V =

0 276 175 227
1289 0 655 703
1390 910 0 830
1338 862 735 0
 .
We see that V is monotone w.r.t. the ranking c  d  b  a.
The relation mC is given by:
mC = {(b, a), (c, a), (c, b), (c, d), (d, a), (d, b)} .
Actually, mC is the ranking c  d  b  a. This result follows from the fact that the
votrix is monotone w.r.t. the ranking c  d  b  a. We conclude that candidate c is the
pairwise winner.
Evidently, mC is given by:
mC = {(a, a), (b, a), (b, b), (c, a), (c, b), (c, c), (c, d), (d, a), (d, b), (d, d)} .
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•a
•d
•c
•b
Figure 10.8: Hasse diagram of the order relation mC .
Figure 10.8 displays the Hasse diagram of the order relation mC .
Note that the pairwisely undominated set is here given by UC = {c}.
The votex induced by the profile of rankings given by the voters is:
W : C 26= −→ {0, . . . , 1565}6
W (a, b) = (269, 449, 571, 245, 31, 0)
W (a, c) = (369, 525, 496, 152, 20, 3)
W (a, d) = (327, 520, 491, 203, 20, 4)
W (b, c) = (130, 325, 455, 369, 215, 71)
W (b, d) = (123, 298, 441, 372, 247, 84)
W (c, d) = (77, 221, 437, 463, 259, 108)
Although the votrix is monotone w.r.t. the ranking c  d  b  a, the votex is not
monotone w.r.t. any ranking. Note that the votex is not monotone w.r.t. the ranking
c  d  b  a since candidate b is never ranked at the last position at the same time that
a is ranked at the first position, but candidate c is ranked three times at the last position
at the same time that a is ranked at the first position. As the votrix is only monotone
w.r.t. the ranking c  d  b  a, the votex cannot be monotone w.r.t. any other ranking
on the set of candidates (see Theorem 5.23).
In Table 10.14, the costs of imposing monotonicity on the votrix and on the votex w.r.t.
each possible ranking are listed. Note that, as expected due to Theorem 5.23, the cost
of imposing monotonicity on the votrix is always lower than or equal to the cost of im-
posing monotonicity on the votex. We conclude that c  d  b  a is the ranking w.r.t.
which the closest profile of rankings with a monotone votrix/votex leads to the lowest cost
(zero/three).
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Ranking Cost V Cost W Ranking Cost V Cost W
a  b  c  d 1926 1927 c  a  b  d 1703 1703
a  b  d  c 1927 1928 c  a  d  b 1702 1702
a  c  b  d 1925 1925 c  b  a  d 1702 1702
a  c  d  b 1845 1845 c  b  d  a 209 211
a  d  b  c 1926 1927 c  d  a  b 1463 1463
a  d  c  b 1846 1846 c  d  b  a 0 3
b  a  c  d 1925 1926 d  a  b  c 1846 1846
b  a  d  c 1926 1927 d  a  c  b 1845 1845
b  c  a  d 1830 1830 d  b  a  c 1845 1845
b  c  d  a 356 356 d  b  c  a 356 356
b  d  a  c 1925 1925 d  c  a  b 1511 1511
b  d  c  a 357 357 d  c  b  a 148 148
Table 10.14: Cost of a closest profile of rankings with a monotone votrix
(Cost V) and with a monotone votex (Cost W) w.r.t. each possible ranking
on C .
Figure 10.9 displays the given profile of rankings represented on the diagram of w≥ (where
 represents the ranking c  d  b  a). Note that the profile of rankings is not monotone
w.r.t. the ranking c  d  b  a. As c  d  b  a is the most frequent ranking, the
profile of rankings cannot be monotone w.r.t. any other ranking on the set of candidates.
Nevertheless, although there are some violations of monotonicity, the cost of imposing
monotonicity w.r.t. the ranking c  d  b  a should be ‘low’.
In Table 10.15, the costs of imposing monotonicity on the profile w.r.t. each possible ranking
are listed. We conclude that c  d  b  a is the ranking w.r.t. which the closest monotone
profile of rankings leads to the lowest cost (five).
The last analysis for the orange harvest problem is linked to the search for a Condorcet
ranking, acclamation and unanimity. As the votrix induced by the profile of rankings given
by the voters is monotone w.r.t. the ranking c  d  b  a, the ranking c  d  b  a
is the Condorcet ranking for the profile of rankings given by the voters. Obviously, the
ranking that leads to the lowest cost (zero) when searching for a Condorcet ranking is the
ranking c  d  b  a. Under the existence of a Condorcet ranking, the ranking that leads
to the lowest cost (2771) when searching for unanimity (which is the winner according
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204× cdba
179× dcba 165× cbda 113× cdab
148× dbca 135× bcda 111× dcab 98× cbad 17× cadb
134× bdca 71× dbac 12× dacb 76× bcad 10× cabd 0× acdb
60× bdac 6× dabc 8× bacd 0× adcb 1× acbd
11× badc 1× adbc 3× abcd
2× abdc
Figure 10.9: Frequencies of Table 10.12 represented on the Hasse diagram of
the order relation w≥ for the ranking c  d  b  a.
Ranking Cost Ranking Cost Ranking Cost Ranking Cost
a  b  c  d 1883 b  a  c  d 1374 c  a  b  d 973 d  a  b  c 1216
a  b  d  c 1931 b  a  d  c 1424 c  a  d  b 891 d  a  c  b 1086
a  c  b  d 1712 b  c  a  d 669 c  b  a  d 593 d  b  a  c 788
a  c  d  b 1676 b  c  d  a 139 c  b  d  a 46 d  b  c  a 105
a  d  b  c 1852 b  d  a  c 840 c  d  a  b 341 d  c  a  b 367
a  d  c  b 1699 b  d  c  a 161 c  d  b  a 6 d  c  b  a 20
Table 10.15: Cost of a closest monotone profile of rankings w.r.t. each possible
ranking on C .
to the method of Kemeny) always coincides with this Condorcet ranking. It remains to
identify the ranking that leads to the lowest cost when searching for acclamation.
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In Table 10.16, the costs associated with the search for a Condorcet ranking, acclamation
and unanimity w.r.t. each possible ranking are listed. We conclude that c  d  b  a is
the ranking that leads to the lowest cost in all three cases.
Ranking Cost C Cost A Cost U Ranking Cost C Cost A Cost U
a  b  c  d 1879 1928 6524 c  a  b  d 1143 1703 5054
a  b  d  c 1927 1933 6619 c  a  d  b 1063 1702 4895
a  c  b  d 1751 1925 6269 c  b  a  d 636 1702 4041
a  c  d  b 1671 1845 6110 c  b  d  a 80 212 2930
a  d  b  c 1847 1932 6460 c  d  a  b 507 1463 3784
a  d  c  b 1719 1846 6205 c  d  b  a 0 6 2771
b  a  c  d 1372 1927 5511 d  a  b  c 1291 1846 5349
b  a  d  c 1420 1928 5606 d  a  c  b 1163 1845 5094
b  c  a  d 764 1830 4296 d  b  a  c 784 1845 4336
b  c  d  a 208 356 3185 d  b  c  a 176 356 3121
b  d  a  c 864 1925 4495 d  c  a  b 555 1511 3879
b  d  c  a 256 357 3280 d  c  b  a 48 148 2866
Table 10.16: Cost of a closest profile with a Condorcet ranking (Cost C), a
closest acclaimed profile (Cost A) and a closest unanimous profile (Cost U)
w.r.t. each possible ranking on C .
As expected due to Theorem 5.32, the cost associated with the search for a Condorcet rank-
ing is always lower than or equal to the cost associated with the search for acclamation.
As also expected due to Theorem 5.32, the cost associated with the search for acclamation
is always lower than or equal to the cost associated with the search for unanimity. Never-
theless, as discussed in Chapter 7, the ranking leading to the lowest cost does not need to
coincide for the three searches, although this is the case in this example.
We conclude this section by analysing the optimal ranking w.r.t. the search for each of
the considered consensus states. Note that, as listed in Table 10.17, the optimal ranking
according to the search for all consensus states is the ranking c  d  b  a.
From the results of this case study it follows that the ranking c  d  b  a clearly is the
most natural ranking of the four methods used by the farmers in Corrientes.
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Search for Optimal ranking Search for Optimal ranking
Monotone scorix c  d  b  a Rec. monotone scorix c  d  b  a
Monotone votrix c  d  b  a Monotone votex c  d  b  a
Monotone profile c  d  b  a Condorcet ranking c  d  b  a
Acclamation c  d  b  a Unanimity c  d  b  a
Table 10.17: Optimal ranking w.r.t. the search for all the considered consen-
sus states.
For this case study, there does not exist a unanimous winner, nor a majority winner.
However, candidate c is the quasipositional winner, the positional winner, the pairwise
winner, the Condorcet winner and the Borda winner.
10.3 Food spoilage in Belgium
In this section, we apply the methodology proposed in this dissertation to a dataset of an
acceptance test that measures the degree of freshness of samples of cod fish [87, 127]. At
the Laboratory of Food Microbiology and Food Preservation at Ghent University, r = 9
experts were asked to give their appreciation of the cod fish samples by ranking them, in
terms of perceived freshness based on their smell.
Four different samples of cod fish were considered. We denote by a the zero-days-old
sample, b the three-days-old sample, c the five-days-old sample and d the seven-days-old
sample. In Table 10.18, the expressed rankings and their frequency are provided.
# i Rankings on C
4 a  b  c  d
2 a  b  d  c
1 a  c  b  d
1 d  b  a  c
1 d  c  b  a
Table 10.18: Expressed rankings and their frequency for the food spoilage
problem.
266 10.3 FOOD SPOILAGE IN BELGIUM
Note that the problem considered in this section has a different nature than the problems
considered in the previous two sections. While the true ranking on the set of candidates is
totally unknown in the Lar rangeland and the orange harvest problem, here, the freshness
of each sample is known and, therefore, samples can actually be ranked according to the
known freshness.
The scorix induced by the profile of rankings given by the voters is:
S =

7 0 1 1
0 7 2 0
0 2 4 3
2 0 2 5
 .
We see that S is not (recursively) monotone w.r.t. any ranking on the set of candidates
due to the fact that the vector of positions of candidate b does not dominate the vector of
positions of candidate d (0 < 2) and, at the same time, the vector of positions of candidate
d does not dominate the vector of positions of candidate b (0 + 7 > 2 + 0).
The relation mB is given by:
mB = {(a, c), (a, d), (b, c)} .
Evidently, mB is given by:
mB = {(a, a), (a, c), (a, d), (b, b), (b, c), (c, c), (d, d)} .
Figure 10.10 displays the Hasse diagram of the order relation mB. Note that the quasipo-
sitionally undominated set is here given by UB = {a, b}.
•a
•d • c
• b
Figure 10.10: Hasse diagram of the order relation mB.
Similarly, the relation mR is given by:
mR = {(a, c), (a, d), (b, c)} .
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Evidently, mR is given by:
mR = {(a, a), (a, c), (a, d), (b, b), (b, c), (c, c), (d, d)} .
Figure 10.11 displays the Hasse diagram of the order relationmR. Note that the positionally
undominated set is here given by UR = {a, b}.
•a
•d • c
• b
Figure 10.11: Hasse diagram of the order relation mR.
In Table 10.19, the costs of imposing monotonicity and recursive monotonicity on the scorix
w.r.t. each possible ranking are listed. We conclude that both rankings a  b  c  d and
a  b  d  c are a ranking w.r.t. which the closest profile of rankings with a (recursively)
monotone scorix leads to the lowest cost (three). Of course, both rankings a  b  c  d
and a  b  c  d linearly extend the strict partial order relation given by mB.
Note that, as expected due to Theorem 5.13, the cost of imposing monotonicity on the
scorix is always lower than or equal to the cost of imposing recursive monotonicity on the
scorix.
The votrix induced by the profile of rankings given by the voters is:
V =

0 7 8 7
2 0 7 7
1 2 0 5
2 2 4 0
 .
We see that V is not monotone w.r.t. any ranking on the set of candidates. First, we note
that the ranking a  b  c  d is the Condorcet ranking. Therefore, the only ranking
on the set of candidates w.r.t. the votrix can be monotone is the ranking a  b  c  d.
Nevertheless, the number of voters preferring candidate a to candidate c (eight) is greater
than the number of voters preferring candidate a to candidate d (seven).
The relation mC is given by:
mC = {(a, b), (a, c), (a, d), (b, c), (b, d)} .
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Ranking Cost S Cost RS Ranking Cost S Cost RS
a  b  c  d 3 3 c  a  b  d 11 12
a  b  d  c 3 3 c  a  d  b 13 13
a  c  b  d 7 7 c  b  a  d 12 13
a  c  d  b 8 8 c  b  d  a 14 15
a  d  b  c 6 6 c  d  a  b 14 16
a  d  c  b 7 8 c  d  b  a 15 16
b  a  c  d 5 5 d  a  b  c 11 11
b  a  d  c 5 5 d  a  c  b 13 14
b  c  a  d 9 10 d  b  a  c 12 12
b  c  d  a 12 13 d  b  c  a 14 16
b  d  a  c 10 11 d  c  a  b 14 16
b  d  c  a 12 13 d  c  b  a 15 17
Table 10.19: Cost of a closest profile of rankings with a monotone scorix
(Cost S) and with a recursively monotone scorix (Cost RS) w.r.t. each possible
ranking on C .
We conclude that candidate a is the pairwise winner. Evidently, mC is given by:
mC = {(a, a), (a, b), (a, c), (a, d), (b, b), (b, c), (b, d), (c, c), (d, d)} .
Figure 10.12 displays the Hasse diagram of the order relation mC .
•a
•d • c
• b
Figure 10.12: Hasse diagram of the order relation mC .
Note that the pairwisely undominated set is here given by UC = {a}.
The votex induced by the profile of rankings given by the voters is:
W : C 26= −→ {0, . . . , 9}6 W : C 26= −→ {0, . . . , 9}6
W (a, b) = (0, 0, 2, 6, 1, 0) W (b, c) = (0, 0, 2, 4, 3, 0)
W (a, c) = (0, 1, 0, 2, 4, 2) W (b, d) = (0, 1, 1, 3, 4, 0)
W (a, d) = (1, 1, 0, 0, 2, 5) W (c, d) = (1, 0, 3, 4, 1, 0)
CHAPTER 10 CASE STUDIES 269
As the votrix is not monotone w.r.t. any ranking on the set of candidates, we conclude
that the votex induced by the profile of rankings given by the voters is not monotone w.r.t.
any ranking either (see Theorem 5.23).
In Table 10.20, the costs of imposing monotonicity on the votrix and on the votex w.r.t.
each possible ranking are listed. Note that, as expected due to Theorem 5.23, the cost of
imposing monotonicity on the votrix is always lower than or equal to the cost of imposing
monotonicity on the votex. We conclude that both rankings a  b  c  d and a  b  d 
c are a ranking w.r.t. which the closest profile of rankings with a monotone votrix/votex
leads to the lowest cost (one/six). Note that both a  b  c  d and a  b  d  c
linearly extend the strict partial order relation given by mC .
Ranking Cost V Cost W Ranking Cost V Cost W
a  b  c  d 1 6 c  a  b  d 11 15
a  b  d  c 1 6 c  a  d  b 14 15
a  c  b  d 6 10 c  b  a  d 12 16
a  c  d  b 7 11 c  b  d  a 15 19
a  d  b  c 6 8 c  d  a  b 15 18
a  d  c  b 8 10 c  d  b  a 15 21
b  a  c  d 4 8 d  a  b  c 12 14
b  a  d  c 5 9 d  a  c  b 15 16
b  c  a  d 11 12 d  b  a  c 13 16
b  c  d  a 12 15 d  b  c  a 16 20
b  d  a  c 12 12 d  c  a  b 16 20
b  d  c  a 13 16 d  c  b  a 17 22
Table 10.20: Cost of a closest profile of rankings with a monotone votrix
(Cost V) and with a monotone votex (Cost W) w.r.t. each possible ranking
on C .
Figure 10.13 displays the given profile of rankings represented on the diagram of w≥ (where
 represents the ranking a  b  c  d). Note that the profile of rankings is not monotone
w.r.t. the ranking a  b  c  d. As a  b  c  d is the most frequent ranking, the
profile of rankings cannot be monotone w.r.t. any other ranking on the set of candidates.
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4× abcd
0× bacd 1× acbd 2× abdc
0× bcad 0× cabd 0× badc 0× acdb 0× adbc
0× cbad 0× bcda 0× bdac 0× cadb 0× adcb 0× dabc
0× cbda 0× bdca 0× cdab 1× dbac 0× dacb
0× cdba 0× dbca 0× dcab
1× dcba
Figure 10.13: Frequencies of Table 10.18 represented on the Hasse diagram
of the order relation w≥ for the ranking a  b  c  d.
In Table 10.21, the costs of imposing monotonicity on the profile w.r.t. each possible ranking
are listed. We conclude that a  b  c  d is the ranking w.r.t. which the closest monotone
profile of rankings leads to the lowest cost (five).
The last analysis for the orange harvest problem is linked to the search for a Condorcet
ranking, acclamation and unanimity. As previously discussed, the ranking a  b  c  d
is the Condorcet ranking for the profile of rankings given by the voters. Obviously, the
ranking that leads to the lowest cost (zero) when searching for a Condorcet ranking is the
ranking a  b  c  d. Under the existence of a Condorcet ranking, the ranking that leads
to the lowest cost (13) when searching for unanimity (which is the winner according to the
method of Kemeny) always coincides with this Condorcet ranking. It remains to identify
the ranking that leads to the lowest cost when searching for acclamation.
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Ranking Cost Ranking Cost Ranking Cost Ranking Cost
a  b  c  d 5 b  a  c  d 6 c  a  b  d 12 d  a  b  c 11
a  b  d  c 6 b  a  d  c 8 c  a  d  b 13 d  a  c  b 11
a  c  b  d 7 b  c  a  d 11 c  b  a  d 13 d  b  a  c 12
a  c  d  b 10 b  c  d  a 13 c  b  d  a 17 d  b  c  a 18
a  d  b  c 9 b  d  a  c 9 c  d  a  b 17 d  c  a  b 18
a  d  c  b 11 b  d  c  a 13 c  d  b  a 22 d  c  b  a 23
Table 10.21: Cost of a closest monotone profile of rankings w.r.t. each possible
ranking on C .
In Table 10.22, the costs associated with the search for a Condorcet ranking, acclamation
and unanimity w.r.t. each possible ranking are listed. We conclude that a  b  c  d is
the ranking that leads to the lowest cost in all three cases, but the ranking a  b  d  c
also leads to a lowest cost for the search for acclamation.
Ranking Cost C Cost A Cost U Ranking Cost C Cost A Cost U
a  b  c  d 0 6 13 c  a  b  d 7 17 25
a  b  d  c 1 6 14 c  a  d  b 10 18 30
a  c  b  d 3 10 18 c  b  a  d 10 18 30
a  c  d  b 6 12 23 c  b  d  a 13 21 35
a  d  b  c 4 10 19 c  d  a  b 13 21 35
a  d  c  b 7 12 24 c  d  b  a 16 26 40
b  a  c  d 3 8 18 d  a  b  c 7 14 24
b  a  d  c 4 9 19 d  a  c  b 10 17 29
b  c  a  d 7 13 25 d  b  a  c 10 17 29
b  c  d  a 10 16 30 d  b  c  a 14 22 36
b  d  a  c 7 14 24 d  c  a  b 14 22 36
b  d  c  a 11 17 31 d  c  b  a 17 27 41
Table 10.22: Cost of a closest profile with a Condorcet ranking (Cost C), a
closest acclaimed profile (Cost A) and a closest unanimous profile (Cost U)
w.r.t. each possible ranking on C .
As expected due to Theorem 5.32, the cost associated with the search for a Condorcet rank-
ing is always lower than or equal to the cost associated with the search for acclamation.
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As also expected due to Theorem 5.32, the cost associated with the search for acclama-
tion is always lower than or equal to the cost associated with the search for unanimity.
Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 7, the ranking leading to the lowest cost does not
need to coincide for the three searches. For intance, we see that the search for acclamation
leads to two optimal rankings, while the search for a Condorcet ranking and the search for
unanimity lead to a unique optimal ranking.
We conclude this section by analysing the optimal ranking w.r.t. the search for each of the
considered consensus states. As listed in Table 10.23, the ranking a  b  c  d is an
optimal ranking according to the search for all consensus states. Nevertheless, the ranking
a  b  d  c is also an optimal ranking for the search for most consensus states.
Search for Optimal ranking Search for Optimal ranking
Monotone scorix
a  b  c  d
Rec. monotone scorix
a  b  c  d
a  b  d  c a  b  d  c
Monotone votrix
a  b  c  d
Monotone votex
a  b  c  d
a  b  d  c a  b  d  c
Monotone profile a  b  c  d Condorcet ranking a  b  c  d
Acclamation
a  b  c  d
Unanimity a  b  c  d
a  b  d  c
Table 10.23: Optimal ranking w.r.t. the search for all the considered consen-
sus states.
From the results of this case study it follows that the ranking a  b  c  d is the
most natural ranking of the cod fish samples according to the perceived freshness. This
result was already expected due to the fact that a represents the zero-days-old sample,
b the three-days-old sample, c the five-days-old sample and d the seven-days-old sample.
Nevertheless, the fact that the ranking a  b  d  c is the optimal ranking according to
the search for five out of eight consensus states - and it is only one unit of cost away from
being optimal according the three other searches - may lead us to think that experts do
not easily identify the difference in freshness between samples c and d.
For this case study, there does not exist a unanimous winner. A quasipositional winner or
a positional winner does not exist either. However, candidate a is the pairwise winner, the
majority winner, the Condorcet winner and the Borda winner.
PART IV
EPILOGUE

CHAPTER 11
Conclusions and perspectives
The field of social choice dates back to the eighteenth century, when Borda and Condorcet
started an endless discussion about the use of either positional or pairwise information.
Three centuries later, after countless axiomatic characterizations of ranking rules, impos-
sibility theorems and many other study subjects that have called the attention of the
scientific community, researchers still debate whether positional information is really sen-
sitive to manipulation or pairwise information disregards the transitivity of the voters’
preferences. Three centuries have passed and the scholars of social choice theory are still
returning to the same old topics that led Borda and Condorcet to embark on more than
one dialectic battle.
This eternal comeback makes us wonder how such an easy, intuitive and natural property
as monotonicity - in the sense of this dissertation - has been disregarded through the years.
It is not until a couple of years ago that Rademaker and De Baets pointed out that, for
a ranking a  b  c to represent a group’s opinion, the number of voters preferring can-
didate a to candidate c should not be less than both the number of candidates preferring
candidate a to candidate b and the number of voters preferring candidate b to candidate
c. In particular, they proposed a ranking rule that amounts to finding the ranking that
is the closest to satisfying this natural property. The idea was undoubtedly revolution-
ary. Probably, Rademaker and De Baets did not know at the time that they just opened
Pandora’s box. Indeed, it resulted in the starting point of this PhD thesis and has led to
an overwhelming number of open problems, which certainly matches the number of closed
problems.
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This monotonicity property can be understood as a property of a particular representation
of votes, the voting matrix or votrix. In general, a representation of votes is a construct that
gathers the most important information given by the voters. Two representations of votes
are historically considered in the field of social choice theory: the votrix and the scorix.
One then wonders whether the notion of monotonicity can be translated to the scorix or
not. As discussed in the very first chapters of this dissertation, the answer is affirmative.
Monotonicity of the scorix can be understood as that, for a ranking a  b  c to represent
a group’s opinion, the positions at which candidate a is ranked should be better than both
the positions at which candidate b is ranked and the positions at which candidate c is
ranked; and, at the same time, the positions at which candidate b is ranked should be
better than the positions at which candidate c is ranked. Monotonicity of the scorix did
not result in such a revolutionary concept as monotonicity of the votrix, as several authors
already analysed this property in the context of scoring ranking rules. Nevertheless, the
search for monotonicity of the scorix did result in a novelty for social choice.
In general, the search for a property is a natural way of defining a ranking rule. Indeed, the
method of Kemeny searches for the ranking that is the closest to becoming unanimous in
the profile of rankings in terms of the Kendall distance function, the Borda count searches
for the candidate that is the closest to becoming the unanimous winner in terms of the
Kendall distance function, the plurality rule searches for the candidate that is the closest to
becoming the unanimous winner in terms of the zero-one distance function, the method of
Dodgson searches for the candidate that is the closest to becoming the Condorcet winner
in terms of the Kendall tau distance function, etc. The set of all profiles of rankings
satisfying certain property that obviously leads to a winning ranking (sometimes winning
candidate) is referred to as a consensus state. The characterization of ranking rules by the
minimization of the distance to a consensus state for some appropriate distance function
is known by the name of distance rationalisation of ranking rules or metric rationalisation
of ranking rules. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, we are not dealing with a notion
of closeness in the most geometrical sense. The axioms of symmetry and, specially, the
triangle inequality lack sense here. The role that the triangle inequality plays in giving
a real meaning to a distance function is replaced by the preservation of a substantial
betweenness relation. In that way, monometrics are introduced, leading to the monometric
rationalisation of ranking rules.
By means of these newly introduced monometrics, we can now address the search for
the best consensus state. But, what does ‘best’ mean here? Unanimity, as proposed by
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Kemeny, seems to be too restrictive. As unanimity tends not to hold in real-life elections,
the search for unanimity turns out to highly depend on the chosen monometric. In most of
the cases, just a change in the monometric may lead to a noteworthy change in the winning
ranking. On the other hand, the presence of a Condorcet ranking seems to be too loose.
As Saari explains in one of my favourite quotes in social choice: “the combination of the
pairwise vote with the Condorcet terms loses the crucial fact that voters have transitive
preferences. [...] An equally surprising assertion is that rather than being the standard,
the Condorcet winner must be held suspect”. Therefore, we need to find a consensus state
that is considerably broader than unanimity, but that, at the same time, still leads to a
consistent and undisputed winning ranking. Monotonicity comes again into play.
First, monotonicity of the scorix is proved to be a meeting point for all scoring ranking
rules. Second, monotonicity of the votrix is proved to be a meeting point for most ranking
rules based on pairwise information. Therefore, the intersection of both consensus states
(w.r.t. the same ranking) turns out to be a meeting point for most ranking rules. Many
other monotonicity-based consensus states are discussed in this dissertation. Recursive
monotonicity of the scorix turns out to be a meeting point between the Borda and the
Condorcet rankings. Monotonicity of the profile is linked to the real existence of a true
ranking on the set of candidates, linked to the philosophy advocated by Rousseau and
Condorcet where personal preferences are not considered and where we try to identify the
‘general will’. This phylosophy is clearly described by Arrow: “each individual has two
orderings, one which governs him in his everyday actions, and one which would be relevant
under some ideal conditions and which is in some sense truer than the first ordering. It
is the latter that is considered relevant to social choice, and it is assumed that there is
complete unanimity with regard to the truer individual ordering”. Monotonicity of other
representations of votes, such as the votex and the beatpath matrix, has also been anal-
ysed. Throughout this dissertation, we advocate that acclamation, which is defined as the
intersection of recursive monotonicity of the scorix, monotonicity of the votrix and mono-
tonicity of the profile (w.r.t. the same ranking), leads to an agreement of most ranking rules
and should be considered in the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules. Obviously,
acclamation is a much broader consensus state than unanimity and its consideration will
decrease the dependence of the ranking rule w.r.t. the chosen monometric.
The search for a consensus state is solved in this dissertation as an optimization problem,
in particular as a well-known type of Integer Linear Programming problem: a transporta-
tion problem. Undoubtedly, there is still a lot of work to be done here. Our proposed
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solution leads to an inconvenient factorial time complexity, which complicates the com-
putation of the optimization problem even for a moderately small number of candidates.
Although similar problems are proved to be NP-hard problems, there is still many room
for improvement here. Several approximations and pruning techniques have been proposed
for the search for unanimity and for a Condorcet ranking, considerably decreasing the com-
putational time. This suggests a clear future direction that will be addressed in the near
future.
Monotonicity of both the scorix and the votrix is a global property that leads to an obvious
winning ranking(s) on the set of candidates. In case either monotonicity of the scorix or
monotonicity of the votrix does not hold, instead of directly searching for this monotonicity,
we may be interested in analysing the underlying reasons why this monotonicity does not
hold. In that way, based on the same principles of (recursive) monotonicity of the scorix,
we can define a strict partial order relation on the set of candidates according to how good
all candidates are in terms of positional information. When there exists a greatest element
for this partial order relation, one talks about the positional winner, and the fact that
the partial order relation is a total relation turns out to be equivalent to the fact that
the scorix is (strictly) recursively monotone. Analogously, based on the same principles
of monotonicity of the votrix, we can define a strict partial order relation on the set of
candidates according to how good all candidates are in terms of pairwise information.
When there exists a greatest element for this partial order relation, one talks about the
pairwise winner, and the fact that the partial order relation is a total relation turns out to
be equivalent to the fact that the votrix is (strictly) monotone.
Last, but definitely not least, we have discussed the potential applications of this dis-
sertation. The aggregation of rankings has been addressed in many scientific disciplines,
including medicine, consumer preference analysis, computer science, management science
and social choice theory. Nevertheless, due to the natural interpretation of the aggregation
of rankings as a voting procedure, social choice theory is considered the most prominent
field of application. Here, we have considered three different real-life problems: an ecosys-
tem management problem where the goal is to rank four plans according to their perceived
suitability for the Lar rangeland in Iran; an environmental decision making problem where
the goal is to identify the best estimation method for the production of orange trees in the
Argentinian province of Corrientes; and a consumer preference analysis problem where the
goal is to check whether or not consumers are able to distinguish between different degrees
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of spoilage of some cod fish samples at the Laboratory of Food Microbiology and Food
Preservation at Ghent University, Belgium.
The methodology introduced in this dissertation has been exclusively analysed here for
the particular case of the aggregation of rankings. Nevertheless, as part of a side joint
project with the Laboratory of Food Microbiology and Food Preservation at Ghent Uni-
versity, a first approach to the aggregation of labels given on a qualitative scale has been
addressed based on the notion of monotonicity. The aggregation of compositional data,
directional data, strings and many other types of structured and/or unstructured data un-
doubtedly is a future research line. The introduction of betweenness relations, consensus
states and monometrics in the field of aggregation results in promising tools that may help
the understanding and progress in the study of the aggregation of such complex types of
data.
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Summaries
In the following, we provide a summary of this dissertation in English, Spanish and Dutch.
11.1 English summary
Social choice theory concerns the study of the conclusions that can be drawn from the
preferences expressed by several voters over a set of candidates. In particular, throughout
this dissertation, we consider the setting where each voter expresses a ranking on the set of
candidates. Although at first sight it might appear to be an artificial theoretical problem
with little application outside the election framework, nothing could be further from the
truth. The application field results to be very rich, attracting the attention of many
different fields such as social sciences, computer sciences, economical sciences, biological
sciences and mathematical sciences.
In Chapter 1, we motivate the problem in the paragraph above and highlight the most
important objectives of this research. We also provide an outline of this dissertation,
together with some suggestions for its adequate reading.
In Chapter 2, we review the history of social choice theory, recalling the most prominent
ranking rules. Plurality, the Borda count, scoring (ranking) rules, majority, the notions
of Condorcet winner and Condorcet ranking, the method of Kemeny - among others -
are recalled and illustrated with some toy examples. It is supposed to serve as a tool
for making this dissertation fully self-contained. We conclude the chapter by explaining
a ranking procedure based on a natural monotonicity constraint proposed by Rademaker
and De Baets, which was the starting point of this thesis.
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In Chapter 3, we review the metric rationalisation of ranking rules, which represents the
characterization of ranking rules by minimizing the distance to a consensus state for some
appropriate distance function. A consensus state is the set of all profiles of rankings
satisfying a natural property that leads to an obvious winning ranking. Monometrics,
which are closely related to distance functions or metrics, are introduced here. Like a
distance function, a monometric satisfies the axioms of non-negativity and coincidence, but
a monometric requires compatibility with a given betweenness relation and does not impose
symmetry nor the triangle inequality. As discussed throughout this chapter, monometrics
are a more suitable tool for the rationalisation of ranking rules than metrics, and will lead
to the introduction of the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules.
In Chapter 4, we analyse different representations of votes, which are tools that play a
key role in the field of social choice theory. Usually, the profile of rankings provided by
the voters is compressed into these representations of votes gathering the most significant
information. For instance, the Borda count, probably the most well-known ranking rule,
reduces the rankings given by the voters to the scoring matrix (from now on referred
to as the scorix), which is a matrix where the element at the i-th row and j-th column
equals the number of times that the i-th candidate is ranked at the j-th position in the
rankings given by the voters. Besides the Borda count, all other scoring ranking rules also
reduce the rankings given by the voters to the scorix. Based on the ideas of Condorcet,
another representation of votes that gathers a completely different type of information is
also commonly used in social choice theory: the voting matrix (from now on referred to
as the votrix). The votrix is a matrix where the element at the i-th row and j-th column
equals the number of times that the i-th candidate is preferred to the j-th candidate in
the rankings given by the voters. Relative positions between candidates are not explicitly
gathered by the votrix, and we propose a new representation of votes gathering this hitherto
unconsidered information: the votex. The beatpath matrix, which is a recently introduced
representation of votes based on the notion of beatpath, is also briefly recalled in this
chapter.
In Chapter 5, we discuss the notion of monotonicity of a representation of votes, which will
be proven to be a cornerstone for social choice theory. Monotonicity is a common desired
property in mathematical modelling exercises, and its importance has been acknowledged
in several disciplines. However, real-life data is often imperfect and does not fully comply
with the monotonicity hypothesis. In the field of social choice theory, the concept of
monotonicity is an old acquaintance for scholars that can easily be traced back to the early
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1970s. This classical concept of monotonicity differs from the one advocated by Rademaker
and De Baets (discussed in Chapter 2), that was the starting point of this thesis. Here,
monotonicity is not understood as a property of the ranking rule. Rather, monotonicity is
a property of the representation of votes that will serve as a tool for defining the ranking
rule. Different monotonicity-based consensus states are discussed in this chapter. Most of
them will be used - together with the presence of a Condorcet ranking and unanimity - for
defining natural ranking rules. Special attention will be paid to acclamation: the consensus
state formed by the intersection of recursive monotonicity of the scorix, monotonicity of
the votrix and monotonicity of the profile (w.r.t. the same ranking).
In Chapter 6, we address the search for all different monotonicity-based consensus states
as an optimization problem. This search is formalized as an Integer Linear Programming
problem. We divide the chapter into two different sections. First, the search for mono-
tonicity is addressed by making changes in the representation of votes. Second, the search
for monotonicity is addressed by making changes in the profile of rankings. The search
for the same property by means of a distance function at the representation level and of a
distance function at the profile level is a common topic in the field of social choice theory.
For instance, the search for a Condorcet winner is addressed by means of a distance func-
tion at the votrix level and of a distance function at the profile level by two well-known
methods: Condorcet’s least-reversal method and Dodgson’s method.
In Chapter 7, we address two main study subjects. First, as Arrow stated in his well-known
Impossibility Theorem, there is no ranking rule simultaneously satisfying all the properties
that can be considered desirable. This leads to an increasing interest of the scientific
community in the search for axiomatic characterizations of different ranking rules. Here,
although we do not provide any axiomatic characterization, we discuss some properties
satisfied by the ranking rules based on the search for monotonicity. Second, we discuss the
independence of the search for all monotonicity-based consensus states described in this
dissertation w.r.t. each other.
In Chapter 8, we consider the more general setting where each voter is assumed to provide
a ranking with ties on the set of candidates instead of a ranking on the set of candidates.
This situation subsumes a three-way decision, where each voter needs to decide whether
‘candidate a is better than candidate b’, ‘candidate b is better than candidate a’ or ‘can-
didates a and b are equally suitable’. This type of decision can be seen as a representation
of bipolar information on a three-label bipolar qualitative scale. As each voter directly
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provides a ranking with ties on the set of candidates, the three aforementioned relations
are considered to be transitive.
In Chapter 9, we discuss different types of winning candidates. There are obviously some
situations in which the selection of a winning candidate is easy; for instance, when every
voter agrees on the candidate that should be the winner. Such candidate is called the
unanimous winner, and, unfortunately, it usually does not exist in real-life elections. In
case more than half of the voters agree on the candidate that should be the winner, one
talks about the (absolute) majority winner. Obviously, the majority winner might not
exist either. Based only on the head-to-head comparisons between candidates, Condorcet
advocated a weaker condition than that of the unanimous or the majority winner: in case a
candidate is preferred by more than half of the voters to each of the other candidates, then it
should be the winner; said candidate is referred to as the Condorcet winner. The existence
of the Condorcet winner is neither assured due to the more than famous ‘voting paradox’
where, although all the voters provide transitive preferences on the set of candidates, the
collective preference might be cyclic. Also, the Borda winner, which is the candidate that
maximizes the Borda score is often considered. In this chapter, two new types of winner
are discussed: the (quasi)positional winner and the pairwise winner. These two winners
will be understood as necessary conditions for the Borda winner and the Condorcet winner
to finally agree.
In Chapter 10, we apply the methodology discussed in this dissertation to different real-life
problems. Presidential elections (social choice), ranking of governmental plans (multiple-
criteria decision analysis) and search for consensus among a group of experts (group de-
cision making) are some of the possible large-scale applications. However, every daily
decision where more than one judgement/criterion is considered turns into an immediate
potential application. The content of this dissertation is mainly of interest to fields such
as ecosystem management, sustainability assessment or consumer preference analysis. In
particular, we consider three problems: an ecosystem management problem in Iran, an
environmental decision making problem in Argentina and a consumer preference analysis
problem in Belgium.
In Chapter 11, we end with some conclusions and a discussion on future research directions.
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11.2 Spanish summary
La teor´ıa de la eleccio´n social estudia las conclusiones que se pueden sacar de las preferencias
de distintos votantes sobre un conjunto de candidatos. En particular, a lo largo de esta
memoria, consideramos el marco teo´rico en el que cada votante expresa un orden total o
ranking de los candidatos. Aunque a primera vista pueda parecer un problema con una
fuerte inclinacio´n teo´rica y poca aplicacio´n ma´s alla´ del marco electoral, nada ma´s lejos
de la realidad. Pueden encontrarse numerosos ejemplos de aplicaciones en campos tan
diferentes como las ciencias sociales, las ciencias de la computacio´n, las ciencias econo´micas,
las ciencias biolo´gicas o las ciencias matema´ticas.
En el Cap´ıtulo 1, planteamos el problema aqu´ı considerado y explicamos los objetivos ma´s
importantes de esta investigacio´n. En este cap´ıtulo, tambie´n esbozamos brevemente como
debe ser le´ıda esta memoria.
En el Cap´ıtulo 2, repasamos las reglas de ordenacio´n ma´s importantes en el campo de
la teor´ıa de la eleccio´n social, as´ı como los conceptos de pluralidad, el recuento Borda,
las reglas de puntuacio´n, las reglas mayoritarias, las nociones de ganador y ranking de
Condorcet y el me´todo de Kemeny, entre otros. Todos estos conceptos son ilustrados por
medio de ejemplos. El principal objetivo de este cap´ıtulo es hacer que esta memoria resulte
comprensible en s´ı misma, sin recurrir a elementos explicativos adicionales. Concluimos con
una explicacio´n detallada de una regla de ordenacio´n basada en la propiedad de monoton´ıa
propuesta por Rademaker y De Baets, que supuso el punto de partida de esta tesis.
En el Cap´ıtulo 3, repasamos la racionalizacio´n matema´tica de las reglas de ordenacio´n,
que es la rama de la teor´ıa de la eleccio´n social que caracteriza las reglas de ordenacio´n
por medio de la minimizacio´n de la distancia a un estado de consenso para una deter-
minada me´trica. Un estado de consenso esta´ formado por todas las listas de rankings
que cumplen una propiedad que, de una manera natural, determina inequivocamente el
ranking que debe ser considerado el ganador. En este cap´ıtulo introducimos el concepto
de monome´trica, un tipo de funcio´n que esta´ ı´ntimamente relacionado con las me´tricas.
Al igual que las me´tricas, una monome´trica cumple los axiomas de no-negatividad y co-
incidencia, pero require adema´s la compatibilidad con una relacio´n de ‘intermediacio´n’ y
no impone el axioma de simetr´ıa, ni la desigualdad triangular. Tal y como explicamos
a lo largo de este cap´ıtulo, las monome´tricas son una herramienta ma´s adecuada para la
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racionalizacio´n matema´tica de las reglas de ordenacio´n que las propias me´tricas. Por este
motivo introducimos la racionalizacio´n monome´trica de las reglas de ordenacio´n.
En el Cap´ıtulo 4, analizamos diferentes representaciones de votos, que son herramientas que
juegan un papel clave en la teor´ıa de la eleccio´n social. Normalmente, una representacio´n
de votos recoge la informacio´n ma´s importante de la lista de rankings dada por los votantes.
Por ejemplo, el recuento Borda, probablemente la regla de ordenacio´n ma´s conocida, reduce
la lista de rankings dada por los votantes a la matriz de puntuacio´n (de ahora en adelante
referida como la scorix), que es una matriz en la que el elemento de la i-e´sima fila y j-e´sima
columna representa el nu´mero de veces que el i-e´simo candidato es clasificado en la j-e´sima
posicio´n. Adema´s del recuento Borda, el resto de reglas de puntuacio´n tambie´n reducen
la lista de rankings dada por los votantes a la scorix. Basada en las ideas de Condorcet,
otra representacio´n de votos que recoge un tipo de informacio´n totalmente diferente es la
matriz de votacio´n (de ahora en adelante referida como la votrix), que es una matriz en la
que el elemento de la i-e´sima fila y j-e´sima columna representa el nu´mero de veces en las
que el i-e´simo candidato es preferido al j-e´simo candidato. Las posiciones relativas entre
los candidatos no son explicitamente reflejadas en la votrix. Por esto proponemos en este
cap´ıtulo una nueva representacio´n de votos que tiene en cuenta este tipo de informacio´n:
el votex. Adema´s, tambie´n mencionamos otra conocida representacio´n de votos: la matriz
de rutas ma´s fuertes.
En el Cap´ıtulo 5, definimos una propiedad que puede ser considerada como una piedra
angular para la teor´ıa de eleccio´n social: la monoton´ıa de una representacio´n de votos.
La propiedad de monoton´ıa es una propiedad deseable en problemas de modelizacio´n
matema´tica y su importancia ha sido reconocida en gran cantidad de disciplinas. Desafor-
tunadamente, las bases de datos procedentes de problemas reales suelen ser imperfectas,
impidiendo que la propiedad de monoton´ıa se cumpla. La nocio´n de monoton´ıa es una vieja
amiga para los eruditos de la teor´ıa de la eleccio´n social que ha sido analizada desde el prin-
cipio de la de´cada de 1970. Este concepto cla´sico de monoton´ıa difiere de aquel propuesto
por Rademaker y De Baets (del cual hablamos en el Cap´ıtulo 2) y que supuso el punto de
partida de esta investigacio´n. En este caso, el concepto de monoton´ıa no es considerado
una propiedad de una regla de decisio´n, sino una propiedad de las representaciones de vo-
tos. En este cap´ıtulo, proponemos diferentes estados de consenso basados en la propiedad
de monoton´ıa. La mayor´ıa de ellos sera´n usados (junto con la presencia de un ranking
de Condorcet y la propiedad de unanimidad) para definir distintas reglas de ordenacio´n.
Prestaremos especial atencio´n al estado de consenso ‘aclamacio´n’, que es definido como la
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interseccio´n de los estados de consenso de monoton´ıa recursiva de la scorix, monoton´ıa de
la votrix y monoton´ıa de la lista de ranking (con respecto al mismo ranking)
En el Cap´ıtulo 6, proponemos un problema de optimizacio´n para la bu´squeda de los dis-
tintos estados de consenso propuestos en el cap´ıtulo anterior. En particular, definimos un
problema de programacio´n lineal entera. Este cap´ıtulo esta´ dividido en dos secciones difer-
entes. En primer lugar, abordamos la bu´squeda de monoton´ıa por medio de cambios en las
distintas representaciones de votos. En segundo lugar, abordamos la bu´squeda de mono-
ton´ıa por medio de cambios en la lista de rankings dada por los votantes. La bu´squeda de
la misma propiedad por medio de cambios en la representacio´n de votos y de cambios en la
lista de rankings es un problema comu´n en la teor´ıa de la eleccio´n social. Por ejemplo, dos
me´todos conocidos en el campo buscan un ganador de Condorcet por medio de cambios
en la votrix (me´todo de mı´nimas inversiones de Condorcet) y de cambios en la lista de
rankings (me´todo de Dodgson).
En el Cap´ıtulo 7, centramos nuestra atencio´n en dos temas de caracter teo´rico. En primer
lugar, tal y como Arrow manifesto´ en su conocido Teorema de Imposibilidad, no existe
ninguna regla de ordenacio´n que cumpla al mismo tiempo tres propiedades que pueden ser
consideradas elementales. Esto conlleva un creciente intere´s por parte de la comunidad
cient´ıfica en la bu´squeda de caracterizaciones axioma´ticas de las diferentes reglas de orde-
nacio´n. Aunque no proponemos una axiomatizacio´n de las reglas de ordenacio´n propuestas
en esta memoria, discutimos las propiedades que todas estas reglas de ordenacio´n cumplen.
En segundo lugar, probamos que todas las reglas de ordenacio´n basadas en la bu´squeda de
un estado de consenso propuestas en esta investigacio´n son independientes entre ellas.
En el Cap´ıtulo 8, consideramos el caso ma´s general en el que cada votante expresa una
ranking con empates en lugar de un ranking (sin empates). Esta situacio´n subsume una
decisio´n a tres bandas, donde cada votante debe decidir si ‘el candidato a es mejor que
el candidato b’, ‘el candidato b es mejor que el candidato a’ o ‘los candidatos a y b son
igualmente buenos’. Como cada votante expresa directamente un ranking con empates de
los candidatos, las tres relaciones ya mencionadas son consideradas transitivas.
En el Cap´ıtulo 9, mostramos distintas nociones de candidato ganador. En algunas situa-
ciones, el candidato que debe ser erigido ganador es obvio. Por ejemplo, en caso de que
todos los votantes este´n de acuerdo en apoyar a un mismo candidato. En este caso nos refe-
rimos a un ganador una´nime. Desafortunadamente, este tipo de ganador no suele existir
en condiciones reales. En caso de que ma´s de la mitad de los votantes este´n de acuerdo en
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el candidato que debe ser erigido ganador, hablamos de un ganador (absolutamente) may-
oritario. Obviamente, el ganador mayoritario tampoco tiene por que´ existir. Basa´ndose
solo en las comparaciones dos-a-dos entre los distintos candidatos, Condorcet propuso una
condicio´n ma´s de´bil que la existencia de un ganador una´nime o mayoritario: en caso de
que un candidato sea preferido por ma´s de la mitad de los votantes a cada uno de los otros
candidatos, debe ser erigido el ganador. Este tipo de ganador es conocido como el ganador
de Condorcet. La existencia de un ganador de Condorcet no esta´ asegurada debido a la ma´s
que conocida ‘paradoja de la votacio´n’ donde, aunque todos los votantes expresan prefer-
encias transitivas, la preferencia colectiva puede resultar c´ıclica. El ganador de Borda, que
es aquel candidato que maximiza el recuento de Borda, es tambie´n habitualmente consid-
erado en el campo de la teor´ıa de la eleccio´n social. En este cap´ıtulo, dos nuevos tipos de
ganador son propuestos: el ganador (quasi)posicional y el ganador por pares. Estos dos
tipos de ganadores sera´n entendidos como condiciones suficientes para que los ganadores
de Condorcet y Borda coincidan finalmente.
En el Cap´ıtulo 10, aplicamos los me´todo propuestos en esta memoria a distintos problemas
de la vida real. Elecciones presidenciales (teor´ıa de la eleccio´n social), la ordenacio´n de
planes gubernamentales (ana´lisis de decisio´n multi-criterio) y la bu´squeda de consenso en-
tre un grupo de expertos (toma de decisio´n grupal) son algunas de las posibles aplicaciones.
Sin embargo, cualquier accio´n diaria donde se considere ma´s de un criterio se convierte en
una potencial aplicacio´n de esta investigacio´n. El contenido de esta memoria es de intere´s,
principalmente, en campos como la gerencia de ecosistemas, la evaluacio´n de sostenibil-
idad o el ana´lisis de preferencias de los consumidores. En concreto, consideramos tres
casos: un primero de gerencia de ecosistemas en Ira´n, un segundo de toma de decisiones
medioambiental en Argentina y un tercero de ana´lisis de preferencias de los consumidores
en Be´lgica.
En el Cap´ıtulo 11, terminamos con unas conclusiones y una pequen˜a discusion de futuras
l´ıneas de investigacio´n.
11.3 Dutch summary
Sociale keuzetheorie behandelt de vraag welke conclusies getrokken kunnen worden uit
de preferenties uitgedrukt door een aantal stemmers over een aantal kandidaten. Meer
bepaald bekijken we in deze thesis de setting waarin elke stemmer een rangschikking van
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het set van kandidaten heeft uitgedrukt. Misschien lijkt dit op het eerste zicht een nogal
artificieel-theoretisch probleem, maar het tegenovergestelde blijkt al gauw waar te zijn. De
toepassingsgebieden zijn zeer diverse en relevant, zoals sociale wetenschappen, computer-
wetenschappen, economische wetenschappen, biologische wetenschappen en wiskunde.
In Hoofdstuk 1 motiveren we belangrijkheid van de probleemstelling en lichten we belan-
grijkste doelstellingen van deze thesis uit. Dit hoofdstuk bevat ook een overzicht van de
opbouw van deze thesis, alsook enkele tips hoe deze best gelezen kan worden.
Hoofdstuk 2 bespreekt de geschiedenis van sociale keuzetheorie, waar we de meest belangri-
jke rangschikking regels even herhalen. Pluraliteit, Borda, scoring (rangschikking) regels,
de meerderheidsregel, het concept ‘Condorcet winnaar’ en ‘Condorcet winning ranking’, de
Kemeny methode en anderen worden hier uitgelegd en ge¨ıllustreerd met kleine voorbeelden.
Het doel van dit hoofdstuk is om van deze thesis een op zich staand geheel te maken, waar
geen verdere naslagwerk bij te pas hoeft te komen. Op het einde van dit hoofdstuk be-
spreken we een rangschikking regel gebaseerd op een natuurlijke monotoniteit voorwaarde
zoals geformuleerd door Rademaker en De Baets. Deze regel vormt het startpunt van deze
thesis.
In Hoofdstuk 3 behandelen we het metriek-aspect van rangschikking regels, waar we
rangschikking regels dus beschouwen als ‘manieren om de afstand tot een staat van con-
sensus te becijferen’ voor enkele toepasselijke afstandsfuncties. Een staat van consensus
is een set rangschikkingen waarvoor de winnende rangschikking evident is. Monometrics,
sterk gerelateerd aan afstandsfuncties of metrieken, worden hier geA˜¯ntroduceerd. Net als
een afstandsfunctie vervult een monometriek the axima van niet-negativiteit en samen-
valling, maar niet symmetrie of de driehoeksongelijkheid. In de plaats van die twee is
een monometriek compatibel met een ‘tussenin’ relatie. Dit hoofdstuk beargumenteert
dat monometrieken toepasselijker zijn dan afstandsfuncties om rangschikking regels te ra-
tionaliseren, en resulteert aldus in de invoering van de monometriek rationalisering van
rangsschikkingsregels.
In Hoofdstuk 4 analyseren we verschillende manieren om stemmen te representeren, een
essentieel en belangrijk deel van het onderzoeksdomein van sociale keuzetheorie. Meestal
zal het profiel van rangschikkingen zoals uitgedrukt door de stemmers samengevat worden
in een van deze representaties, om de meest belangrijke informatie makkelijk verwerkbaar
te maken. De Borda telling bijvoorbeeld, wellicht de best gekende rangschikking regel,
reduceert de rangschikkingen uitgedrukt door de stemmers tot de score matrix (vanaf nu
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de scorix genoemd), een matrix waarin een element in rij i en kolom j het aantal keer
dat de i-de kandidaat op de j-de plaats weer gevonden werd in de rangschikkingen uitge-
drukt door de stemmers. Niet enkel de Borda telling, maar ook alle andere scorende
rangschikkings regels reduceren de stemmen tot de scorematrix. Een andere voorstelling
van de uitgebrachte stemmen is de stemmen matrix (vanaf nu votrix genoemd), gebaseerd
op de opvattingen van Condorcet en een gericht op een wezenlijk verschillend type infor-
matie. De votrix is een matrix waarin het element in de i-de rij en de j-de kolom het aantal
keer dat de i-de kandidaat verkozen wordt boven de j-de kandidaat in de rangschikkingen
uitgedrukt door de stemmers. Relatieve posities tussen kandidaten blijven niet bewaard
in de votrix, en we formuleren een nieuwe representatie die toelaat om deze vooralsnog
ongebruikte informatie alsnog in rekening te brengen, en noemen deze representatie de vo-
tex. De beatpath matrix, een recentelijk geformuleerde manier representatie van stemmen
gebaseerd op het beatpath concept, wordt ook even kort aangehaald in dit hoofdstuk.
Hoofdstuk 5 bespreekt de notie van monotoniteit in een representatie van stemmen, en we
zullen bewijzen dat dit een hoeksteen van sociale keuzetheorie vormt. Monotoniteit is een
vaak vereiste eigenschap in wiskundige modellering toepassingen, en de belangrijkheid er-
van wordt in verschillende disciplines expliciet erkend. Maar data komende uit de realiteit
is vaak niet foutloos en vervult dan ook niet de monotoniteitvereiste. In het onderzoeks-
domein van social choice theorie vormt het een oude bekende die voor het eerst opdook in
de jaren 70 van de vorige eeuw. Dit monotoniteit-concept verschilt van het concept onder-
schreven door RAdemaker en De Baets (besproken in Hoofdstuk 2), het startpunt van deze
thesis. De monotoniteit bedoeld door Rademaker en De Baets is geen eigenschap van de
rangschikking regel, maar eerder als een mogelijke eigenschap die vervuld kan worden door
een representatie van de stemmen, en zal dienen als een onderdeel van de definitie van de
rangschikkings regel. Verschillende monotoniteit-gebaseerde consensus regels worden be-
sproken in dit hoofdstuk. De meeste van deze alsook ‘de aanwezigheid van een Condorcet
ranking’ en ‘unanimiteit’ zullen gebruikt worden om intu¨ıtieve rangschikkigns regels te for-
muleren. We zullen extra aandacht besteden aan acclamation: de consensus toestand waar
recursieve monotoniteit van de scorix, monotoniteit van de votrix en monotoniteit van het
profiel met betrekking tot een en dezelfde rangschikking, alledrie samen aanwezig zijn.
In Hoofdstuk 6 zullen we uiteenzetten hoe het kwantificeren van monotoniteit als een
optimalisatievraagstuk bekeken kan worden. Meer bepaald kan deze vraag geformaliseerd
worden als een Integer Lineair Programmeringsprobleem. Dit hoofdstuk bestaat uit twee
verschillende secties. In de eerste aanpak zal de zoektocht naar een consensus toestand
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gebeuren worden door aanpassingen in de representatie van de stemmen uit te voeren. In
de tweede aanpak zullen we aanpassingen in de stemmen zelf doorvoeren, dus vo`o`r we de
informatie reduceren tot representatie niveau. We zullen als voorbeeld bespreken hoe een
Condorcet winnaar te bepalen wanneer we de afstandsfunctie op votrix-niveau berekenen
en wanneer we die een afstandsfunctie op niveau van de stemmen berekenen, zowel voor
de Condorcet methode van minste omkeringen en de methode van Dodgson.
Hoofdstuk 7 zal twee onderwerpen behandelen. Vooreerst bespreken we het Onmogelijkhei-
dstheorema van Arrow, welke stelt dat er geen rangschikking regel bestaat die een aantal
intu¨ıtieve en aantrekkelijke eigenschappen simultaan vertoont. Welke rangschikking regels
dan wel welke eigenschappen vertonen, is dan ook een dankbaar onderwerp voor onderzoek
geweest. In dit hoofdstuk zullen we dan ook een aantal eigenschappen bespreken van de
rangschikking regels gebaseerd op monotoniteit, al zullen we geen volledige axiomatische
karakterisatie doorvoeren. Vervolgens bespreken we of de zoektochten naar elk van de
verschillende monotoniteit-gebaseerde consensus toestanden, onafhankelijk zijn van elkaar.
In Hoofdstuk 8 bekijken we de meer algemene setting waar een stemmer een rangschikking
uitdrukt waarin sommige kandidaten als evenwaardig beschouwd worden, een niet-strikte
rangschikking. Met andere woorden, voor elke twee kandidaten a en b, zal elke stemmer
uitdrukken ‘a is beter dan b’, ‘b is beter dan a’ of ‘a en b zijn even goed’. We kunnen dit
beschouwen als een representatie op een bipolaire kwalitatieve schaal met drie verschillende
labels. Aangezien de stemmers nog steeds een rangschikking uitdrukken, veronderstellen
we dat de beter dan en even goed relaties transitief zijn.
In Hoofdstuk 9 bespreken we verschillende types winnende kandidaten. Er zijn om-
standigheden waarin het bepalen van de winnende kandidaat eenvoudig is; bijvoorbeeld
wanneer elke stemmer dezelfde kandidaat boven alle andere verkiest. Een dergelijke ‘una-
nieme winnaar’ zal in de realiteit jammer genoeg slechts zelden aanwezig zijn. Wanneer
(meer dan) de helft van alle stemmers dezelfde kandidaat boven alle anderen verkiest
hebben we een (strikte) meerderheid kandidaat. Het spreekt vanzelf dat ook de aan-
wezigheid van een meerderheid kandidaat niet verzekerd is. Condorcet, die enkel de paars-
gewijze preferentie relatie beschouwde, suggereerde een zwakkere voorwaarde voor een
meerderheid kandidaat: de Condorcet winnaar is een kandidaat die door meer dan de helft
van de stemmers boven elke andere kandidaat verkozen wordt. Jammer genoeg is ook het
bestaan van een dergelijke kandidaat niet verzekerd, aangezien er een cykel kan optreden,
waarbij de Condorcet meerderheid relatie niet transitief blijkt te zijn. Aangezien dit kan
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optreden zelfs wanneer elke stemmer zelf transitiviteit respecteert, wordt dit al een para-
dox beschouwd. Een Borda winnaar, een kandidaat die de grootste Borda score behaald,
is wel steeds aanwezig. In dit hoofdstuk introduceren we twee nieuwe types winnaars: De
(quasi)positionele winnaar en de paarsgewijze winnaar. De aanwezigheid van deze twee
winnaars zal volstaan om Borda en Condorcet eindelijk met elkaar te verzoenen: Wanneer
deze twee tegelijkertijd aanwezig zijn, zullen de Borda en de Condorcet winnaar een en
dezelfde zijn.
In Hoofdstuk 10 passen we de methodologie¨n uit de vorige hoofdstukken toe op enkele
problemen uit de praktijk. Presidentsverkiezingen (social choice), rangschikking van be-
heersplannen (meervoudige criteria analyse) and zoektocht naar consensus in een groep ex-
perts (groepsbeslissing technieken) zijn enkele van de mogelijke grootschalige toepassingen.
Eigenlijk is elke dagdagelijkse beslissing waar meer dan een criterium of oordeel in reken-
ing gebracht wordt, een potentie¨le toepassing. In deze thesis behandelen we voorbeelden
uit een ecosysteem beheersprobleem in Iran, een milieugerelateerd beslissingsprobleem in
Argentinie¨ en een consumenten preferentie analyse toepassing in Belgie¨.
Hoofdstuk 11 ten slotte bevat de conclusies en een blik vooruit naar potentieel verder
onderzoek.
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